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Most of the groups and individuals affected by the behavior of
American public corporations do not have a voice in their governance. Just
as governments retreat from regulating these entities, whether by political
choice or as a result of globalization and regulatory arbitrage,1
stakeholders' 2  ability to shape corporate behavior themselves remains
weak. Government empowers only one corporate stakeholder group-
employees-to bargain with corporations for terms in their own interest.
1. See Eugene D. Genovese, Secularism in the General Crisis of Capitalism, 42 AM. J. JURIS.
195, 202 (1997) (multinational corporations are coming to control the "world economy, over which.,..
centralized national governments have less and less control."); Larry CatA Backer, Multinational
Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nations ' Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 37 CoLUM.
HuM. RTS. L. REv. 287, 290 (2006). Backer goes on to note that:
[t]he problem of corporate regulation shows the evolution of the transnational-
that is, the transformation of a regulatory issue from one exclusively centered
within the nation-state (the 'problem' of corporate social responsibility), to one
involving three actors: nation-states, international public law institutions, and
private law actors (transnational corporations) and institutions (associations of
private or transnational civil society actors).
Id. at 294. See also, generally Halina Ward, The Interface between Globalisation, Corporate
Responsibility, and the Legal Profession, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 813-20 (2004) (noting that the
processes of economic and technological globalisation have included significant shifts in the balance of
public and private sector responsibilities around the world resulting in governments intituting policies
that attract business and encourage regulatory arbitrage); Ilias Bantekas, Corporate Social
Responsibility in International Law, 22 B.U. INT'L L.J. 309, 325 (2004) ("with the exception of bribery
and tax evasion, most matters pertinent to MNE operations outside the host State are not subject to
extraterritorial legislation"); see also Larry Cata Backer, The Autonomous Global Corporation: on the
Role of Organizational Law Beyond Asset Partitioning and Legal Personality, 41 TULSA L. REv. 541,
543-44 (2006) ("The character of law as an exogenous force is increasingly belied by an emerging
global economic system in which many have suggested 'no one is in charge.' In a globalizing world,
the territorial principle produces a perverse effect-limiting, rather than expanding, the importance of
law as a force in the regulation of economic enterprises or of those with an interest in them").
2. "Stakeholders" is a term that traditionally refers to those individuals, other than shareholders,
who have a stake in the success of a corporation, e.g., labor, creditors, consumers and the surrounding
community. See generally Lawrence Mitchell, A Theoretical Framework for Enforcing Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 70 TEXAS L. REV. 579 (1992).
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Unions represent a mere fourteen percent of American workers -and a
paltry eight percent of private sector employees.4 Meanwhile, the law
affords but one group of corporate stakeholders, e.g., shareholders, any
rights in a corporation's internal governance.5 Those rights, in turn, remain
limited.6 In fact, the force most influential on corporate decision-making is
arguably the so-called market for corporate control, whereby directors will
endeavor to keep stock prices inflated to avoid takeover bids and keep their
jobs (and perhaps to take the best advantage of their stock options).
As a consequence of this corporate law regime, a board of directors is
often beholden to short-term stock prices, usually at the expense of other
stakeholder interests. Thus, the corporation exists as an amalgamation of
private interests controlled almost exclusively by a board of directors,
wielding the wealth and power of a multinational, yet nevertheless enjoying
the rights and liberties afforded individual citizens.' Faced with the waning
power of sovereign governments and deregulation, stakeholders are left
with relatively few defenses against abuses of corporate power.8
In contrast, the governance of public corporations in continental
European countries forces those corporations to embrace more obligations
to their stakeholders.' For example, in Germany, not only must public
3. Viet D. Dinh, Codetermination and Corporate Governance in a Multinational Business
Enterprise, 24 J. CORP. L. 975, 977 (1999) (union membership fell from 40% of the work force to less
than 14%, a level below that existing before the Wagner Act was passed).
4. Cynthia Estlund, Who Mops the Floors at the Fortune 500? Corporate Self Regulation and the
Low-Wage Workplace, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 671, 678 (2008). The New York Times, on
December 21, 2010, reported that private sector worker unionization had dropped to 7.2% Steven
Greenhouse, U.S. Proposes Posted Notice of the Right to Unionize, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 12/22/business/221abor.html? lr-&refbusiness.
5. See, e.g., Dinh, supra note 3, at 976 ("The dominance of the contractarian paradigm focused
the attention of corporate law scholars for a decade or so on explaining, refining, or challenging the
notion the maximizing shareholder value is the most efficient form of corporate governance because it
allocates resources efficiently and thereby maximizes social welfare . . . . For the most part, American
corporate law scholars have scantly examined the reasons for the implications of worker participation in
the governance of corporations."). These theories of corporate governance in American academia, and
their failure to address stakeholder interests, are discussed in more detail infra.
6. Discussed briefly, infra.
7. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 906 (2010) (First
Amendment rights afforded to corporations); but see Scott A. Trainor, A Comparative Analysis of a
Corporation's Right Against Self Incrimination, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 2139, 2167-68 (1995) (right
against self-incrimination not afforded to corporations in the United States).
8. See Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of "Global" Convergence in
Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 321, 326 (2001) ("[T]raditional forms of corporate
governance, which respond to the Berle-Means separation of ownership from control and the ensuing
agency cost problem, simply are not responsive to the problems the growth of large multinationals
portend. Worker exploitation, degradation of the environment, economic imperialism, regulatory
arbitrage, and plantation production efforts by the growing stable of gargantuan multinationals, whose
power exceeds that of most nation states, is far higher on the global agenda than is convergence in
governance.").
9. See Sanford M. Jacoby, Corporate Governance in Comparative Perspective: Prospects jbr
Convergence, 22 COMP'. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 5, 6 (2000) ("[I]t's possible to identify two distinctive
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corporations support social safety net programs, they must also incorporate
worker viewpoints into their decision-making. Half of their supervisory
boards must seat worker representatives, and unions are powerful and
institutionalized.'0 Company shares are held en masse by long-term
captured investors: banks, other companies, and wealthy families." As a
result, German public companies orient themselves more towards long-
term strategies that are better suited to serve all their stakeholders,
including their employees and the surrounding economy. In comparison to
their American counterparts, they are viewed as public and political entities
serving larger social interests.
Given the lessening role of the state in protecting stakeholders, many
progressive advocates seek to incorporate stakeholder protections into the
American corporate governance regime.' 2 These advocates often look to
the German example for reforms. Yet, the wholesale adoption of the
German form of corporate governance in America is unrealistic. For
reasons explained later in this paper, Germany's corporate governance
model is a product of its unique political and economic history. It is also
anathema to popular academic, political, and economic thinking in
America." Moreover, Germany itself faces pressures to harmonize its
corporate governance laws with those found in Anglo-American regimes,
both to accommodate its membership in the European Union and to attract
foreign minority investors.
A study of stakeholder-oriented corporate governance systems, like
that of Germany, may nevertheless prove useful. It suggests another kind
of corporate governance model, one that integrates stakeholders in
corporate decision-making while accommodating the shareholder-centric
patterns [of corporate governance] among the advanced industrial countries. First, there is the
'shareholder' system, which also goes by such names as the Anglo-American system, the market-
outsider system, or simply stock market capitalism. The other is the 'stakeholder" system, which has
also been called the relational-insider system, the dedicated-capital system, and welfare capitalism.
This is the model that prevails in Germany, Japan and some other countries.").
10. E.g., Sanford M. Jacoby, Corporate Governance in Comparative Perspective: Prospects for
Convergence, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 5, 6-7 (2000).
11. Id.
12. See Estlund, supra note 4, at 684 ("The single most important safeguard is effective
participation by stakeholders, those for whose benefit the relevant laws or social norms were chiefly
enacted."). For example, building in worker representation into a corporation's management structure
may preclude the need for exogenous labor law protections. See Martin Htpner, Corporate
Governance in Transition: Ten Empirical Findings on Shareholder Value and Industrial Relations in
Germany 32 (Max-Planck-Inst. for the Study of Societies, Working Paper No. 05/2001, Oct. 2001) (use
of works councils and codetermination in Germany reduces the role of labor law).
13. See John Armour, Simon Deakin, Viviana Mollica and Mathias Siems, Law and Financial
Development: What We Are Learning from Time-Series Evidence 5 (European Corporate Governance
Inst., Working Paper No. 148/2010, 2010) (the "legal origins" theory of corporate law explains that
meta-level rules, norms and practices, mechanisms for lawmaking and dispute resolution, and the
conception of the role of government in the economy and society influence financial and corporate
la w).
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model of the United States, namely, one that empowers corporate
stakeholders through their role as corporate stockholders. Stockholders,
already enjoying a foothold in American corporate governance, have the
best chance of any corporate stakeholder to influence corporate policy.
Indeed, the increasing prevalence of "activist" union pension fund investors
in Britain and, to a lesser extent, the United States, illustrates the growing
realization that public corporations need not only serve the bottom lines of
their short-term investors. Unable to influence corporate behavior directly,
workers and other stakeholders can, and increasingly do, attempt to change
corporate policy by throwing their weight around corporate boardrooms,
the halls of Congress, 14 and during bureaucratic rulemaking."
This paper will set forth an argument as to why the empowerment of
stakeholder investors presents the only currently viable means for
stakeholders to influence the behavior of the American public corporation.
It will accomplish its purpose by first exploring the history of the
corporation in America and the theories of the firm that describe the laws
and policies that govern them. Through this analysis, it will become clear
that, of the various interests that have power over corporate decision-
making, shareholders can best accommodate stakeholder interests. The
paper will then describe the history and policies underlying corporate
governance in Germany. The purpose here is to illustrate how stakeholder
interests can be represented in corporate management and decision-making.
Next, this paper will analyze corporate governance in the United Kingdom,
a regime that is similar to that found in the U.S., but, for reasons that will
be explained, is much more favorable to shareholders and therefore to
activist stakeholder-shareholders. This analysis will reveal that the
empowerment of stakeholder-shareholders can reform corporate
governance in the United States. The paper will conclude with an
inventory of the current status of stakeholder-shareholder involvement in
the governance of public corporations while suggesting some reforms.
I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AMERICA
In popular theory and practice, corporate governance in America is
almost always stated in terms of maximizing shareholder wealth.16 While
14. For example, the recently passed Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010 gives investors advisory "say on pay' and directed the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") to promulgate rules increasing their access to proxy machinery. Pub. L. No. 111-
203 § 951 (2010).
15. For example, new Rule 14a-1 1 on proxy access for director elections and amendments to Rule
14a-8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-I11(2011); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011) (allowing shareholders to include
in a company's proxy materials a proposal to amend the compdny's bylaws to provide fur proxy acccss)
(both currently stayed from enforcement pending litigation).
16. See, e.g., Dinh, supra note 3, at 976; Geoffrey Owen, Tom Kirchmaier & Jeremy Grant,
Introduction to CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE US AND EUROPE: WHERE ARE WE NOW?, 6-25, 6
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scholars often disagree as to the best method of such wealth maximization,
the goal itself is rarely disputed. Yet, the corporation was not always
understood in these terms." As such, it is possible to yet again re-define
the American corporation to accommodate stakeholder interests. To justify
and discover a worthwhile departure from the accepted thinking, a study of
history and theory is useful.
A. THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CORPORATION
The role played and the interests served by the public corporation in
America transformed several times over the past few centuries. While the
corporation began first as institution created specifically to serve
designated social functions, it eventually evolved into a private association
governed by a powerful board of directors enjoying a significant amount of
discretion and often burdened with the single-minded goal of maximizing
the wealth of its diversified shareholders. The modem corporation in
America, with its laissez-faire treatment of worker rights, reflects an
inherent faith in social mobility over plutocracy." Over the past few
decades, however, market and political pressures are again revolutionizing
the public corporation. Recent changes in corporate law and behavior
reflect a growing acceptance of corporate responsibility for public
welfare." This metamorphosis shows that stakeholder-friendly reforms can
indeed occur in America's political and social climate. It also shows that
such reforms will come most easily through the manipulation of the
shareholder-centric purpose of the public corporation.
1. Before General Incorporation
Before the passage of general incorporation laws, corporations in
America existed as specially chartered non-profit organizations, whose
special status depended upon their promise to provide some sort of public
function.20 The King of England, and later State governments, would grant
(Palgrave 2005) (explaining that "[t]he focus on shareholder value as the principal measure of a
company's performance was seen to be a powerful force for concentrating the minds of managers on
making their businesses more efficient and more profitable"); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668
(Mich. 1919) (a notorious case oft-studied in American law schools that holds that a corporation could
not cut prices to benefit consumers at the expense of shareholder dividends); and discussion infra.
17. See discussion infra.
18. Frank Rich, Who Will Stand Up to the Superrich?, N. Y. TIMES, November 14, 2010
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/14/opinion/14rich.html?hp.
19. In particular, the growing multi-nationalization of corporate enterprises highlights the need for
reforms, as business moves to countries with less exogenous protections for stakeholders. See, e.g.,
Branson, supra note 8, at 326.
20. Liam S~amus O' Melinn, Neither Contract Nor Concession: The Public Personality of the
Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 200, 216 (2006).
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special charters to schools, churches,21 and municipalities, 22 allowing such
organizations to act as legal persons, i.e., to own property and to enter into
binding contracts. As artificial entities granted life by virtue of the state,
they were subject to regulation by the state.23 Their special, nearly
government-like, status in society meant that such organizations served a
public purpose, and thus owed particular duties to the community. Their
"shareholders" were not owners of business assets, but instead members of
an already identifiable and socially meaningful group.24
The state would also grant charters for corporations serving an
economic purpose. Yet it granted corporate status only after negotiation,
and only after argument regarding the important public service that the
corporation would provide.25 Usually, the government would task the
corporation to fulfill a specific need of the state's economy, e.g., to build
bridges or roads. 26  The charters of these corporations were, therefore,
specifically tailored to the corporation's specific business function. Here,
too, the state would cede pieces of its sovereignty, endowing corporate
managers with powers usually reserved for government. 27
2. General Incorporation and the Separation of Ownership and Control
Later, as a result of politics and industrialization, the States enacted
general incorporation laws that permitted persons to incorporate without
any special permission or charter. 28  The promulgation of general
incorporation statutes, permitting the formation of corporations without
government consent, arguably arose as a result of American democratic and
individualistic values. Simply, special corporation charters smacked of
21. By affording the church corporate charters, the U.S. government could achieve separation of
church and state. "The corporation became a vehicle which, by exercising powers that had once
belonged exclusively to government, permitted government to get out of the business of religion." Liam
Sdamus O'Melinn, Neither Contract Nor Concession: The Public Personality oJ the Corporation, 74
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 200, 224 (2006).
22. Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics oJ Progressive Corporate Law, 151 U.
PA. L. REV. 1861, 1870 (2003) ("By comparing municipal associations to governments, courts were
able to impose checks on their powers, checks that were similar to the limits imposed on sovereign
powers."), O'Melinn, supra note 20, at 216-21. By allowing for the incorporation of municipalities,
the government could avoid taking on additional governance duties. It was, in a sense, a form of
outsourcing. See id., at 228. For a general discussion, see Joan C. Williams, The Invention of the
Municipal Corporation: A Case Study in Legal Change, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 369 (1985).
23. Tsuk, supra note 22, at 1870-71.
24. See O'Melinn, supra note 20, at 220 (a corporation had a "real" personality whose "existence
did not originate with the state" and which "in appropriate circumstances, could claim priority over the
state by virtue of its claim to represent the moral aspirations of its members").
25. E. Norman Veasey & Christine DiGuglielmo, History Inbfrms American Corporate Law: The
NecessI of Maintaining a Delicate Balance in the Federal "Ecosystem,' I VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201,
203 (2006).
2 6. Id.
27. O'Melinn, supra note 20, at 230.
28. Id at 232; THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE COMPANY 30 (Andrew Gamle et al. eds., 2000).
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favoritism and aristocracy.29 Indeed, this separation of the corporation
from the state comported with the common law tendency to shift allegiance
from a monarchy or sovereign and to place power in the hands of the
individual. 0
The dawn of the public corporation in America broke during its
industrial age." Political unrest bristled at the size, power, and behavior of
industries, often dominated by a few power players. The anti-business
sentiment culminated in the passage of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914,
which, among other things, forbade the kind of interlocking directorships
that enabled America's capitalistic elite to amass such wealth and power.32
As American industry came to rely less on this "capitalist class," corporate
finance increasingly came from a dispersed array of equity investors, 33 who
would place their wealth into the hands of specialized corporate
managers.34 At the same time, directors exploited the relatively weak voice
of stockholders by retaining eamings rather than distributing dividends,
thereby avoiding reliance on banks for their financing.35 The ensuing
growth in the size and prevalence of the business corporation in America,
as well as the accompanying dispersal of stock ownership, transformed the
American economy.
These changes prompted Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, in their
famous treatise, The Modern Corporation and Private Property,3 6 to
identify the negative implications of the concentration of so much public
power and wealth into the hands of a corporation's board of directors.37
29. O'Melinn, supra note 20, at 232-33.
30. See Jacoby, supra note 9, at 8.
3 1. See Mark S. Mizruchi & Daniel Hirshman, The Modern Corporation as a Social Construction,
33 SEATILE U. L. REv. 1065, 1072 (2010) ("[t]he large corporation emerged in the United States during
the period between 1870 and 1900," culminating with the U.S. Steel conglomerate, Standard Oil and
other industries controlled by J.P. Morgan and John Rockefeller).
32. Id. at 1073 (citing § 8 of the Clayton Act). This phenomenon perhaps helps explain the
different ownership structure found in Germany, characterized by many firm cross-holdings. See
discussion infra.
33. Liquid and diverse securities markets created a system of equity-based corporate finance.
Shareholders required such liquidity to induce them to invest in otherwise risky investments. Other
industrialized economies relied not on American-style equity financing, but instead on debt financing.
One such economy, Germany, is discussed infra.
34. See, e.g., MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 4 (1994); ALFRED CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE
MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 484-00 (1977) (examining the modem shift
toward managers running large corporations and its effect on the concentration in American industries).
35. Mizruchi & Hirshman, supra note 31, at 1075; 1089 (noting also that the Glass-Steagall Act,
by separating commercial and investment banks, prevented them from growing into serious providers of
financing). The banks, however, were not completely out of luck: they were well positioned to become
neutral intermediaries, i.e., the investment and underwriting banks common in America today. See id.
at 1090.
36. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
37. Id at 357-58 (the modern corporation "has brought a concentration of economic power which
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Surrendering control and responsibility over their investments, the
dispersion of shareholders created a new form of property, one over which
shareholders could claim ownership, but no control. 8 With this new form
of property, shareholders lost their ability, and interest in, attempting to
control firm policies, viewing their stocks as investments rather than as an
ownership stake in the firm.39 Berle and Means used this change to justify
the promulgation of a different kind of property law that accounted for
unique characteristics of dispersed stock ownership.40 Their solution was
to name a corporation's board of directors as the trustee of this new form of
property, to be governed for the benefit of both shareholders and the greater
community. 4 1
Berle and Means also recognized that the growth of the large public
company in America predated, for the most part, the consolidation of the
federal government's power.4 2  "[T]he United States was a country in
which big business emerged before big government." 4 3  Business, and not
government, controlled political and economic policy, at least up until the
New Deal era.44 And business did not take stakeholders' interests to heart.
Thus, Berle and Means, contrary to the conclusions drawn by much
modern scholarship, 45  did not seek only to protect shareholders.
Recognizing that the power wielded by the public corporation affected all
of society, the authors challenged political and economic scholars to begin
examining the corporation's role in society seriously, 46 and suggested that
the "corporation may have an obligation to serve those beyond its
stockholders." 47 While they observed that power of the corporation began
to resemble that of a sovereign state, 4 8 the authors relied upon shareholders
can compete on equal terms with the modern state" and might some day become "the dominant form of
social organization"); Mizruchi & Hirshman, supra note 31, at 1071 ("Berle and Means described the
separation of ownership and control with some degree of consternation. The increasing autonomy of
management led to a growing concentration of power in a relatively small group of individuals who
were potentially unaccountable to any external forces.").
38. Mizruchi & Hirshman, supra note 31, at 1068-69.
39. Id at 1070.
40. Tsuk, supra note 22, at 188.
41. Id. This theory of the corporation is discussed in a little more detail, infra.
42. See Mizruchi & Hirshman, supra note 31, at 1072-75 (Berle & Means wrote during the Great
Depression and before World War 11 and the New Deal, when the United States became an economic
power and when the government began to flex its regulatory power over industry); Id at 1085 ("Prior to
the Great Depression, the government played a relatively minor role in the American economy.").
43. Jacoby, supra note 9, at 9.
44. Id. at 9-10; Mizruchi & Hirshman, supra note 31, at 1072-73.
45. Discussed infra.
46. See Tsuk, supra note 22, at 1881 ("They exposed organizations, associations, and corporations
as loci both of individual self-government and of coercive power cloaked by liberal legal thought as
free contractual arrangements between individuals."); Mizruchi & Hirshman, supra note 31, at 1068-
70.
47. Mizruchi & Hirshman, supra note 31, at 1071.
48. Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th-Century American
Legal Thought, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 179, 188, 192 (2005) (corporations began to even look like
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to ensure boards of directors did not self-deal or shirk in their duties. "In
other words, only the owners (the shareholders) could channel corporate
power toward socially beneficial goals." 49  Thus, in a society rapidly
turning into a consumer society, Berle & Means sought to make
shareholders the foundation of the modem economic order.50
3. The Plight of Stakeholders: The New Deal, Union Politics, and
Welfare Capitalism
A modem economic order did, in a sense, finally emerge. Because of
the politics and legislation of the New Deal, the changes wreaked on
society by the growth of the modem public corporation did not devolve
into the kind of class warfare witnessed elsewhere in the industrialized
world." Rather, society relied upon unions to be the coequal and opposing
democratic force to the power of corporations as it affected worker
interests. Eventually, the government bowed out of the picture, allowing
labor and industry resolve their differences through collective bargaining.52
Following industrialization and the Great Depression, New Deal
policies, reflecting an acceptance of a certain degree of government
interference in the economy through fiscal policy, social safety nets,
collective bargaining, and securities regulation, tempered corporations'
influence in society." Given the perceived spectacular failure of laissez-
faire capitalism and the tragic impact of the Great Depression on the
American economy, such interference was seen as justified despite
America's embrace of a capitalistic economy.
governments, i.e., hierarchical, law-making and law-applying).
49. Tsuk, supra note 22, at 1872-73; see also id. at 1892 ("Having challenged managers'
willingness to assume social responsibilities, Berle put his faith in a new propertied class, a class that
was yet to be formed-the shareholders.").
50. Id.
51. See id at 1866.
52. See generally Jennifer Klein, The Politics of Economic Security: Employee Benefits and the
Privatization ofNew Deal Liberalism, 16 J. OF POL'Y HIST. 34 (2004), available at http://www.
yale.edu/history/ faculty/documents/PoliticsofEconomicSecurity.pdf.
53. Tsuk, supra note 44, at 194; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Innocent Shareholder: An Essay on
Compensation and Deterrence in Securities Class Action Lawsuits, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 243, 243 (200);
Klein, supra note 52, at 34 ("The New Deal was a watershed in American political culture and political
economy, establishing both a set of structural relationships between business, labor, and the state and a
set of ideological expectations that governed their interactions. As a result of New Deal legislation, the
national government, for example, would directly intervene in financial, agricultural, housing, energy,
and labor markets. The state entered the formerly insular employment realm and compelled employers
to pay minimum wages, old-age pensions, and unemployment compensation and to recognize unions
and maximum-hours restrictions."). See also Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate
Voting, 62 VAND. L. REiV. 129, 143 (2009) ("During the New Deal, Congress and the Roosevelt
Administration chose not to federalize state corporations codes but rather to supplement state law with
new federal rules, principally disclosure-based, where existing state law seemed inadequate.").
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The labor movement in the United States, approaching the climax of
its political power, pursued a legislative strategy that would federalize
worker protections. 4 Basing the legitimacy of their movement on New
Deal legislation,55 trade unionists lobbied for reforms that would mandate
56the provision of social safety programs to all citizens. At the same time, it
worked through its new powers of collective bargaining, granted by the
Wagner Act of 1935, to pressure employers into providing pension and
health benefits, hoping that the result would lay the bricks for national
legislation.5 ' Fearing further social welfare reforms, industry began to
select and provide employee benefits on its own initiative. In this way,
industry could keep the provision of benefits under its control while taking
the steam out of the unions' campaign for national health and retirement
protections.58
During World War II, the government interfered to facilitate this
emergent regime of welfare capitalism by mediating disputes and
sanctifying the contracts they formed, without labor input, with a
burgeoning health insurance and private pension industry. 60  War-time tax
breaks and the National War Labor Board ("NWLB") encouraged
corporations to adopt benefits programs before employees had a chance to
negotiate over their terms. 6 1 After the war, the turmoil of New Deal
politics, and during America's ascendency to economic power, the national
government retired from its role as mediator and left industry and labor to
hammer out their differences alone.62 Much of the country's social welfare
programs thus fell into the hands of corporate America.6 3 With those hands
on the wheel, business was "able to alter the role of the state in industrial
relations politics, and in fact to use it to sustain an increasingly insular,
54. Klein, supra note 52, at 35.
55. For example, the National Labor Relations Act (the "Wagner Act") and the Social Security
Act. See id at 35; Mizruchi & Hirshman, supra note 31, at 1087 (minimum wage rules, overtime pay,
restrictions on the use of child labor).
56. Klein, supra note 52, at 34, 36-40 (author recounts the history of various political campaigns
such as the American Federation of Labor's ("AFL") efforts to add disability and health insurance to
the Social Security Act). Id. at 38-39.
57. Id at 39, 46 ("Neither CIO nor AFL unionists intended to abandon their support for an
expanded welfare state, but they had the sense [of] a way in which labor could build on the
collective-bargaining regime fashioned by the NWLB and make it part of the broader politics of
security."); Estlund, supra note 4, at 677.
58. Klein, supra note 52, at 44; 50-51; Mizruchi & Hirshman, supra note 31, at 1087-89.
59. See Klein, supra ntoe 52, at 41-42 (The National War Labor Board, in a series of rulings, held
that "workers' rights would be based upon the specific language in a contract, and the contract would
function as a 'constitution' or 'a basic statute for the government of an industry or plant.... [And] the
board rarely ruled in the union's favor if the [benefits plan] had already been unilaterally implemented
by the employer.").
60. Id at 42-43.
61. Id at 35, 40-41, 48 (for employers, the unilateral purchase uf commercial gruup insurance
offered one key to containing union power and union political goals).
62. Id at 49; Mizruchi & Hirshman, supra note 31, at 1084.
63. See generally Klein, supra note 52.
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private, firm-centered definition of security."6 4  In a sense, by the 1950s,
these developments realized Berle and Means' goal that the modem public
corporation take responsibility for its stakeholders. 5
At least one scholar explains this phenomenon through the lens of
legal and political pluralism. During the early twentieth century,
politicians, jurists, and academics-perhaps as a compromise between
conservative liberal individualism and radical class-based Marxism-came
to define and discuss society in terms of group identities.6 6 These political
and legal pluralists were particularly interested in legitimizing labor unions
by couching them not in terms of class conflict, but rather as a "forum in
which individuals found meanings for their ideas and actions." 67  And
lawmakers, perhaps unwilling to upset the balance of power, relied upon
unions to protect the interests of labor.68 This view glossed over any class
conflict, transferring the debate to two competing, but equally legitimate,
interest groups. 69  It also left to shareholders the responsibility of curbing
any abuses of power exercised by corporate management. 70  This vision of
society, and interest group politics,7 ' thus facilitated a vision of corporate
governance that focused solely on management and investors-relegating
labor and work to other (waning) specializations of policy and
scholarship.72
A populist suspicion of concentrated financial power did, however,
manifest. But rather than focus on the growing wealth at the disposal of
corporate managers, it fell squarely on banks and financial institutions.73
Statutory restrictions on the size and operations of the country's banks
prevented them from becoming the dominant financial actors that they are
in other industrialized states.74 Therefore, for example, Americans' savings
64. Klein, supra note 52, at 36; Mizruchi & Hirshman, supra note 31, at 1084-85.
65. Mizruchi & Hirshman, supra note 31, at 1080.
66. Tsuk, supra note 22, at 1866.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1868 ("[V]iewing workers' interests as protected by their unions, scholars relied upon
other, less immutable social interests or classes, namely shareholders and managers, to tame corporate
power.").
69. Id. at 1877 ("[P]luralists did not single out the working class (or the proletariat). Rather, they
viewed all associations as important to individual development, and sought to encourage their
growth.").
70. Id at 1868, 1878 ("Instead of looking to workers to constrain corporations, corporate law
scholars, beginning in the 1930s, sought to limit corporate power by focusing, first, on other social
structures-on the classes of managers and shareholders-and then, on the norms of expertise,
efficiency, and wealth maximization.").
71. See Douglas G. Smith, A Comparative Analysis of the Proxy Machinery in Germany, Japan
and the United States: Implications for the Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 58 U.
PITT. L. REv. 145, 151 (1996) (citing MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS (1994)).
72. Tsuk, supra note 22, at 1868; 1875.
73. Jacoby, supra note 9, at 9.
74. Id (for example, the Glass-Steagall Act, eventually repealed in the 1 990s, prevented the
combination of both investment and commercial banking); Smith, supra note 71, at 152 ("Professor
Roe notes that these more centralized foreign structures [in Germany and Japan] would be illegal in the
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dropped directly into securities markets and not first through a financial
intermediary." At the same time, the dispersed character of corporations'
ownership structure appealed to populist notions."
The high regard for individualism and independence likewise
contributed to the formation of a corporate governance regime that
excluded stakeholders. The common-law view of ownership accepted
property rights as natural, unalienable, and not conditioned on the
performance of any social function. Therefore, shareholder ownership
rights were sacrosanct, even at the expense of stakeholder interests." It
certainly emphasized freedom of contract and the protection of private
property more than those countries with civil law roots, as such countries
tend to accept a more activist role for the state. 78  At the same time,
dispersed stock ownership appealed to the American democratic ideal.
Thus, this deep-seated American commitment to freedom of contract and
individual property rights" and individual property rights likely helped to
sculpt the role of the corporation in the new welfare capitalism.
Finally, the Taft-Hartley legislation, passed by Congress as an
amendment to the Wagner Act in 1947, allowed industry to split control of
workers' pension funds with employees, taking them out of the hands of
unions." Their voices muted, corporate stakeholders could not easily flex
their muscles in internal corporate governance by virtue as their role as
shareholders.82
United States. He discusses as examples of legal barriers preventing more concentrated ownership in
the United States various financial regulations including the Bank Holding Company Act, the Glass-
Steagall Act, and the McFadden Act that prevent the development of German or Japanese-style systems
in the United States." MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS 94-96, 98-99, 170-71).
75. Smith, supra note 71, at 152-53. This perhaps helps to explain the difference between
Germany's corporatist structure of finance and the capital-market finance of the United States. These
phenomena are discussed infra.
76. Id at 154 56.
77. See Ronald J. Columbo, Ownership, Limited: Reconciling Traditional and Progressive
Corporate Law Via and Aristotelian Understanding of Ownership, 34 J. CORP. L. 247, 260-62 (2008).
78. Armour et al., supra note 13, at 2. The authors go on to note that "[c]ommon law systems[,
e.g., the legal systems of the U.S., U.K., and Australia] have been found to have more dispersed share
ownership, more liquid and extensive capital markets, and more highly developed systems of private
credit, than civilian ones.' Id.
79. Mizruchi & Hirshman, supra note 31, at 1079.
80. Michael Gottesman, Wither Goest Labor Law: Law and Economics in the Workplace, 100
YALE L.J. 2767, 2767-68(1991).
81. Sec Klein, supra note 52, at 49.
82. This sheds light on why the trade unionist movement does not pursue activist investor
strategies in the United States as much as it does in Europe. Indeed, such American "activist investors"
are usually government employee pension funds.
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4. Liberalization ofRegulation and Globalization
During the 1980s and 1990s, America witnessed a partial reversion to
laissez-faire capitalism. As inflation surged, oil prices swelled, and the
economy fell into a deep recession in the 1970s, corporate America faced
increasing competition from abroad." Indeed, the ensuing trade
imbalances motivated President Nixon to abandon the Bretton Woods
agreement and unpeg international exchange rates from the U.S. dollar.8 4
With a government pliable after economic and political crisis, industry
convinced government to implement "supply-side" economics. The
government consequently attempted to jump-start the stagnating economy
not by raising consumer demand through fiscal policy," but instead by
increasing industry supply by decreasing the costs of doing business.
Corporate tax rates plummeted while free trade treaties multiplied and
government began deregulating.8 7 With the government out of the picture,
and with global economic pressures depressing wages and benefits,"
corporations gained concessions from unions during collective
bargaining.89 The federal government retreated from strict enforcement of
environmental and labor laws,90 union power waned,91 and employment
relationships became short-term and contingent. 92 With the world open to
83. Mizruchi & Hirshman, supra note 31, at 1096.
84. Id.
85. Commonly referred to as "Keynesian economics."
86. Mizruchi & Hirshman, supra note 31, at 1097-98.
87. For example, the repeal of the New Deal era Glass-Steagall Act and the deregulation of the
transportation, telecommunications, and utilities industries. See Estlund, supra note 4, at 679; see also
Mizruchi & Hirshman, supra note 31, at 1097-98.
88. For example, from 1979 to 2005, real hourly wages fell by 2.3% for workers in the bottom
10% of the labor market, while those of workers in the top 5% increased 33%. Estlund, supra note 4, at
672. See also id. at 679 ("Transnational mobility of goods and some services means that many
domestic producers face more competition from low-wage regions."). For a thorough discussion, see
generally Katherine V.W. Stone, In the Shadow of Globalization: Changing Firm-Level Employment
Practices and Shfting Economic Risks in the United States (U.C.L.A. Law School, Research Paper No.
07-13, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1023696. The author notes, for example, that
increased labor and product market competition drives employers to seek flexibility to hire and fire on
notice and to retain workers on an as-needed basis. This puts substantial pressure on historical labor
law regimes. Id. at 2. See also Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age, 2
HARv. L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 3-5 (2008).
89. Klein, supra note 52, at 34, 52 ("As the state receded, not only did organized labor lack the
power at the bargaining table to translate private plans into secure workers' rights. By the mid-1950s,
Democratic liberals had neither the ideological commitment nor the political weight to use the state to
recast private plans as matters of public security and public interest."). The author then posits that the
power of unions waned even further as a result of Cold War red-scares and corruption scandals. Id. at
52-53. Then, "[i]n the 1970s, the tables turned and bargaining started going in the other direction;
bargaining for security became a downward spiral of concessions and losses." Id at 57; Mizruchi &
Hirshman, supra note 31, at 1098.
90. Mizruchi & Hirshman, supra note 31, at 1098.
91. Estlund, supra note 4, at 680.
92. E.g., Stone, supra note 88, at 7-9 (describing the change from long-term, paternalistic and
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new and cheaper labor markets in countries without expensive exogenous
regulations, American corporations would move shop, leaving American
stakeholders behind with their hands empty."
Through this deregulation and the relative absence of the state in
providing social security mechanisms and in mediating labor-industry
disputes, the public corporation came to resemble less a public entity with
special duties and responsibilities to society, and more like a private
institution enjoying the benefits traditionally enjoyed by private individual
citizens 94-without many of their responsibilities." As the conservative
American political discourse concentrated on the privatization of social
security, healthcare, and worker pensions-and the pruning of government
power in general-the corporation as an expression of private economic
power became a paradigm of the new political and economic order. Thus,
perhaps ironically, the suspicion of conglomerations of power in the hands
of the few, most often cast upon governments, enhanced the same kind of
conglomeration of power into the hands of a few corporate boards.
5. International Capital Markets and Shareholder Primacy
While the twentieth century saw the nationalization of the public
corporation, the twenty-first century bears witness to its
internationalization. The elimination of barriers to capital markets, along
with privatization of national enterprises and pensions, yielded a new breed
of investors with never-before-seen influence on capital markets and,
therefore, corporate decision-making.9 6 Many of these investors clamored
for profits, i.e., short-term increases in share price." Flooding the world's
burgeoning securities markets, these investors are often institutional and
managed by intermediaries who do not necessarily share the same values as
the companies in which they invest. Indeed, they often do not share the
same values as the beneficiaries on whose behalf they invest-many of
whom are themselves, ironically, corporate stakeholders.9 8 An increasingly
structured relations to the new "flexible labor market"). In 2005, more than 12% of the American work
force was either an independent contractor, working from home or at the employer's premises, or as an
on-call employee working on an as-needed basis. Stone, supra note 88, at 10 (citing a Department of
Labor report). These workers, even though they may perform similar work as "regular" employees,
face significantly less pay, reduced benefits, and very limited rights under federal labor laws. Id.
93. See supra note 1; Stone, supra note 88, at 12-13 (describing reduction in pay, benefits, and job
security as a result of global product market competition).
94. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
95. For example, corporations enjoy limited liability for the injuries they may cause and special
protections under bankruptcy laws not afforded to individuals. They also enjoy lesser tax rates.
96. See Leo E. Strine, Towards Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared
interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L.
1, 4(2007).
97. Id at 13.
98. See id. at 4-5. The result is somewhat perverse; a union pension fund managing the retirement
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active hostile takeover market, prompted by stagnating securities markets
in the 1970s, likewise turned directors' attention from long-term growth to
their short-term job security, and, therefore, short-term stock prices.99
Corporate managers, also aware that unhappy investors could move their
money abroad and into to the budding global capital markets, would work
hard to keep their stockholders happy. 00
These powerful and wealthy institutional investors, having enough
equity interest to make exit difficult,o'0 began a campaign of "shareholder
activism" that pressured corporate management and governments 02 to
adopt policies favoring "shareholder value," i.e., a principle that anoints the
maximization of shareholder wealth as the primary purpose of corporate
life.'o They bring their financial leverage and voting power to bear against
underperforming corporate boards by waging proxy campaigns against
underperforming management and by selling their shares, thus placing
downward pressure on stock price and exposing the company to hostile
takeover. 104
Having to appease shareholders that clamor for higher returns on their
investments, boards have less discretion105 to make decisions that protect
stakeholders by pursing long-term growth strategies.' 6 Adding to the
investments of workers may pressure the employer for unhealthy, short term profits-pressure that may
ultimately result in layoffs, outsourcing, or worse. See Ronald J. Gilson, Leo Strine's Third Way:
Responding to Agency Capitalism, 33 J. CoRP. L. 47, 47-48 (2007); Simon Deakin, Squaring the
Circle: Shareholder Value and Corporate Social Responsibility in the UK, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 976,
977 (2002).
99. Mizruchi & Hirshman, supra note 31, at 1100.
100. Estlund, supra note 4, at 679.
101. Mizruchi & Hirshman, supra note 31, at 1101 (describing the "Wall Street Rule"-where
investors prefer to sell their shares in a poorly performing company rather than influence governance).
102. This pressure is made most manifest by the Dodd-Frank Act that affords shareholders greater
rights in the management of corporate affairs including, e.g., proxy access reform and "say on pay"
measures. Pub. L. No. 111-203 § § 951, 971.
103. See, e.g., Peer Zumbansen, Varieties of Capitalism and the Learning Firm: Contemporary
Developments in EU and German Company Law-A Comment on the Strine-Bainbridge Debate about
Shared Values of Corporate Management and Labor 5, 9 (York University Osgoode Hall Law School
CLPE Research Paper 21/2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstractid=1002680 (noting that
globalization of capital markets and the privatization of pension funds increases pressure on stakeholder
models of corporate governance).
104. See, e.g., Scheherazade S. Rehman, Can Financial Institutional Investors Legally Safeguard
American Stockholders?, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 683, 692 (management's "[flailure to [maximize
shareholder value] is quickly reflected by declining share prices in the deep and liquid capital markets.
Thus failure is generally visible, and either the shareholders, through voting at the annual meeting, or
the Board of Directors, by chastising or replacing management, attempt to correct problems as they
arise.").
105. See Backer, supra note 1, at 553 (noting, for example, that Delaware law allows directors to
resist tender offers even if offering a high share price). Although the familiar "business judgment rule"
protects most management decisions-including those to protect stakeholders-it affords a weak
defense indeed against institutional shareholders bent on removing management in proxy contests. See
Strine, supra note 96, at 5.
106. The point presumes, of course, that management is interested in preserving long-term corporate
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pressure, executive compensation schemes tied to profits and stock options
serve to align managements' interests with those of investors. 0 7 Quarterly
financial reporting requirements, in addition, focused management not on
long-term sustainable growth, but short-swing profits.' Simply, although
management, labor and other stakeholders may enjoy a common interest in
the long-term sustainability of corporations, their shareholders may not.'"
As a result, corporate boards began to make increasingly short-term
decisions that proved ruinous not only for the long-term survival of
companies themselves, but also for their employees, creditors, suppliers
and other stakeholders.'o Gone is the insulated, isolated pocket of power
once afforded boards of directors that enabled them, in the post-War era, to
health. Certainly, management desires to ensure that the employer cutting its paychecks survives into
the future. And many might argue that management runs adrift of the pursuit of long-term
sustainability only when improperly incentivized, i.e., when they hold stock options that, like
shareholder activists, reward them for short-term profits. Still, many shareholders, especially pension
fund investors, will pressure management to be more socially responsible. See discussion of SRI intfa
pp. 1 17-20.
107. See Rehman, supra note 104, at 692. For a discussion of alternative compensation plans that
could encourage long-term thinking, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term
PerJbrmance, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915 (2009).
108. Strine, supra note 96, at 16 (quarterly statements cause directors to "manage to markets'
instead of focusing on long-term plans for growth).
109. See id. at 3 ("1 accept as a reality that management and labor now derive much more of their
economic wealth than they used to from the equity they own in the corporations for whom they toil and
the stock market more generally. Therefore, both management and labor share an interest in the vitality
of Amenican equity markets. At the same time, I also accept the notion that most American workers
obtain the bulk of their wealth from their labor and that even most top American managers can trace
their wealth (including the equity they have accumulated) to their labor as executives. Therefore, both
management and labor might be thought to have more concern than trust fund babies or investment
bankers do for the continued ability of American corporations to support dorestic employment."). A
particularly striking example is the "golden parachute" afforded to Don Blankenship, the notorious
masthead of Massey Energy, following the mining disaster in West Virginia that killed 29 miners.
Shareholders bristled at the retirement package that Blankenship would be awarded upon his well-
deserved ouster: $2.7 million, a free house for life, millions more in deferred compensation, and a
'salary continuation retirement benefit' of $18,241-a-month that will continue for 10 years after his
departure at the end of the year. See Matthew Mosk, Critics Say W. Va. Coal Boss Will Get Golden
Parachute, ABC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/golden-parachute-don-blankenship-
massey-energy/story?id= 12333677&tqkw-&tqshow-. The tension among the corporation's
stakeholders, here, its workers who need a better boss, and its shareholders, upset at the impact of the
golden parachute on the company's bottom line, is palpable.
This does not mean that generating wealth for shareholders is necessarily a bad thing. "The major
strengths of the system are its flexibility, transparency and accountability, enabling corporate managers
rapidly to respond to competitive challenges and shareholder demands." However, "[i]ts disadvantage
are the limited influence of stakeholders other than shareholders and the income and wealth gap
between managers and workers on the one hand and shareholders and the rest of society on the other
hand." Rehman,supranote 104, at 692.
I 10. It may, for example, drive boards to conduct the rvgulatury arbitrage, shedding Ilcl jobs and
moving to low-rent districts. See Strine, supra note 96, at 5. Also familiar are the accounting
shenanigans leading to the doom of Enron and other notorious corporations. Many blame such bad
behavior on the pressure brought on executives by investors hungry for quarterly profits.
324 Vol. 7:2
STAKEllOLDER-SHAREHOLDER THEORY
bargain with unions and to provide security benefits at their own
discretion."'
6 Socially Responsible Investment and Corporate Social Responsibility
With liberalization and globalization came a reactionary movement,
still in its relative infancy. Proponents of corporate social responsibility
("CSR"), wishing to encourage corporations to respect human rights and
the environment, began creating guidelines for corporate management that
protected communities and corporate stakeholders.112 At the same time,
certain institutional investors began seeking out investment opportunities in
corporations that embraced such policies. Accordingly, a socially
responsible investment ("SRI") movement began.
Most popular in the U.K. and Europe,113 CSR is supported by many
sovereign governments who often either encourage or mandate CSR
reporting.114 In the U.S., traditionally only academia embraced CSR."'
111. Mizruchi & Hirshman, supra note 31, at 1103.
112. See generally, e.g., CSR EUROPE, A GUIDE TO CSR IN EUROPE: COUNTRY INSIGHTS BY CSR 2
(Oct. 2009) (observing, for example, that "growing attention is being paid to the voluntary actions that
companies take as part of their CSR strategies to manage their economic, social and environmental
impacts and to contribute to the wider societal development") [hereinafter CSR EUROPE] available at
http://www.csreurope.org/data/files/20091012_a guide to csr in-europe final.pdf; Tom Zeller, Jr.,
Can Business Do the Job All By Itseff, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/29/business/energy-environment/29green.html?pagewanted=1; Ward,
supra note 1, at 815 (the current CSR movement arose in the 1990s alongside globalization and free
trade movements); Bantekas, supra note 1, at 339 ("CSR is founded on the reasoning that the company
owes duties not only to its shareholders but also to its stakeholders"); Sol Picciotto, Rights,
Responsibilities and Regulation of International Business, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 131, 139
(2003).
113. Technically, CSR as a voluntary principle of governance is most popular in the U.K. Other
European countries already have stakeholder protection regulations built into their corporate
governance laws. See, e.g., Cynthia Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The
Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 493, 498-99
(2005). Bantekas, supra note 1, at 320 ("The involvement of the E.U. with CSR commenced in 1995
with the signing of the European Business Declaration against Social Exclusion between the
Commission and a group of business leaders. In March 2000, at the Lisbon European Council Summit,
E.U. leaders made a special appeal to companies' corporate sense of social responsibility regarding best
practices on lifelong learning, work organisation, equal opportunities, social inclusion and sustainable
development. The publication of the Commission's CSR Green Paper in 2001 resulted in a consultation
process with more than 250 organizations and individuals, leading to the release of an official E.U.
strategy document on CSR in July 2002.") (internal quotation omitted); see also Deakin, supra note 98,
at 985; Aaron Einhorn, The Evolution and Endpoint of Responsibility: The FCPA, SOX Socialist-
Oriented Governments, Gratuitous Promises, and a Novel CSR Code, 35 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
509, at 534 ("The stakeholder governance style of European companies, under which corporations
consider relationships with employees, consumers, and the environment when making decisions, has
made Europe a natural leader in [the CSR development process]").
114. E.g., CSR EUROPE, supra note 113, at 4. 15, 58 (noting, e.g., that in Austria, CSR reporting is
endorsed by the government but is not yet mandatory; that in France, company reporting on social and
environmental responsibility has been mandatory, in some form or another, since 1977; and that in the
U.K., the Brown administration appointed a CSR minister that will be issuing reporting guidance);
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However, more and more U.S. companies now recognize that adopting
CSR policies helps maintain and enhance their brand names, attract
customers, and avoid bad press and costly regulation."' Also a growing
trend, the U.S. government takes measures to advocate CSR."' Various
Williams & Conley, supra note 113, at 497 ("In some countries ... there are newly promulgated legal
mandates that require the disclosure of much more information about social and environmental risks . . .
[the laws of] European Union ("EU"), France, and the UK [are] illustrative of the types of rules being
promulgated and contrast those with the more limited requirements for social and environmental
disclosure in the United States); id. at499 ("On May 5, 2004. . the British government introduced draft
regulations that will require 1290 British-based companies listed on the London Stock Exchange
("LSE"), the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), or NASDAQ to publish an annual Operating and
Financial Review and Directors Report ("OFR") [that] require[s] companies to identify material
social and environmental risks and to disclose information about those risks"); id. at 508 ("In its May
15, 2001 Communication on the EU Strategy for Sustainable Development, the Commission "invited"
companies with 500 employees or more to publish a triple-bottom-line report in their annual report to
shareholders. At that time, the Commission also adopted Recommendation 2001/453/EC on the
recognition, measurement, and disclosure of environmental issues in annual reports and financial
accounts."); Bantekas, supra note 1, at 326-27 (describing mandatory disclosure rules in France and the
U.K.); Aaron A. Dhir, Moving Forward with Corporate Environmental, Social and Governance
Disclosure in Canada, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL
REGULATION (Sept. 19, 2010), http://blogs.law.harvard.educorpgov/2010/09/19/moving-forward-with-
corporate-environmental-social-and-governance-disclosure-in-canada.
Triple bottom line reporting is becoming more popular in the U.S., with even the SEC entering the mix.
See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 17 C.F.R. Parts 211, 231
and 241 (Feb. 8, 2010) (the SEC promulgates guidance on the advisability of reporting on
environmental and climate change risks created by the issuer).
The CSR reporting movement came in tandem with the monitoring and disclosure movement arising
after the Enron scandals and manifested most famously in the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002. "The grounding for this approach has been a normative assumption that the government's power
to demand disclosure is broader than any narrowly focused requirement for shareholder wealth
maximization." Larry Cata Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law. The United
Nations 'Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate
Social Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 304 (2006); see also
Williams & Conley, supra note 113, at 509.
115. Backer, supra note 114, at 298 ("In contrast to the American bench and Bar, American
academics, increasingly joined by others outside the United States, continued to debate, with greater or
lesser intensity, the foundations of a corporation's responsibilities beyond a simple primary obligation
to investors"); Williams & Conley, supra note 113, at 499.
116. See, e.g., Adelle Blackett, Global Governance: Legal Pluralism and the Decentralized State: a
Labor Law Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 401, 401-02
(2001) ("[C]orporate actors, through their own codes of corporate conduct, publicize to consumers that
they are acting voluntarily to ensure that workers in their global production chain enjoy certain rights.
In both cases, these initiatives purport to contribute to improved regulation of the workplace.");
Bantekas, supra note 1, at 337 (also noting that as of 2002, about 45% of the Global Fortune Top
companies produce environmental, social, or sustainability reports in addition to financial reports);
Picciotto, supra note 112, at 139-42 (also giving specific examples of MNE scandals); Zeller, supra
note 112; Bantekas, supra note 1, at 336.
This movement is reminiscent of the movement towards welfare capitalism, whereby industry undercut
the union movement by providing social welfare benefits on its own terms. See discussion supra.
1 17. For example, the U.S. recently endorsed, with the U.K., the Voluntary Principles on Security
and Human Rights. Einhorn, supra note 113, at 535. The SEC also issued reporting guidance that
encourages companies to assess their impact on global climate change and mandates disclosure of
'"conflict minerals." See 17 C.F.R. Parts 211, 231 and 241 (Feb. 8, 2010); Conflict Minerals, 75 Fed.
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private-sector and nongovernmental organizations also promote the CSR
movement, publishing guidelines for CSR reporting standards that include,
for example, recommendations that companies disclose how they
incorporate the interests of corporate stakeholders into their decision-
making." Intergovernmental organizations likewise promote CSR
initiatives. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD"),"9 for example, published guidelines for multinational
enterprises aimed at protecting human rights.' 20 Such instruments provide
both political pressures on corporations to adopt CSR initiatives as well as
guidance on how to implement such reforms.
SRI is also growing more popular, "with the mainstream investment
community now recognizing that effective management social and
environmental risks are a core business value with a compelling business
rationale."' 2 ' Many U.S. institutional investors, recognizing that "doing
good also increases shareholder value," 22 pressure the boards of the
Reg. 80948, Exchange Act Release No. 63547 (proposed Dec. 15, 2010).
118. For example, the Global Reporting Initiative, formed in 1997-98 as a partnership between a
Boston-based non-profit, CERES and the United Nations Environmental Program, published
sustainability reporting guidelines in 2006 (the "G3 Guidelines") that include a provision on how the
company incorporates stakeholder interests into its business decisions. The G3 Guidelines, before they
were adopted, were released for public comment and subseqently received 270 responses. See G3
Online, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/G3
Online/ (last visited March 15, 2011).
119. The OECD began as a vehicle through which to implement the Marshall Plan following World
War II. Existing in its current form since 1962, the OECD serves as a "forum for intergovernmental
policy making to manage globalization." See TRADE UNION ADVISORY COMM., THE OECD PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2 (Oct. 2004), available at http://www.tuac.org/en/public/e-
docs/00/00/01/OB/document doc.phtml. Member countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.
ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: REFORM AND ExiT STRATEGIES
(Sept. 2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/20/0,3343,en_ 2649 34813 43726868
1 1_1_37467,00.html [hereinafter OECD THE FINANCIAL CRISIS].
"The policies adopted by the OECD are not binding per se, but a review and compliance
process tends to promote a convergence of policies or at least, 'a more concrete definition of
obligations.' One of the principal functions of the OECD is to facilitate the flow of information among
its members. As one commentator put it, 'the supply of information is the most important element: all
concerned emphasize the value of a regular exchange of data."' Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel
Wolff, Fragile Nature of International Securities Regulation, 10 INT'L CAP. MARKETS & SEC. REG
§1; 81 (Nov 2009).
120. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,3746,en_2649-34889_2397532
1 1_1_1,00.html; see Christopher N. Franciose, Sharpening the Cutting Edge of the United States'
Implementation of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMPL. L.
REV. 223,226-27 (2007).
121. DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS, ENTERPRISE AND REGULATOR REFORM, CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 11 (2008), available at http://www.berr.gov.uk/flles/file50312.pdf
[hereinafter BERR Report].
122. See, e.g., Zeller, supra note 112; INT'L CORP. Gov. NETWORK, STATEMENT OF PRINCiPLES ON
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companies in which they invest to adopt CSR.123 They also actively seek
out CSR companies in which to invest.' 24
These trends show that the public conception of the corporation
increasingly accommodates the idea that corporations are entities with
duties and responsibilities to the communities their behavior impacts. As
such, they are, and should be, more than an accident of the free market.' 25
Rather, they are increasingly seen as centers of power that must answer to a
variety of constituent interests.
7. Conclusions
Over the course of American history, the corporation transformed
from a creature of the sovereign government serving public purposes into
privately ordered individual business interests. Corporations became
entities of immense economic and political power that afford boards of
directors and corporate executives largely unfettered discretion to govern as
they see fit, subject only to market pressures and the agitations of activist
shareholders. Much of the social welfare system was left in into corporate
hands, which, as a result of globalization, market pressures, and politics,
INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER RESPONSIBILITIES 10 14.3 (2007) ("Shareholder rights should always
be exercised with the objective of delivering sustainable and growing value in mind") [hereinafter
ICGN Statement]. The International Corporate Governance Network is "a not-for-profit body, founded
in 1995 that has evolved into a global membership organisation of more than 500 leaders in corporate
governance. Its members are based in 38 countries from around the world, and include professionals,
corporations, policy makers and institutional investors with capital under management in excess of $US
10 trillion." Id at 2. The ICGN Statement is well-recognized by the institutional investor community.
See DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS, OECD STEERING GROUP ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CONCLUSIONS AND EMERGING
GOOD PRACTICES TO ENHANCE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRINCIPLES, 26 (Feb. 24 2010), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/62/44679170.pdf [hereinafter OECD STEERING GROUP].
123. Zeller, supra note 112 (observing, for example, that the Financial Times recently hosted a
conference for business representatives, sustainability professionals and investors with the goal of
putting more pressure on business to adopt CSR, and that insurance giant Lloyd's of London noted that
"[p]ressure is building on business to address the environmental impact of their operations .... Moves
by intergovernmental bodies and regulators suggest that they could soon be made more financially
accountable for the pollution they cause.").
124. See, e.g., CSR EUROPE, supra note 112, at 2; Hermes Equity Ownership Services ("Hermes
EOS"), Values and Value, HERMES FUND MANAGERS, available at http://www.hermes.co.uk/eos.aspx.
Hermes EOS, an institutional investor advisory service well known for its pro-SRI outlook, notes on its
website that it "aims always to represent to directors a shareholder's perspective on the company's
environmental, social and governance performance and to frame its discussions with companies in
terms of long-term Value creation. The stronger and more representative that shareholder voice, the
more effective it is likely to be." Id.
125. See Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate
Law, 102 YALE L.J. 2021, 2028 (1993) ("U.K. firms are not subject to the same type of ownership
restrictions as U.S. firms, yet they have dispersed stock ownership rather than the bank-dominated
governance structure of Germany. This difference may be an historical accident; that is, it may be due
to disparate industrial development in England and Germany in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries that led to the establishment of different financial institutions.").
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squeezed tight. Over the past few decades, however, the political climate
began to change, as corporations began to take more account of the impact
of their actions on their stakeholders. It is, therefore, realistic to expect that
the American public corporation can once again be bent by society to serve
some social purposes. And, given this historical interface between
corporate constituencies, it makes sense that corporate governance theory
should take account of stakeholders. As will be explained in the following
section, it certainly does.
B. THEORIES OF THE FIRM IN AMERICA
An examination of the legal, political and economic theories that
justify and explain the various permutations of the corporate identity
augment the understanding gained through the historical narrative of the
American corporation. It can provide insight into how or why such a
regime came about, and how it can or should be changed.
A review of current literature on the theories of corporate governance
popular in the United States reveals that "so much ideology is committed
and ink spent on comparatively so little; at stake is simply the definition of
the boundaries of the corporation's commitment to shareholder interests.
The debate does not challenge the core of that commitment."1 2 6  The
selection of shareholder value as the driving goal of corporate governance
arose because stock price "was seen to be a powerful force for
concentrating the minds of managers on making their business more
efficient and more profitable."1 27
Nevertheless, like the changing history of the role of the American
corporation in society, the theories justifying and explaining the
corporation governance regime are likewise beginning to take account of
stakeholder interests. 128  Indeed, the most popular corporate governance
theories can be divided into two categories: (1) those that are shareholder-
centric, involving propositions regarding how to best serve shareholder
interests; and (2) those that are stakeholder-centric, involving propositions
126. Dinh, supra note 3, at 983. The author goes on to note that "the primacy (as opposed to
exclusivity) of shareholder interests as the goal of the corporate enterprise is generally assumed in both
corporate jurisprudence and scholarship." Id.
127. Owen et al., supra note 16, at 6. Accordingly, much corporate governance literature uses stock
price as a proxy for firm (and therefore social) wealth. A common measurement is "Tobin's Q," a ratio
of the book and market value of a company's assets, which theoretically "captures the firm-specific
intangle assets such as 'good managers."' Ande Anne Anderson & Parveen Gupta, A Cross-Country
Comparison of Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Do Financial Structure and the Legal
System Matter?, J. CONTEMP. ACCT. & ECON. (forthcoming), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1417589.
128. See Branson, supra note 8, at 333 (citing recent scholarship advocating stakeholder models).
Branson later observes that most of the world's corporate governance regimes are stakeholder-based
models. Id at 346. Undoubtedly, the growing attention paid to comparative and international law
contributed to the growing acceptance of such models by American academics.
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on how to best serve the community of interests impacted by corporate
behavior. 129  As some scholars continue with the shareholder-stakeholder
debate, often talking past each other, others are finding ways to meld the
two paradigms. Notably, a review of their work reveals that a theory of
corporate governance that incorporates stakeholder interests by virtue of
their role as shareholders is not all that far-fetched or controversial. It is a
theory that takes advantage of a pro-shareholder paradigm already gripping
American academia and policy-makers.
A summary of these theories is set forth below.
1. The Public Corporation as Quasi-Sovereign
Before general incorporation, corporations existed by the grace of the
sovereign."3 Some scholars extrapolate this concept to create a
stakeholder-centric theory that justifies and explains the existence of the
corporation in American society. They see the corporation as an
extraordinary kind of person, a singular entity that transcends the myriad
contracts and relationships that form its internal structure.' 31 They define
corporations as social entities that assume the responsibilities traditionally
afforded to governments, and can exercise their powers justly or unjustly
just as a government might. 132  Historically, corporations were non-profit
organizations that could be viewed as "spores" of the U.S. government,
taking on roles it was unwilling or unable to assume. Corporations
represented churches, educational institutions, and municipal governments.
They looked and acted like governments.1'
As corporations transformed into economic institutions, their state-like
power over their constituents of society did not wane, but instead increased.
129. See, e.g., Dinh, supra note 3, at 985 ("Progressive-or perhaps more aptly, communitarian-
approaches emphasize the nature of the corporation as a distinct and separate entity which owes some
sort of obligation to those who are affected by its actions. The stakeholders in this corporate entity
include not only the various forms of capital (debt and equity) and labor (management and employees),
but also the immediate community, and indeed, the general society."); Peer Zumbansen & Daniel Saam,
The ECJ, Volkswagen and European Corporate Law: Reshaping the European Varieties of Capitalism,
Vol. 03 No. 06, York University Osgoode Hall Law School CLPE Research Paper 30/2007, 23 (2007)
(laws and regulations that address the mixed "public and private nature of the norms constituting [the
corporate governance regime]" are "unavoidably political").
130. Columbo, supra note 77, at 286.
131. O'Melinn, supra note 20, at 201. The author also argues that the privileges afforded
corporations are "seen most powerfully in the exercise of corporate sovereignty over noncontractors"
and therefore show "just how shallow is the language of the corporate contract how tenuous is the route
towards shareholder primacy." Id. at 206.
132. Some critics of modern corporation law view it as a mechanism that "ratifies, enables, and
sanctifies a corporate system of property holdings which leads to vast inequalities of power and
shocking concentrations of capital in a few hands," thus ignoring and failing to account for the reality
that corporations as social institutions that impact a wide variety of constituents. Douglas Litowitz, The
Corporation as God, 30 J. CORP. L. 501, 508 (2005).
133. See generally id.
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Their hierarchical structures and ability to promulgate and enforce rules
upon their members remained, and they began to control public welfare
benefits. 13 4  At the same time, corporations began to assert state-like
sovereignty over outsiders, through, e.g., shrink-wrap adhesive consumer
contracts. 135 Thus, like a government, a corporation is both "an association
of individual right holders, on the one hand, [and] an entity with state-like
powers, on the other."136
As corporations become increasingly globalized, and therefore not
always subject to government regulation, this viewpoint of corporations-as-
quasi-sovereigns becomes even more salient. Multinational enterprises,
existing outside the jurisdiction of nation-states, are "vested with
responsibilities traditionally assigned solely to states" and that they "ought
to be recognized as state actors of sorts and on that basis become subject to
rules and norms flowing from the same source as rules regulating the
conduct of states."' 3 7
The implications of this theory are clear. As a sovereign actor, a
corporation ought to have the same duties and responsibilities towards its
constituents as a state government. According to Western political
theory,138 those duties and responsibilities are rooted in democratic values.
"Yet the modern corporation is not controlled by the persons most affected
by it." 39  This theory, therefore, demands the incorporation industrial
democratic principles into modern corporate law.14 0
134. See discussion, supra Part I.A.
135. See O'Melinn, supra note 20, at 206; Litowitz, at 525 ("the company had more power to
influence the lives of local residents than the local government.").
136. Tsuk, supra note 22, at 1870 (citing Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1059, 1099 (1980)).
137. Backer, supra note 1, at 291-92. After all, corporations are taking on increasingly public
functions-like pensions and healthcare. Zumbansen, supra note 103, at 37. This view, however,
creates dissidence with the "shareholder value" theory of corporate governance popular in the U.S. and
U.K. Instead, it is "[m]ore in line .. . with the stakeholding approach that views the corporation as a
locus of responsibility in relation to a wide array of stakeholders' interests" and not as "a legal
instrument for shareholders to maximize their own interests." Silvia Ayuso & Antonio Argandona,
Responsible Corporate Governance: Towards a Stakeholder Board of Directors? 2 (University of
Navarra IESE Business School, Working Paper No. 701, 2007); Branson, supra note 8, at 326.
138. For example, those theories espoused by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and, later, Paine, Jefferson,
and Franklin.
139. Litowitz, supra note 132, at 525.
140. See Richard Mitchell, Anthony O'Donnell, & Ian Ramsay, Shareholder Value and Employee
Interests: Intersections between Corporate Governance, Corporate Law and Labor Law, 23 WIS. INT'L
L. J. 417, 424 (2005) (Stakeholder-centric reformers insist that "[c]orporate boards should be a
deliberative forum, representing not solely shareholder interests, but also those interest groups among
the company's stakeholders."); See also William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs, & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The
Great Takeover Debate: A Mediation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067,
1077 (2002).
For example, Vice Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr., in a recent article that channels democratic
political theory and John Stuart Mill-posits that corporations should be governed as republics, where
good governance depends both upon an enlightened electorate and an expert, well-meaning sovereign.
See Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporation Governance Question We Face: Can
331Summer 2011
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
2. The Corporation as a Trustfor Stakeholders
This view recognizes that the modem public corporation facilitates the
massive accumulations of wealth to be distributed at the discretion of a
handful of managers. It likewise recognizes that the ensuing separation of
ownership from control engenders not merely to agency costs for
shareholders, but also "enabled large collective institutions to amass
coercive power." 4' Observing the dismantling of the "property atom,"
commonly understood as the "separation of ownership and control," Berle
and Means, in their famous treatise, therefore made a "political argument
about the allocation of power in society, particularly the allocation of
power between the state and a wide range of collective institutions." 42 in
essence, because a public corporation modified the treatment of property,
the application of traditional liberal property rights was unwarranted.
Given the massive political and economic power wielded by the
corporation, and because of the inapplicability of traditional property
rights, proponents of this view justified governmental interference into
corporate governance. According to this view, corporate power should,
therefore, be exercised in trust for the community. 143 It thus suggests that
reforms incorporating stakeholder interests into corporate decisions are
appropriate and desirable. A major drawback to this theory exists,
however: it is not immediately clear how a firm is to determine what
behavior will benefit stakeholders.144
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think
Long Term?, 66 Bus. LAW. 1, 5 and n. 13 (2010) [hereinafter Strine, Fundamental Question]; see also
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk's Solution
for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1759, 1775-77 (2006); William B. Chandler Ill
& Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary
Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 999-01 (2003).
141. Tsuk, supra note 48, at 182.
142. Id. at 181-82; Strine, Fundamental Question, supra note 140, at 9.
143. Tsuk, supra note 48, at 182 (Berle and Means made a "proclamation that the power of large
economic organizations, as augmented by the separation of ownership and control, should be exercised
to satisfy the demands of the community. Corporate power was a power in trust for society.")
144. Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporute Law. Thu Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J.
CORP. L. 637, 661 (2006). The author notes, and this author agrees, that this problem is often
overstated. The existence of guidelines for SRI and CSR prove the point. A discussion of SRI and
CSR is provided sup ra.
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3. The Corporation as a Separation of Ownership from Control
This "traditional," or classic understanding of the corporation,14 5
begins to move away from the two stakeholder-centric theories addressed
supra by concerning itself with the plight of disenfranchised stockholders.
It describes the corporation as a phenomenon whereby those who own the
business' assets are not the same as those who exercise control over them.
Stated differently, the modern American public corporation "[splits] the
classical entrepreneurial function between salaried executives, who sat atop
hierarchical organizations, and anonymous equity participants, who [hold]
small stakes and prized market liquidity over participation.""46 It regards
the corporation as a mechanism of specialization, i.e., allowing those who
have capital to place it in the hands of expert entrepreneurs.147  While
shareholders contribute equity, and bear the risk of loss of their investment,
manager agents direct that capital towards (hopefully) profitable ventures.
Scholars thus often address this theory in terms of "agency costs"
arising from the separation of corporate management of company assets
from their residual owners, the shareholders.148  The theory posits that
generally, an owner's "desire for personal gain, for profits, can be relied
upon as an effective incentive to his efficient use of any industrial property
he may possess."' 4 9 When the owner can no longer control these assets, the
theory suggests that this efficient use grows more difficult to achieve. In
fact, managers may exploit their power by expropriating shareholder assets
and corporate opportunities.' Accordingly, corporate governance laws
145. Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment, 43
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1630-31 (2002) ("In the past two decades, a consensus of sorts has
emerged about the economic function of the public corporation and the state laws that enable its
formation. According to this dominant account, enterprises choose the corporate form over other types
of business organization to realize the gains produced by the separation of ownership from control").
While often described in term like "original" or "traditional," it is plausible that the principal-agent
theory of the corporation did not arise until the law and economics movement of the 1980s, when, it is
argued, scholars reinterpreted Berle and Means' famous work. See Tsuk, supra note 48, at 211.
146. William W. Bratton, Welfare, Dialectic, and Mediation in Corporate Law, 2 BERKELEY BUS.
L.J. 59, 67 (2005).
147. See, e.g., id.
148. Modem-day agency theory also describes agency costs (conflicts of interest) associated with
other corporate constituents. See REINIER R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW:
A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (Reinier R. Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009).
Nevertheless, the theory still focuses on the agency costs arising between shareholders and managers.
See Beate Sjafjell, The Core of Corporate Governance: Implications of the Takeover Directive for
Corporate Governance in Europe (Univ. Coll. Dublin Law, Criminology & Socio-Legal Studies,
Working Paper No. 27, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
1598298.
149. Dinh, surpa note 3, at 986 (quoting MODERN CORPORATION, supra note 36, at 8).
150. Sec, e.g., Theodor Baums & Kenneth E. Scott, Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously?
Corporate Governance in the U.S. and Germany 3 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper
No. 17, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id-473 185). ("[E]quity
investors may be taken advantage of in a number of ways. Those in control of the firm-who may be
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aim to prevent such costs by assigning fiduciary duties to managers and
directors, the shareholders' agents, that aim to prevent shirking and
disloyalty.
At the same time, shareholders must avoid micromanaging their
managers, lest they lose the benefits of the specialization, i.e., the
efficiency gains to be realized from the separation of ownership from
control."' Yet, without monitoring, shareholders risk permitting manager
opportunism. Corporate governance theories espousing this principal-agent
theory thus seek to discover the proper balance between shareholder
influence over management and respect for managers' business judgment
that maximizes firm value. Regardless, the principal-agent account, both
logically and rhetorically, lends itself to the establishment of a "shareholder
primacy" norm. 52  Managers, as mere agents, must work to maximize the
wealth' of their principals, the shareholder-owners.'54
The principal/agent theory leaves the interests of the corporate
constituents to the domain of private contract and market mechanisms.155
its managers or its largest shareholders-may find ways to appropriate corporate assets and income for
themselves Or those in control may waste corporate resources through poor managerial
investment and operating decisions").
151. See Meese, supra note 145, at 1637; Tsuk, supra note 48, at 180 (referring to Berle & Means'
famous treatise, the author notes that "[l]egal scholars turn to the book's exegesis of the phenomenon of
the separation of ownership from control to justify the shareholder-centered vision of managerial duties,
most famously expressed by Milton Friedman, according to which corporate managers are agents of
shareholders and must manage the corporation in ways that maximize the profits of their principals, to
the exclusion of the interests of other corporate constituencies or the community at large."); Klaus J.
Hopt, Modern Company and Capital Markets Problems: Improving European Corporate Governance
After Enron 453 (European Corp. Governance Inst. Law Working Paper No. 05/2002, 2007), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=356102 ("In public companies, centralized
management by the board is the rule. It serves shareholders best, provided that the board is efficient,
loyal and competent.").
152. See Tsuk, supra note 48, at 202 (describing how the popular theory of private property
transformed it into natural right or basic human entitlement that must be protected against abusive
government power, and how this view arguably translated into a shareholder right to corporate profits).
153. It is, of course, difficult to determine when wealth is maximized. See Bratton, supra note 146,
at 65.
154. See Meese, supra note 145, 1631 (the author, in conformity with a nexus of contracts theory,
goes on to observe that "[b]ecause [shareholders] hold an exclusive property right in the firm's residual,
it is said, shareholders will internalize the costs and benefits of the firm's actions." The author later
notes that, under this theory, "shareholders employ directors to oversee managers, and both are duty-
bound to deploy the firm's resources in a manner that maximizes shareholder welfare."). Id. at 1639.
155. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439, 442 (2001) ("Of course, asserting the primacy of shareholder interests in corporate law does
not imply that the interests of corporate stakeholders must or should go unprotected. It merely indicates
that the most efficacious legal mechanisms for protecting the interests of nonshareholder
constituencies-or at least all constituencies other than creditors-lie outside of corporate law. For
workers, this includes the law of labor contracting, pension law, health and safety law, and
antidiscrimination law. For consumers, it includes product safety regulation, warranty law, tort law
governing product liability, antitrust law, and mandatory disclosure of product contents and
characteristics. For the public at large, it includes environmental law and the law of nuisance and mass
torts."); Stephen M. Bainbrid ge, The Case/for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA. L. Rev.
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Asserting that workers and creditors remain less vulnerable to management
opportunism than shareholders, proponents of the principal-agent model
observe that many market mechanisms have arisen to protect their interests,
e.g., insurance, collective bargaining, and reputation-based market
mechanisms.'5 6 Advocates of the theory even note that the law subsidizes
these market remedies by institutionalizing collective bargaining, thereby
spreading the fixed costs of negotiation among many parties.
Accordingly, these mechanisms, boosted by law, "make up an institutional
framework that obviates the necessity of altering corporate law" to account
for stakeholder interests.' Indeed, agency-theory perspectives "tend to
presume a zero-sum game between shareholders and other stakeholders,
whereby any regard by management to constituencies other than
shareholders is seen as an equivalent to self-dealing."159
Nevertheless, "[t]o be sure, not all publicly held firms are
unionized." 60 And, to be sure, not everyone is satisfied with the status
quo.16' Inequalities in bargaining power, path dependencies, and collective
action problems arguably prevent efficient (and socially acceptable)
contractual protections for stakeholders.' 62
Given its shareholder-centric characteristics, this theory of corporate
governance appears to counsel against pro-stakeholder reforms. It does,
however, suggest that shareholders can, and ought, to monitor
management. If these shareholders represent stakeholders, the theory does
indeed support the involvement of stakeholders in corporate decision-
making.
4. The Corporation as a Nexus of Contracts
The nexus of contracts model captivated corporate governance
scholarship through the 1980s and 1990s.' 63 Beginning in the 1970s,
political and historical circumstances lead to the rejection of public
regulation of private enterprise, generating a fertile environment for the
601, 614-15 (2006) (workers are protected by the labor market, collective bargaining, severance pay,
etc.).
156. It could easily be argued, of course, that such "market mechanisms" also exist to protect
shareholders, e.g., incentive-based executive pay (stock options), the market for corporate control, and
the "Wall Street walk."
157. Meese, supra note 145, at 1655.
158. Id
159. Mitchell et al., supra note 140, at 429.
160. Meese,supra note 145, at 1656.
161. See, e.g., Litowitz, supra note 132, at 502 (Corporate law serves to mediate, i.e., paper-over,
"smoldering contradictions in American culture and by lending a veneer of legitimacy to the structural
inequalities of the marketplace.").
162. See, e.g., Mitchell et al., supra note 140, at 432.
163. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in Corporate
Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719, at 722 (2005).
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growth of the law and economics movement in corporate governance
theory. 164  Corporations were no longer considered public entities with
special rights and duties concomitant to their peculiar role in society.
Instead, drawing on microeconomics, many in American academia came to
see the corporation as a simple nexus of contracts, existing within the
domain of private citizens.' 65 Any negative externality created by this
phenomenon would be adequately controlled through private contracting. 166
Stakeholder interests, under this theory, are "protected through explicit
contractual covenants rather than through the [endogenous] corporate
governance mechanism." 67
Academia came to re-interpret Berle and Means' famous treatise
regarding the agency costs arising from the separation of ownership and
control. 168  They reclassified the shareholder not as an owner separated
from control, but as a contractual party that bargained for the residual' 69
profit of the company. Their lack of control was, in fact, not a cost but an
efficient, bargained-for aspect of the corporate nexus whereby the
shareholders received rights associated with a corporation's residual
profits.'o The theory then posits that shareholders, by virtue of this
residual interest, are best suited to monitor management shirking and
disloyalty.'"' Because shareholders only receive a profit after all other
stakeholders are paid according to the terms of the contracts, they have the
164. A conservative political movement, coinciding with the Reagan administration, coupled with a
new neoclassical economic consensus among American academia. See Tsuk, supra note 48, at 209-11.
165. E.g., id at 209-10; Dinh, supra note 3, at 985 ("contractarians view the corporation as a
conceptual and legal fiction shorthand for the bundle of contracts that define the rights and obligations
of those who participate in the economic enterprise.").
166. E.g., Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 3 ("[S]takeholders (managers, employees, customers,
suppliers, lenders) have as their primary concern their individual transactions with the firm, which are
usually well defined and enforced through contract law; normally they do not, and need not, depend on
the institutions of corporate governance."). For example, workers would be adequately protected
through private and collective bargaining. Dinh, supra note 3, at 977. Indeed, even labor law
academics focused on exogenous labor laws and ignored worker protections via endogenous corporate
laws. Id.
167. Dinh, supra note 3, at 985. The cavalier indifference of "tortious externalities and insistence of
contract as the means of engagement by outsiders are tolerated only because outside regulation makes
significant adjustments to ameliorate "them." Bratton, supra note 146, at 72. Therefore, "the system is
fully defensible in theory only on the assumption that the backstop regulations adequately protect the
public interest." Id.
168. See generally, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw 212 (1991).
169. A residual claim is poorly defined, and does not lend itself to easy enforcement via contract
law. The claim is to whatever is left over after all prior claims are paid, including lenders' interest,
employee wages, supplier invoices and taxes. E.g., Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 2; Dinh, supra
note 3, at 987 (residual claimant is one 'rwho receives profits of the enterprise or bears its losses after
expenses arc paid from revenues.").
170. See, e.g., Meese, supra note 145, at 1641.
171. E.g., Dinh, supra note 3, at 987 ("Residual claimants have the greatest incentive to maximize
net returns to the corporate enterprise and thus should be given the control rights to do so.").
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most incentive to ensure that management maximizes firm wealth. 172 And,
taking the theory to the end, social welfare is assumed to be maximized
when firm wealth is maximized."'
This theory usually incorporates share price as a proxy for firm
wealth. 74  Accordingly, proponents of the nexus of contracts theory posit
that the goal of corporate governance is to maximize shareholder wealth by
maximizing stock prices." ' It thus shifted the conversation about
corporations from questions of power, influence, and legitimacy to
questions of efficiency and profit maximization.176
Many scholars, therefore, treat the nexus-of-contracts theory as
shareholder centric. However, some critics also recognize that, as a
conceptual matter, nothing about the nexus-of-contracts theory requires that
"residual claimant" status be assigned solely to shareholders. '77 For
example, it can be argued that at-will workers bear residual risks and
profits because they will either retain or lose their jobs, or enjoy better or
worse working conditions, as a result of overall firm performance.' 7 ' Labor
172. Dinh, supra note 3, at 987.
173. Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 3 ("Social welfare in a competitive environment is served
by maximizing firm value, thereby in general advancing economic efficiency and increasing social
wealth."). Of course, "[t]here is no indication . . . of the extent to which the delivery of shareholder
value might involve enhancing the welfare of other corporate stakeholders." Mitchell et al., supra note
140, at 429. This assumption, moreover, erroneously assumes that social welfare is always maximized
if firm value is increased. Successful firms may create negative externalities, e.g., pollution and
anticompetitive monopolistic conduct. Fisch, supra note 144, at 660.
174. See, e.g., Anderson & Gupta, supra note 127, at 13 (using Tobin's Q, a ratio of market and
book value of assets, where market value of assets is the sum of the book value of assets and market
value of equity, less the book value of equity and deferred taxes). The use of share price as a proxy for
firm wealth is not without its critics. See Fisch, supra note 144, at 643. For example, stock prices will
reflect bubbles manipulative accounting devices meant to artificially inflate the price. Id. at 672-73.
This method became popular, however, because of the inherent difficulty in measuring firm value. Id.
at 672; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31
DEL. J. CoRP. L. 769, 822 (2006) (share price could depress not because of mismanagement, but
because of exogenous shocks).
175. Dinh, supra note 3, at 985.
176. Tsuk, supra note 48, at 210-11; See, e.g., Mitchell et al., supra note 140, at 424; Fisch, supra
note 144, at 639.
177. E.g., Dinh, supra note 3, at 988 ("Within the contractarian framework, residual claimants are
simply those parties to the corporate contract who have agreed to receive residual profits of the
enterprise or to bear its losses. . . . [T]hose who contract for the residual risk are contributors of equity
capital, but they need not be."); See, e.g., Mitchell et al., supra note 140, at 427-28; See, e.g., Columbo,
supra note 77 at 257; See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 144, at 657.
178. See, e.g., Dinh, supra note 3, at 992; Mitchell et al., supra note 140, at 459-60 ("[F]rom a labor
law perspective, to conceive of employment contracts as basically the same as other commercial
contracts is a fundamental misunderstanding. They are not 'spot' contracts... . Employers are usually
uncertain at the time of the formation of an open-ended employment contract about the precise nature,
quantity, intensity, and timing of particular types of work required by the business. As a result,
employment contracts are largely incomplete or open ended . [M]anagement [retains] considerable
discretion to direct labor as it sees fit . [therefore] shareholders are clearly not the only corporate
stakeholder whose contractual relations with the company are so incomplete as to require a
supplemental governance structure or other regulatory safeguards"). See also Fisch, supra note 144, at
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laws, like minority shareholder protections, arise, therefore, to address
workers' residual relationship.179 In addition, the presumption that share
price is a good proxy for firm wealth not necessarily a good one: firm
value, by its nature, exceeds shareholder value because of the value
provided to stakeholders in the form of, e.g., wages, interest payments, and
wealth generated by a corporation's suppliers and customers.80
Accordingly, the contract theory anticipates that residual claimant status-
and therefore rights to participate in corporate governance-can shift to
corporate constituents other than shareholders.' 8 '
Other critics insist that shareholders, through the market mechanisms,
choose to cede governance power to managers for efficiency reasons.182
According to this variation, "[a]ctive investor involvement in corporate
decision making seems likely to disrupt the very mechanisms that makes
the public corporation practicable; namely, the centralization of essentially
non-reviewable decision making authority in the board of directors." 8 3
Some even insist that the board of directors is the nexus of contracts,
"wielding sui generis powers as a sort of Platonic guardian."' 84 They argue
that rather than direct monitoring and oversight, the market, i.e., the ability
for shareholders to sell their shares, adequately disciplines management.1
Because this "market paradigm" suited the political agendas of proponents
of economic deregulation in general,' the nexus-of-contracts theory
gained popularity in academia.' Taking corporate decision-making from
the hands of shareholders and placing it in the hands of the board, these
critics support a theory that, even if it does not explicitly address
stakeholder interests, at least does not advocate a corporate governance
regime based solely on shareholder influence on management.
659 (the assumption that stakeholders are adequately protected by contract is deficient. Their contracts
are incomplete, illiquid and imperfectly priced, and employees lack hedging mechanisms, like
insurance, to protect against risk). The team theory of the corporation, discussed infa, explores this
concept further.
179. Mitchell et al., supra note 140, at 462.
180. Fisch, supra note 144, at 644.
181. Eg., Dinh, supra note 3, at 992 (the author also queries "[u]nder what circumstances is
codetermination a preferable mechanism to compensate employees for their investment in the
corporation?").
182. See Bainbridge, supra note 155, at 601 (The "director primacy-based system of U.S. corporate
governance has served investors and society well. This record of success occurred not in spite of the
separation of ownership and control, but because of that separation."); Id. at 606-08 (because efficient
participatory democracy requires all decisionmakers to have equal information, and because, in reality,
corporate stakeholders do not have equal information, the director-primacy model is an efficient
solution); Bainbridge, supra note 174, at 779-81 (because of the incompleteness of contracts, corporate
governance by fiat by a board of directors reduces transaction costs).
183. Bainbridge, supra note 155, at 603.
184. Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose in the 'Anglo-American' Corporation, 50 VA. J.
INT'L L. 579, 601 (2010) (referring to the work of Prof. Stephen Bainbridge).
I185. Mitchell et al., supra note 140, at 427; Bainbridge, supra note 155, at 624.
186. Brafton, supra note 146, at 65.




Over the past few decades, and despite the pro-director variations in
the nexus-of-contract theory, the shareholder value movement came to
dominate the attention of many scholars of corporate law.18  It posits that
share value, whether because of normative or efficiency reasons, is the goal
of corporate governance regimes." 9  "Shareholder primacy" theories
sometimes propose, for example, that because shareholders "own" the
corporation, the corporation ought to be governed according to their
interests. 9 0 It is then assumed that their interests focus on raising the price
of their shares. Shareholder primacy theories also suggest that share price
functions as a proxy for overall firm wealth."' By forcing management to
concentrate on raising stock price, corporate governance would encourage
firms to become more productive, thereby maximizing social good.192
Proponents of shareholder primacy seek to empower shareholders,
believing that they can best look after their own interests, policing
management self-dealing and shirking. They support reforms that, for
example, ease proxy access, require majority voting standards for director
elections, and eliminate management entrenchment devices like staggered
boards and poison pills.
Advocates of shareholder primacy also value the so-called "market for
corporate control" as an effective disciplinary tool on corporate
management. Theoretically, the tender offer market curbs corporate
management's bad behavior by threatening tender offer takeovers for
companies with poor management. This market allows better management
to acquire corporate assets, use them more efficiently, and thereby increase
shareholder value.193
Critics argue that shareholder primacy encourages short-term thinking
that respects only the interests of equity "investors" who, instead of
supporting the long-term success of the firm, advocate swings in stock
prices that may undermine sustainable growth and employment.' 94
188. See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 88, at 8-9. However, it is argued that is origins began in the
1930s, during the famous debate between Merrick Dodd and Adolf Berle. Fisch, supra note 144, at
647.
189. Fisch, supra note 144, at 637 (The shareholder primacy norm defines the objective of the
corporation as the maximization of shareholder wealth.).
190. See generally, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 155; EASTERBROOK & FISCREL, supra
note 168; Julian Velasco, Shareholder Ownership and Primacy, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 897 (2010); Fisch,
supra note 144, at 648-49 (also noting that the notion of "ownership" is a powerful rhetorical device
that supports the theory).
191. See, e.g., Meese, supra note 145, at 1669.
192. Owen, et al., supra note 16, at 6; see also Allen et al., supra note 140, at 1075.
193. Owen, et al., supra note16, atl 1819.
194. Id. at 21; Mitchell et al., supra note 140, at 431 (equity market pressures and the market for
corporate control will "enhance shareholder value in the short-term" but will also "tend to focus on the
reduction of labor costs" because, for example, "corporate raiders often recoup the high cost of high
339Summer 2011
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
Moreover, when stock markets experience a bubble, and when equities are
over-valued, the market for corporate control will become an ineffective
monitor.195
Nevertheless, the theory does not necessarily exclude stakeholder
interests from corporate governance. Nothing in the theory suggests that
all shareholders must be bent towards the goal of increasing short-stock
price.196 It therefore supports a stakeholder-shareholder theory. Moreover,
employee pension funds-and, necessarily, employee stakeholders-would
of course benefit from any such increase.' 97
6. Specific Investment and Team Theory: Approaching a Stakeholder
Model Based on Shareholder Value
Relatively recently, American scholars' 98 began to reincorporate
stakeholder interests into the theory of corporate governance by
recognizing the concomitant resources and investments donated to the
corporate enterprise by a variety of actors. Based on the economic theory
of capital lock-in,' 99 this model of corporate governance recognizes that
team members must make investments specific to the enterprise, putting
them at risk if the enterprise failed or if one team member attempted to
hold up the others. Thus, corporate production often requires a variety of
"stakeholder" groups to make specific investments that cannot be protected
by formal contracts and that put them at risk if the business fails or if they
are forced to sever their relationship with the firm.200
The theory therefore suggests that:
co-investors in projects that need large commitments of specific capital
often understand intuitively that, in order to protect the value of the joint
project, they need to place control over it into the hands of someone who
has neither motive nor easy opportunity to profit from withdrawing
assets from the firm.201
To ensure that capital is locked-in and protected from competing
corporate constituencies, corporate decision-making becomes the
takeover premiums through subsequent downsizing."); Greenfield, supra note 88, at 10; Strine,
Fundamental Question, supra note 140, at 10.
195. Owen et al., supra note16, at 21 22.
196. See Columbo, supra note 77, at 269 (realistically, shareholders do not seek profit at all costs).
197. Mitchell et al., supra note 140, at 431.
198. This theory is traditionally attributed to corporate law scholars Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout,
although their theories derive from earlier work by economic scholars like Oliver Hart. See Blair &
Stout, supra note 163, at 735.
199. Incorporated business entities allow investors, equity and nonequity, to contribute their
resources irretrievably. This model is good for industries with high sunk costs, where each individual
asset is worth less than all contributors' assets combined together. Lynn A. Stout, On the Nature of
Corporations, 2005 U. ILL. L. R. 253, 254-55 (2005).
200. Blair & Stout, supra note 163, at 735-36.
201. Stout, supra note 199, at 261.
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responsibility of a neutral mediating hierarch, in the form of a board of
directors. The board is tasked with a fiduciary duty to never usurp
corporate assets for its own benefit202 and instructed to balance the interests
of the various stakeholder contributors.2 03 So that it might perform this
mediating function, the team-theory holds that the board must retain
discretion to manage the business according to its own judgment. The
existence of this neutral arbiter assigned with the protection of stakeholder
interests attracts more firm-specific investment from a variety of groups.
For example, unsecured creditors may prove more willing to lend, and
employees may prove more willing to put in some extra overtime. 2 04 It
therefore encourages a maximum and socially desirable investment from all
actors. 205
Debunking the notion of a shareholders' "residual" claim to corporate
wealth as a justification for shareholder monitoring of corporate behavior,
the team production model of corporate governance observes that
shareholders have no right or reasonable expectation to dividends. A board
of directors can, for example, elect to distribute corporate profits to
employees as bonuses or to re-invest earnings into the business.206
Moreover, the theory recognizes that corporate employees, like
shareholders, experience loss upon firm failure in a manner not set forth in
their contracts: they are laid off.207 In addition, unlike shareholders and
debt-holders, they cannot diversify their human capital in order to mitigate
the risk of loss through corporate failures.208 As residual claimants
themselves, employees are at least as good monitors of firm performance as
shareholders. Other corporate constituencies likewise have "residual"
claims upon firm failure: creditors may see their debts become bad, and the
community may lose out on tax revenue. 209 Therefore, no reason exists that
justifies the allocation of monitoring duties on a single corporate
constituency, i.e., shareholders. 2 10
The team theory of the corporation suffers from a critical flaw: Quis
custodiet ipsos custodes? Without any single residual claimant overseeing
mediating hierarchs-who do not have an interest in the company apart
from their job security-the team theory risks the same kind of
opportunism and shirking endemic to other corporate government
202. Blair & Stout, supra note 163, at 737.
203. Id
204. Stout, supra note 199, at 265.
205. Meese, supra note 145, at 1667.
206. Blair & Stout, supra note 163, at 728.
207. See Steven H. Kropp, Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation, Corporate
Performance, and Worker Rights in Bankruptcy: Some Lessons form Game Theory, 57 DEPAUL L. REV.
1, 42 (2007) (when a firm fails, employees lose their jobs and their pensions).
208. Dinh, supra note 3, at 992.
209. See Blair & Stout, supra note 163, at 729.
2 10. Id.
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models.21 Except, in this model, not even shareholders exist to monitor
them.212 And, should monitors be given a residual claim to incentivize
them to maximize team wealth, the theory collapses into the traditional
principal/agent model.213 Stated differently, if managers are not the agents
of one particular group of stakeholders, they are not accountable to anyone
at all.214
While this theory appears to embrace stakeholder interests, its
proponents are nonetheless careful to distance themselves from stakeholder
theories by couching their argument in terms of economic efficiency.2 15 It
is therefore not properly a "stakeholder" model of corporate law.
Moreover, modem corporate law reflects in many respects the team
theory.2 16 Directors, protected by the business judgment rule, enjoy wide
discretion to govern the corporation-and distribute its residual-as they
see fit. Only in specific circumstances are they under any obligation to
maximize shareholder wealth.217  Recent publications from the Securities
and Exchange Commission, which regulates public companies, likewise
211. See, e.g., Dinh, supra note 3, at 990 (the theory "relies on heroic levels of faithfulness to
fiduciary duties among corporate directors... [it] leads to the obvious question of who is watching the
watchers"). Proponents of the theory counter that normative ethical guidelines and legal sanctions may
adequately curtail the bad behavior of mediating hierarchs, as they do the bad behavior of any social
actor. Id.
212. See Meese, supra note 145, 1635 ("a mediating hierarch approach would undermine the
shareholders' role as the primary monitors of firm activity and thus severely attenuate the incentives of
directors to maximize anything other than their own welfare"). The author goes on to argue that
managers in shareholder-oriented models have every incentive to encourage team-specific investment
by curbing against opportunism, because such investment increases shareholder wealth. Id at 1636.
See also id. at 1665-66 (Blair and Stout "have failed to describe any plausible mechanism that will
encourage directors who act as mediating hierarchs to pursue their duties in a conscientious manner.
Such hierarchs would not hold residual claims; nor would they be legally accountable to anyone who
does. Moreover, Blair and Stout have not identified any legal or market mechanisms that cause
mediating hierarchs to maximize the welfare of the team. Indeed, as Blair and Stout see things, the
greatest virtue possessed by such hierarchs is their independence from any such influence.").
213. See Meese, supra note 145, at 1641, 1669 ("there is no need to monitor the monitor if he or she
possesses a property right to the team's residual product and can sell that right and associated control if
necessary to someone who is able to do a better job. In these circumstances, it might be said, the
monitor will take care of itself"). Of course, while mediating hierarchs may be susceptible to
opportunism on all fronts, they, without being beholden to shareholders' residual claims, are free to
distribute profits to other corporate stakeholders. Moreover, legal mechanisms-like a director's
traditional fiduciary duties of care and loyalty-could be used to encourage mediating hierarchs to
maximize team value.
214. Id at 1667 ("because no constituency would be entitled to any particular share of the residual,
none would have the incentive or the ability to monitor directors' actions as they related to the joint
product of the entire team. Because the fruits of this monitoring would become common property, no
constituency could capture more than a fraction of the benefits of such monitoring, and efforts to
produce such monitoring would be beset by free riding."). The author goes on to describe potential
credibility problems: corporate constituents would have no reason to believe that managers would even
seek maximization of team wealth. Id at 1668.
2 15. Seelid




encourage diversity on boardrooms to encourage the mediation of
stakeholder interests? 8 Despite the alignment of the team theory with real
life, however, modem American corporations do not appear to do a very
good job at protecting stakeholders. 219 Directors are, after all, free to ignore
or undermine those interests. 2 20  Therefore, although the team theory
suggests a more stakeholder-oriented corporate governance regime, a
different approach is needed.
7. Conclusion
The theories that justify and explain the public corporation in America
reveal that, although much contemporary thought focuses on the economic
plight of the stockholder, a growing body of scholars also view the
corporation as a social institution that exists to serve the welfare of other
stakeholders. Indeed, at least one of these theories, the team theory of
corporate governance, suggests that the interests of stakeholders and
stockholders can be accounted for in a consistent and cohesive manner
without having to pick sides. Such theories can be used to justify the
incorporation of stakeholder voices into corporate decision-making. When
viewed together, the theories of corporate governance also tend to support
this incorporation by taking advantage of stakeholders' role as corporate
stockholders.
C. MODERN CORPORATE LAW IN AMERICA
Although some scholars of American corporate law ignore the plight
of stakeholders, the laws that influence corporate decision-making are less
absolutist. The rules that specifically address the duties of boards of
directors give them much freedom to steer the corporation bastion as they
see fit. Thus, they are often free to choose to protect stakeholder interests
at the expense of shareholders. Based upon the acceptance of such laws in
America, integrating stakeholder interests more thoroughly into American
corporate governance should not prove impossible.
At the same time, however, shareholders do enjoy significant
protections that encourage those boards to pursue the shareholder wealth
maximization norm. And surely, the laws of corporate governance deny
218. See Luis A. Aguilar, Comm'r, S.E.C., Address at the SAIS Center for Transatlantic Studies,
Diversity in the Boardroom is Important and, Unfortunately, Still Rare (Sept. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch091610laa.htm.
219. For example, in 2007, the top 1% of American earners received 23.5% of the nation's pretax
income, up from less than 9% in 1976. At the same time, the median income for working householders
went down and the poverty rate rose. Frank Rich, Who Will Stand Up to the Superrich?, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/l11/14/opinion/14rich.html?hp.
220. See Bruner, supra note 184, at 600 (the amount of discretion afforded directors under the team
theory allows them to ignore stakeholder interests, regardless of any social costs).
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stakeholders any direct voice in corporate decision-making. With the
waning influence of sovereign governments in the face of the growing
prevalence of multinational enterprises, those desirous of protecting
stakeholders must look for solutions based on sources other than exogenous
legal protections. Thus, given the current legal infrastructure,
incorporating stakeholder interests into governance must come via their
role as shareholders. But first, the legal infrastructure is described in more
detail in the following paragraphs.
1. State Corporate Laws
By affording corporate management near absolute discretion to
manage the affairs of the company, 22 1 state corporate laws permit boards to
consider stakeholder interests in corporate decision-making even when
such decisions hurt shareholders' bottom line.222 State corporate laws,
therefore, do not perfectly adhere to the shareholder wealth maximization
norm popular among many American academics. Nevertheless, while such
laws provide some direct protections to shareholders, they leave other
stakeholders' interests squarely in the hands of a board of directors who
may prove indifferent to their concerns. 223  Accordingly, those aiming to
221. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. 8 § 141 (West 2010) (board of directors has original, undelegated
power to manage the corporation, including decisions to relocate factories and offices abroad, to cut
benefits, to layoff workers, etc.). Moreover, the "business judgment rule," a judicially created standard
of review for board behavior, protects directors from liability arising from their decisions unless such
decisions create a clear conflict of interest with shareholders or are the result of gross negligence.
Combined with their statutory authority, the business judgment rule allows boards of directors to
manage American public companies as they see fit. See, e.g., Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 6.
The demand requirement, moreover, requires shareholder to either ask the board to sue itself first or
explain why the board lacks the requisite independence to make such a determination. E.g., FED. R.
Civ. P. 23.1; CH. CT. R. 23.1; Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362 (Del. 1993). The
demand requirement, therefore, significantly limits shareholder power to police management through
litigation. See, e.g., Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 9.
222. See, e.g., Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at I (The Delaware Supreme Court "has constructed
an elaborate theology of deference to board decisions, with but casual regard to maximizing shareholder
welfare."); see also, e.g., Francis X. Pileggi, Corporate Social Responsibility and Shareholder
Primacy-Delaware and Taiwan, DEL. CORP. & COM. LITIG. BLOG (Dec. 5, 2010),
http://www.delawarelitigation.com ("Justice Holland [of the Delaware Supreme Court] noted [during a
conference between jurists of Delaware and Taiwan] that [stakeholder-friendly theories] emerged as the
winner of [the shareholder primacy debate] as supported by Delaware's judicial decisions which
differentiate between three different scenarios: (i) the day-to-day operations of a corporation; (ii) the
hostile takeover situation and (iii) and the sale of the corporation. In the day-to-day operations,
Delaware corporate law (and in particular the business judgment rule) allows directors to make
decisions deviating from short-term profit maximization and redirect some resources from shareholders
to other stakeholders. In the hostile takeover situation, under Unocal, in analyzing the effect of an
imminent takeover on the "corporate enterprise," directors may consider the "impact on constituencies
other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community
generally").).
223. For example, for workers subject to substandard working conditions at the hands of a
multinational enterprise, the problem is not management underperforming, but over-performing-
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incorporate stakeholder interests into corporate governance would do well
to exploit their role not as stakeholders, but as shareholders.
The discretion afforded corporate boards allows directors to make
decisions that benefit stakeholder interests at the expense of
shareholders. 4  They may, for example, trigger poison pills, stagger board
elections and adopt other protective devices to prevent hostile takeovers
that may harm stakeholders. 25 Some states even promulgated stakeholder
statutes that expressly permit directors to make decisions to benefit
constituencies other than shareholders in corporate reorganizations and
sales of control. 26 Moreover, directors' fiduciary duties, derived from the
law of trusts, are owed not only to shareholders, but also to the corporation
as a whole-including all its constituents. Indeed, "[j]udges presented with
takeover cases are unavoidably aware that the interests of more than
stockholders are usually at stake." 227 They recognize that:
"[t]o enable the corporation to reach its current value, decades of
investment are often required from employees, creditors, and communities.
Investors of capital ... are seen in this view as the constituency with the
most transitory form of investment . . . . [E]xit is fast and low cost." 22 8
Judges will be uncomfortable handing down orders that displace
reaping too many profits for shareholders, at the expense of workers. See Branson, supra note 8, at 361.
224. Fisch, supra note 144, at 650-53; Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 1 (citing L. Bebchuk &
A. Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers," 99 COLUM
L. REV. 1168 (1999)); Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 11 ("the board should see itself as bbalancing'
the interests of everyone significantly affected by the firm's actions").
225. For example, so-called "entrenchment devices," e.g., poison pills and shareholder rights plans,
which protect boards from the "market for corporate control," are often justified in terms of their benefit
to the long-term viability of the corporation itself, including all of its stakeholders. See, e.g., HLpner,
supra note 12, at 18 ("[C]orporations in systems enabling hostile takeovers pay more value added to
their shareholders, pay less value added as wages and are less growth-oriented.").
It should be noted that such discretion is not afforded boards of directors in the U.K., which has a
similar corporate governance regime. Some scholars explain this difference by the existence of greater
exogenous protections to stakeholder interests that already exist, i.e., more social safety net programs
like unemployment benefits and free universal healthcare. This phenomenon is discussed in greater
detail infra.
226. Backer, supra note 1, at 296-97 ("Corporate boards were permitted some flexibility. . . . First,
corporations were permitted to distribute corporate property for charitable or other eleemosynary
purposes within certain clearly defined limits. Second, corporate boards of directors were given some
flexibility when they sought to serve other constituencies, to the extent that such service was consonant
with their primary missions. After the merger manias of the 1970s and 1980s, such flexibility was
sometimes memorialized in so-called "other constituency" statutes."); Baums & Strauss, supra note
150, at I (more than half the states have adopted "stakeholder statutes" that allow boards to take into
consideration a variety of non-stockholder interests); Id. at 11. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
5 11(d) (West 2005).
227. Allen et al., supra note 140, at 1084 (it should be noted that this essay was authored by three of
Delaware's most eminent jurists, hailing from the State Supreme Court and the Delaware Court of
Chancery).
228. Id at 1084. The authors go on to query "[wjhy should the corporate governance system be
structured to allow the equity holders' interests to prevail at the expense of other constituencies when
the directors who were elected by the stockholders themselves do not believe that the stockholders'
preferred outcome is desirable?" Id.
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decisions of directors affecting the future of such corporate institutions.
Indeed, no modem court has struck down a decision by a board of
directors because it favored stakeholder interests at the expense of
shareholder interests.229
The law of corporations in the United States gives directors so much
discretion that they may even approve self-interested transactions, so long
as certain procedural obstacles are met. For example, while the law allows
shareholders to sue directors derivatively for self-dealing transactions,
those transactions can be immunized from scrutiny if first approved by a
sufficiently large number of disinterested directors or by shareholders, after
sufficient disclosures are made.230
At the same time, however, Delaware law permits shareholder wealth
maximization norms to permeate some aspects of corporate decision-
making.23' Because the law permits only shareholders to elect directors,
boards will ever remain cognizant of maximizing those shareholders'
investments. Shareholder wealth maximization norms also govern the
resolution of conflict of interest situations and during certain sales of
corporate control.232 For example, directors must refrain from triggering
entrenchment devices that completely foreclose the opportunity for
shareholders to sell their shares at a premium during a hostile tender
offer.233 Moreover, once directors decide to sell a controlling share of the
corporation, they have a fiduciary duty to maximize the price given to their
shareholders for their shares.234 Moreover, perhaps cognizant of their
229. Fisch, supra note 144, at 650. See also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc.,
506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986) (While "concern for various corporate constituencies is proper when
addressing a takeover threat, that that pinciple is limited by the requirement that there be some
rationally related benefit accruing to the shareholders.").
230. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. 8 § 144, (West 2010); Fleiger v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221
(Del. 1976); Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 403-04 (Del. 1987).
231. This tendency is enhanced by incentive compensation schemes, e.g., those that distribute stock
options that align director interests with shareholder interests. It is argued, moreover, that such schemes
render directors too focused on short term shareholder profits, thereby encouraging them to take risky
and sometimes fraudulent-steps.
232. In sales of corporate control, directors face an inherent conflict: they risk losing their jobs
should the new shareholders elect different directors. Accordingly, Delaware courts subject such
transactions to heightened scrutiny. See generally Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrolcium Co., 493 A.2d 946
(Del. 1985); see also Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
233. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1390-91 (entrenchment devices only available to protect shareholders
if Board determines that tender offer is inadequate).
234. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184. This duty to maximize share value, however, is not triggered unless
the Board determines to sell a controlling block of shares and not, for example, on the open market. Id.
Moreover, in sale of control transactions, when directors have a specific fiduciary duty to maximize
shareholder wealth, they can exercise their discretion to sell control for a lower price if doing so
presents less of a business risk. See In re Cogent, Inc. S'holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487, 516 (DCl. Ch. 2010)
(upholding a board of directors determination to reject a competing tender offer with a higher price
because of the contingent nature of the competing offer); In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94,
1 18-19 (Del. Ch. 2007) (board allowed to select a lower price because of bidder's iconic status and the
length of time the company had been on the auction block). It is easy to imagine a situation where a
346 Vol. 7:2
STAKEHOLDER-SHAREHOLDER THEORY
audience, Delaware courts often justify rulings that afford management
significant freedom to exercise their business judgment by arguing that
such freedom increases shareholder wealth.235 And, while Delaware law
suggests that directors' fiduciary duties are owed to the corporation as a
whole, only shareholders may enforce those directors' fiduciary duties to
the corporation through derivative suits.236 Adding to the pro-shareholder
flavor, Delaware case law often reflects that board legitimacy rests upon
shareholder franchise.2 37
Accordingly, Delaware corporate law mediates only the divergent
interests between shareholders and management.238  Non-shareholder
stakeholders, meanwhile, must rely upon the goodwill of the board.239
Statutes that appear to protect stakeholders only permit boards of directors
to consider their interests; they need not, if in their business judgment, they
decide not to consider them.240 In contrast, the law does require directors to
maximize shareholder wealth in a few circumstances. Therefore, those
advocating for the incorporation of non-shareholder stakeholder interests
into corporate governance would do well to look to take advantage of the
shareholders' foothold into the corporate boardroom.
2. Federal Securities Laws
The Federal Securities Laws, in contrast to Delaware law, clearly
favor shareholder wealth maximization norms. These laws arm
shareholders with the tools to monitor management of publicly traded
board justifies protection of stakeholders as a lesser "business risk" than alternative decisions. See also
Bainbridge, supra note 174, at 802 (in Revlon, the directors were not required to focus only on share
price, but could also consider tax, regulatory, financing, and timing issues).
235. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Unitrin, Inc. v.
America General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
236. Fisch, supra note 144, at 653.
237. Bruner, supra note 184, at 602; Bainbridge, supra note 155, at 602 (citing Blasius Indus. Inc. v.
Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988)).
238. See, e.g., Bruner, supra note 184, at 594-99 (Delaware corporate law takes an ambiguous
approach to shareholder and stakeholder interests, reflected in, for example, policies that allow directors
to block tender offers in order to defend corporate policy). Moreover, "Delaware has long adhered to
the view that management owes fiduciary duties of care and loyalty 'to the corporation and its
stockholders' simultaneously, a formulation reflecting a studied ambiguity regarding whose interests
should prevail when push comes to shove.' Id. at 598. See also Allen et al., supra note 140, at 1067,
1072-73; see generally Bainbridge, supra note 174.
Many commentators argue that Delaware law favors managers and directors over shareholders by
giving them undelegated discretion to manage the affairs of the corporation according to their business
judgment. Recently, Delaware courts have also impeded shareholders' ability to amend corporate
bylaws or to otherwise affect corporate policy. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emp. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d
227, 238-39 (Del. 2008). Nevertheless, Delaware law does give some rights and protections to
shareholders; it gives none to other corporate constituencies. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.




HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
firms: they mandate transparency of financial reporting. Thus, managers,
fearful of shareholder "exit" and the ensuing drop in corporate stock prices,
will, in theory, manage the company to ensure those stock prices do not
drop.24' Shoring up their pro-shareholder incentives, U.S. securities laws
also grant shareholders private rights of action and impose criminal
sanctions against management for dishonest disclosure.242
Since the 1930s, the Federal Securities laws have played an important
role in regulating corporate governance, i.e., by mandating reporting
standards and regulating director elections by promulgating proxy access
and disclosure rules.243 The disclosure and transparency regulations,
enforced by the U.S. Department of Justice, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and a lively plaintiffs' bar,244 remain the most robust in the
world.24 5 Detailed regulations govern the disclosure of specific information
during defined events and periods. Financials must be prepared according
to U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP"), and reports
must be issued at the initial public offering (the prospectus), at quarterly
and yearly increments (the 10-Q and 10-K), 246  and during proxy
campaigns.247 Generally, these laws seek to empower shareholders to avoid
injury and mismanagement by opening up corporations' books. 24 8 As an
unintended result of their quarterly reporting requirements, however,
directors sometimes focus their attention on short-term results that impact
short-term stock prices. 249
241. See Strine, supra note 96, at 16.
242. E.g., Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 8; see Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act" or
"Securities Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(k), 77(l)(a)(1) thru (2) (2006); see The Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 ("1934 Act" or "Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2006); see Rule 1Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-
5 (2010); see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14A-9 (2010); see also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (implied right
of action).
243. The 1933 Act regulates disclosure requirements for prospectuses, issued in conjunction with
initial public offerings. The 1934 Act regulates disclosures in the secondary market. Both the 1933 Act
and 1934 Acts regulate misstatements, manipulations and fraud in conjunction with such disclosures.
See, e.g., Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 7.
244. See, e.g., id at 8. The 1933 Act creates explicit private rights of action for misstatements;
courts have inferred such rights of action in the '34 Act (from Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5).
245. E.g., Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe,
21 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 117, 127 (Winter 2007).
246. E.g., Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 7-8.
247. E.g., Smith, supra note 71, at 190 07.
248. See generally, LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 8
(5th ed. 2004); Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 62 (2d
ed. 1933) ("Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is
said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman."); S. REP. No. 73-47 at 1
(1933) ("The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public. The aim is to prevent further
exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, fraudulent, and worthless securities through
misrepresentation; to place adequate and true information before the investor; to restore the
confidence of the prospective investor in his ability to select sound securities; to bring into productive
channels of industry and development capital which has grown timid to the point of hoarding; and to aid
in providing employment and restoring buying and consuming power.").
249. See Strine, supra note 96, at 16,
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The securities laws also regulate the ability of shareholders to access a
corporation's proxy statement during director elections, as well as to
submit shareholder proposals to a popular referendum during yearly
meetings. The securities laws permit, for example, shareholders who hold
a sufficient amount of equity to submit their ideas, if they pass certain
regulatory hurdles, to a shareholder vote.250
Recently, the securities laws also began to influence director decision-
making in favor of shareholders25 1 by expanding the shareholder franchise,
regulating executive compensation, mandating the creation and
composition of certain board committees, and emphasizing the role of legal
and professional gatekeepers.25 For example, by eliminating broker
discretionary voting for director elections, self-regulatory organizations
("SROs") like the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") forced
institutional investors to seek the opinion of beneficial shareholders in
director elections.253 Recent changes to Exchange Act Rules allow more
shareholders access to corporate proxy materials, giving them a louder
voice in decision-making by allowing them an opportunity to change
company by-laws.254 New "say-on-pay" advisory votes allow shareholders,
moreover, to express their opinions on excessive executive
compensation.255 Shareholders are taking advantage of these changes by
proposing rules that encourage the election of outside, nonmanagerial
directors. Here, the aim is to seat directors that are not beholden to insider
managers, and thus more receptive to shareholder concerns.25 6
While providing shareholders with a bunch of ammunition, the U.S.
securities laws do very little to directly promote worker and stakeholder
interests. Although it is argued that a maximized share price serves as a
reliable proxy for firm wealth-and therefore worker welfare257-One
might argue they are subversive to such interests. By encouraging directors
to focus their attention on share price, the securities laws encourage them to
make short-term decisions that do not promote job security, environmental
250. See generally Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2008); Smith, supra note 71, at 207-08.
251. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 155, at 603.
252. See id.
253. NYSE Rule 452 (2010).
254. See, supra note 155, at 603 (describing such reforms before promulgated by the SEC). By
allowing certain shareholders access to corporate proxy materials, the costs of waging a proxy
campaign are significantly diminished.
255. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951 (requiring (1) a non-binding shareholder vote on
executive compensation, (2) a non-binding vote on the frequency of the say-on-pay vote, (3) disclosure
of "golden parachute' arrangements in connection with specified change in control transactions, and (4)
a nonbinding shareholder vote on golden parachute arrangements in connection with these change in
control transactions).
256. See Andrew K. Prevost, Ramesh P. Rao & Melissa A. Williams, Labor Unions as Shareholder
Activists: Champions or Detractors? 17 (Ohio University, working Paper Feb. 9, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1 119328.
257. See Mitchell et al., supra note 140, at 427.
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protection, and long-term investment. Nevertheless, it is possible for
stakeholder-shareholders to take advantage of the power afforded them
under the federal securities laws to influence corporate policy.258
3. Federal Labor Laws and Other Regulation
As described above, the endogenous laws that govern the alignment of
power and decision-making within a public corporation, i.e., state corporate
and Federal securities laws, do not provide for the involvement of any
corporate constituency other than directors and shareholders.2 59  Instead,
only exogenous regulations serve to protect the interests of creditors,
consumers, workers, and the dependent community.260 However, as a
result of globalization, free trade, and the explosion of multinational
enterprises, such protections often prove inadequate.261 Stakeholders must,
therefore, look instead to influence corporate behavior from the inside. 26 2
In the U.S., external regulation serves to protect non-shareholder
stakeholder interests. For example, the Wagner Act and a system of
collective bargaining ostensibly protect the interests of workers, allowing
"[l]abor [to seek] its share of the corporate pie by explicit contracting with
management." 263 The Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act work to protect
258. Assuming, of course, that Delaware and other state corporate law allows them to do so. See
CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 239-40 (Del. 2008). Here, the Delaware
Supreme Court held that a stockholder proposed bylaw that would require the company to reimburse a
stockholder's reasonable proxy expenses in event that the stockholder succeeded in having at least one
director elected pursuant to a proposed short slate would violate Delaware law. Id. But Amendments to
Rule l4a-8 of the 1934 Act would allow shareholders to include in a company's proxy materials a
proposal to amend the company's bylaws to provide for proxy access, arguably usurping state law.
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 971.
259. Tsuk, supra note 22, at 1861 ("American corporate law ignores workers. They don't figure
into the structure of the corporation or its legal duties."). It is argued that stakeholder concerns are
better protected by exogenous legislation rather than by endogenous corporate governance laws: "it is
not clear why and how a firm can serve society better by introducing a new set of social and
environmental goals (which are not determined in a political process and do not necessarily reflect the
will of society as a whole) rather than by maximising profits within the normal framework of laws and
norms"). However, in an environment where exogenous regulation is difficult to implement and to
enforce, i.e., one of regulatory arbitrate, the argument holds less water.
260. In contrast, the notion of "industrial citizenship," whereby employees have managerial rights in
the corporate enterprise, is inherent in European company laws. See, e.g., 1, Trends,
Developments, and Mutual Influences Between United States Corporate Law(s) and European
Community Company Law(s), 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 277, 323-24 (2008).
261. See, e.g., Branson, supra note 8, at 352-55 (the growing irrelevancy and impotency of the
nation-state, economic imperialism and regulatory arbitrate lead to environmental degradation and
plantation production); Strine, supra note 96, at 9 ("The hurly-burly of capitalism has globalized. But
something else has not." Mainly, protections for stakeholders.).
262. See Bratton, supra note 153, at 72 ("[Tjhe system is fully defensible in theory only on the
assumption that the backstop regulations adequately protect the public interest.").
263. Dinh, supra note 3, at 984. The author further observes that "[o]ur national labor policy is
focused on providing parity in bargaining power by facilitating collective bargaining by unions in order
to offset the collective action problem inherent in coordinating employee interests. The structural
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the environment. State and Federal fraudulent transfer laws insulate
creditors from management expropriation of assets otherwise owing to
lenders. Local zoning laws protect communities from industrial hazards
and inconveniences. Contract and tort laws protect consumers, workers,
creditors, and suppliers. Corporate taxes pay for public goods and fund the
amelioration of negative externalities.264 Logically, if such exogenous
protections are nonexistent or insufficient, stakeholder interests will remain
ignored by corporations unless nurtured through other means.
Arguably, such protections are indeed deficient. For example, as a
result of globalization and free trade treaties, union membership in the
United States declined precipitously over the past few decades. 265  The
diminishing relevancy of the trade unionist movement caused labor markets
to become "flexible," characterized by job insecurity, work intensification
and weak investments in firm-specific training.2 66 As corporations grow,
moreover, their bargaining power increases. More and more of their
contracts with stakeholders are no longer freely negotiated, but "shrink
wrapped" contracts of adhesion.267
And, with the explosion of multinational corporations, corporate
management can now choose to do business in jurisdictions that do not
protect stakeholder interests.268  This "regulatory arbitrage" permits
management to transfer wealth that would otherwise serve to protect
stakeholders to themselves and to shareholders. Indeed, patterns of
economic globalization erode states' power to regulate the impact of
corporate behavior on stakeholders.269 Corporations unhappy or unable to
compete with "costly" labor, environmental, and other stakeholder
protection laws can simply move to a jurisdiction that boasts less onerous
regulatory burdens.270  Exacerbating the problem, powerful multinational
corporations can pressure captive developing country governments,
desperate more for income than for labor and environmental protections, to
adopt friendly legislation.27 ' Such antics directly impact the conditions of
relationship between shareholders and managers on the one hand, and labor on the other, contemplate
arms length dealing, if not outright conflict, as opposed to the comparatively cooperative relationship
among the three groups under the German approach." Id. (internal quote omitted). The German
approached is address infra.
264. See Dinh, supra note 3, at 992.
265. Id. at 977.
266. Mitchell et al., supra note 140, at 418.
267. O'Melinn, supra note 20, at 257.
268. See, e.g., Branson, supra note 8, at 352.
269. Id.
270. See, e.g., James Salzman, Labor Rights, Globalization and Institutions: The Role and Influence
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 769, 771-72
(2000).
271. Bantekas, supra note 1, at 315 ("MNEs substantially outstrip LDCs in financial and
technological terms, and as a result . . . they are able to influence the policy and practice of LDCs.");
Branson, supra note 8, at 131-32; see James Harrison, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations:
Can More Meaningfl International Obligations be Established?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, EcoNOMIC
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local workers and, because of market pressures, depress the wages of U.S.
workers while undermining corporate commitment to sustainable
development at home.272  Thus, "law understood through the lenses of
government legislation and regulation has not 'globalised' overall at the
same pace as the economy, business or communications." 273
Despite the erosion of exogenous protections, endogenous corporate
governance laws have not yet adapted to incorporate stakeholder
interests.274 Unsurprisingly, advocates and international bodies therefore
attempt to impose upon multinationals codes of conduct and minimum
standards. 2 75 Their efforts remain a work in progress.
D. CONCLUSIONS
The theories and history of the firm in the United States show that
while some reference is made to the rights and interests of non-shareholder
corporate stakeholders in corporate governance, the reality is that
corporations, and the courts and governments that control them, often view
corporations as mechanisms designed to solely create wealth for
shareholders. 76 While differences exist as to which corporate constituency
should govern to best achieve this goal, the goal itself is, for a large part,
uncontroversial.
Yet a thirst for the consideration of stakeholders exists not only in
academia, but also as a result of economic crisis and globalization.
American workers and communities despair at the loss of jobs to foreign
countries, the loss of their healthcare and pension benefits. They rail at the
amassing of wealth into the hands of corporate CEOs and bailed-out banks.
The time is ripe for the introduction of a new corporate governance regime.
GLOBALISATION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2-3 (Edward Elgar ed., 2010).
272. See history discussion, supra.
273. Ward, supra note 1, at 819; see also Strine, supra note 96, at 9- 10.
274. Berle and Means, of course, assumed that large and powerful corporations operated, by and
large, subject to the dictates of a single nation-state which, in theory, possesses sufficient power to
regulate should it desire to do so. Branson, supra note 8, at 356.
275. For example, the various human rights treaties emanating from the United Nations, the 1998
International Labor Organization on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work; and United Nations
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Regards to Human Rights (resulting in a nonbinding guidelines commonly known as the "Ruggie
Framework").
276. See, e.g., Jtirgen Odenius, Germany 's Corporate Governance Reforms: Has thc System
Become Flexible Enough? 3 (IM F, Working Paper WP/08/179 2008) ("Corporate governance in Anglo-
Saxon countries aims to maximize shareholder value, while in many other countries, including in
Europe and Asia, it continues to target stakeholder value.").
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II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN GERMANY
For those looking to change the governance regime of the U.S. public
corporation, the German model often appears as an attractive alternative.
In Germany, unlike in the U.S., public company stakeholders have a direct
role in company governance. They do not rely solely upon exogenous legal
protections and collective bargaining. At the same time, minority
shareholders enjoy much less protection than their Anglo-American
counterparts. The inherent stability of the German corporate governance
regime, moreover, appears to weather financial crises better than many
other advanced economies.2 77 It comes as no surprise, therefore, that many
advocates for change in the American corporate governance regime
commonly look to Germany for guidance.
Yet, while Germany certainly possesses a modem and successful
economy,278 its corporate governance regime is a child of its unique culture
and history.27 9 A direct transplant of the German model into the U.S. is
therefore impracticable. Nevertheless, a study of its history and character
may reveal other avenues of reform.
A. HISTORY
The history of the German corporation shows the metamorphoses of a
liberal laissez-faire regime to one that not only permits state intervention in
its economy, but even rejects much of the individualism so treasured in the
United States while embracing an idealized notion of the nation-state.
Indeed, the greater racial homogeneity, later enfranchisement, lower rate of
social mobility, and the more collectivist value system of Germany underlie
the significant differences among its corporate govemance system.280 In
addition, Germanycs tradition of civil law, distinct from the common law
regimes of the U.S. and U.K., indicates that Germans accept a more activist
role of the State in economic policy. 281
277. See, e.g., David Jolly, German Business Confidence Jumps, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/25/business/global/25euecon.html? r-1&ref-business (the German
economy is driving the financial crisis recovery in the Euro Zone, surpassing the U.K., in growth and
exports).
278. See Eric Nowack, Recent Developments in German Capital Markets and Corporate
Governance, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 35, 35 (2001) ("[E]conomists continue to point to Germany as a
relatively successful model of a bank-centered economy.").
279. See Odenius, supra note 276, at 3 ("The stakeholder-and shareholder-oriented corporate
governance systems are deeply rooted in countries' distinct traditions and ownership structures.").
280. See Jacoby, supra note 9, at 13.
281. See Armour et al., supra note 13, at 2. More precisely, the "legal origins" theory of corporate
governance postulates that different legal systems influenced the creation of different kinds of financial
and capital markets. See generally La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, Law and Finance,
106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998). For example, La Porta et al. explain the existence financial systems
characterized by large shareholder blocks and debt based finance by pointing to a lack of minority
353Summer 2011
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
The history of the German corporation thus reflects a stakeholder view
of corporate governance, which "[obliges] managers to take into account
the multiple interests of all stakeholders in a firm, as opposed to the more
clearly defined interests of shareholders." 282 Germany's unique history and
social psychology, therefore, counsels against the adoption of German-style
corporate governance in the U.S. 283  Recent trends towards convergence,
however, illustrate that change is indeed feasible, and that stakeholder-
friendly reforms are viable even in modern capitalistic economies.
1. Laissez-Faire Capitalism and the Individual
Once a feudal and mercantilist state, Germany (Prussia), influenced by
the liberal tradition of Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant, embraced
economic and political freedom in the first half of the nineteenth century. 284
State intervention, at this time, was "only accepted as a means to guarantee
safety and equality of opportunity." 285  Pre-war Germany was prosperous
and boasted vibrant capital markets, which were among the most highly
developed in the world.286  Indeed, prior to the First World War, these
German markets were active, liquid, and larger than the New York Stock
287Exchange. They were among the most highly developed in the world,
and ownership of firms was widely diffused. 28 8 This would change.
2. The Birth of the German Welfare State
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, certain portions of the
German polity began to rebel against so-called "Manchester Capitalism" 289
and to embrace the state as a noble embodiment of the body politic, i.e., the
shareholder protections and voting rights. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, Law and
Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1117 (1998).
282. Owen et al., supra note 16, at 13.
283. See id ("[g]iven these different histories, it is not surprising that only partial convergence has
taken place between national corporate governance systems").
284. Harald Baum, Change of Governance in Historic Perspective: The German Experience 5,
(Max Planck Institute for Private Law and the European Corporate Governance Institute, Law Working
Paper No. 28, Mar. 2005).
285. Id
286. Nowack, supra note 278, at 35.
287. Eric Nowak, Investor Protection and Capital Market Regulation in Germany, in THE GERMAN
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 426 (Jan Pieter Krahnen & Reinhard H. Schmidt eds., Oxford 2004) (also noting
that from 1905 to 1914. Germany had 300 initial public offerings ("IPOs")); see also Nowack, supra
note 278, at 35 ("Although there are now only about 750 companies listed on German stock exchanges,
in 1914 there were almost 1200 (as compared to only about 600 stocks listed on the New York Stock
Ex change.").
288. Owen et al., supra note 16, at 12 (also noting that the number of publicly quoted companies
were similar in the U.K. and Germany before the First World War).




newly founded German Reich.290 Unlike the United States, where business
came to power before government, the state in Germany was strong and
centralized and could therefore become deeply involved in economic
development. 291  The German government at once promoted
industrialization while pursuing social harmony and stability. Playing
catch-up with its British competitor, the German state encouraged bank-
based finance, which was quicker and less cumbersome that developing the
deep and liquid capital markets necessary to nurture economic growth. 292
Germany even banned secondary securities markets in the 1870s.293
At the same time, the German state made sure corporate stakeholders
had a voice in corporate governance. Social programs included social
insurance legislation and worker committee laws.294 Employee
participation in firm management, through the implementation of advisory
councils, began in the mid-1800s. By 1891, workers obtained powers to
review workshop regulations and, in 1920, the first legislation mandating
the use of such councils was promulgated. 295 The state meant these earliest
works councils to force cooperative behavior by unions and management
that would facilitate production of coal and then, later, to support the war
economy.296
3. Post World War II
The liberal economic regime receded even more as Germany dealt
with its depressed economic conditions between297 and after the World
Wars. 2 98 Germany's comfort with its modern-planned economy likely
arose after World War IL, following the Potsdam conference. For example,
the "level of industry plan," imposed upon Germany by the Allied powers,
regulated the extent and type of manufacturing permitted in the country.
The International Authority of the Ruhr,2 99 and later the Economic Coal and
290. Baum, supra note 284, at 6; Shawn Donnelly, The Public Interest and the Company in
Germany, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE COMPANY 85 (John Parkinson, Andrew Gamble &
Gavin Kelly, eds., Oxford 2000).
291. Jacoby, supra note 9, at 10.
292. Jacoby, supra note 9, at 10.
293. Donnelly, supra note 290, at 85.
294. Jacoby, supra note 9, at 10.
295. Dinh, supra note 3, at 980.
296. Donnelly, supra note 290, at 90.
297. John Maynard Keynes, for example, predicted that severe inflation and unfavorable treaty
terms to Germany following the First World War would render Europe ripe for instability. See
generally JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE (Harcourt Brace
1920).
298. Owen et al., supra note 16, at 12.
299. An international body established in 1949 by the Allied powers to control coal and steel
industries in post-war Germany. See, e g., Amos Y oder, The Ruhr Authority and the German Problem,
17 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS 345-58 (Jul. 1955). It was later abolished by the Treaty of Paris, which
substituted the regulatory authority the European Coal and Steel Community, a precursor to the
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Steel Community, likewise regulated industrial output. And, during the
Bonn Republic, a post-war compromise was struck between unions,
government, and corporations, who understood each other to be partners in
a market ordering exercise.300 For example, when the British ceded
responsibility of Volkswagen back to Germany after World War II, the
company's employees, unions, and the German government negotiated a
compromise that divided authority over the company between them. The
parties agreed on a governance regime for the company that safeguarded
the firm against hostile takeovers and incorporated worker voices into
company decision-making. 30 ' In the 1950s, Germany constitutionalized
codetermination, at least for the largest firms, thereby cementing workers'
role in the supervisory boards of public corporations.30 2
At the same time, participation of economically weakened private
investors shrank303 as the government continued to promote bank-based
development. 30 4  By the 1950s and 1960s, Germany's unique variety of
capitalism emerged: the creation of large companies with one or two large
long-term investors, usually a family or another company, and supported
by a powerful bank.305
4. Globalization and Harmonization Efforts
Over the past two decades, efforts to harmonize306 European company
laws and to encourage free trade in the Euro Zone307 transformed the
German company yet again. As explained more thoroughly in the next
section, a stagnating economy, combined with harmonization efforts and
the globalization of capital markets, prompted legal reforms meant to
attract foreign equity investors.3 08 Such efforts bore fruit: The number of
modem-day European Union.
300. Zumbansen & Saam, supra note 129, at 9.
301. See Zumbansen & Saam, supra note 129, 13.
302. Donnelly, supra note 290, at 91.
303. Owen et al., supra note 16, at 12.
304. Odenius, supra note 276, at 7 ("The elevated role of lenders is a reflection of the continued
heavy, albeit declining, reliance on bank financing over capital market financing.").
305. Owen et al., supra note 16, at 12; Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 5.
306. "Harmonization" is "a rapprochement among state laws, in which those laws come to resemble
each other within a federal system, while retaining their identity of state law. The objective of
harmonization is not unification, but the achievement of a common rather than a single legal system ....
As a result of the attempt to find common solutions, the harmonization process leads to the 'convergence'
of national legal rules." 1, supra note 260, at 290.
307. For example, Article 56 of the Treaty of the European Community ("EC Treaty") guarantees
the free movement of capital. Accordingly, EU countries are attempting to harmonize their laws and to
remove restrictions that impeded capital flows. See Zumbansen & Saam, supra note 129, at i("member
states, the Commission, and the [International Court of Justice] have been finding themselves in an
ongoing negotiation and contestation of historically grown company law regimes and the pressures of
globalizing capital markets").
308. See, e.g., Nowak, supra note 278, at 40.
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shareholders increased from 3.2 million in 1988 to 5.3 million by the end of
2002, and stock investments as a percentage of wealth held by individuals
nearly quadrupled from 1997 to 2002.309 Institutional investors like foreign
pension funds become more and more prevalent.310 As a result, observers
conclude that Germany is experiencing "a gradual evolution towards a
market-oriented equity culture." 311 At the same time, however, "the
established institutions are not losing their dominant voice." 312  Thus, the
German model offers an example of the kind of compromise that can be
struck between shareholder and stakeholder-based corporate governance
regimes.
Germany's accommodation of certain aspects of shareholder primacy
in its stakeholder-based corporate governance system, described in more
detail below, illustrates that a stakeholder-shareholder theory of corporate
governance is possible. First, though, a closer study of the structure and
operation of the German public company is useful.
B. STRUCTURE OF GERMAN PUBLIC COMPANIES
Undoubtedly, Germany boasts a modern and successful industrial
economy.313 The structure of corporate governance in Germany, however,
differs markedly from that found in the United States. Such differences
counsel against the wholesale adoption of the German form of corporate
governance in America. Nevertheless, a study reveals that the
incorporation of endogenous stakeholder protections in a modern
economy's corporate governance regime is possible, so long as any efforts
maintain the balance created by a country's unique social, economic, and
political culture. Recent legal and economic changes that encourage
Anglo-American-style equity investment in Germany prove the point.
Indeed, a closer look at Germany's corporate governance leads to
suggestions for stakeholder-friendly reforms in the United States.
Accordingly, a brief summary of German corporate law follows below.
309. Nowak, supra note 287, at 427.
310. Owen et al., supra note 16, at 7 ("[i]nstitutional investors have long been dominant in the UK
and US, and are becoming increasingly important in Continental Europe").
311. Nowak, supra note 287, at 427. However, following the corporate scandals of the early 2000s
and the 2008 capital markets crisis, Germany, along with many other continental European countries,
began to have second thoughts about the American model-especially when the "concept of
shareholder value maximization did not fit easily with long-established habits and attitudes." Owen et
al., supra note 16, at 6.
312. Donnelly, supra note 290, at 85.
313. See Jolly, supra note 277 (Germany leading the Euro Zone recovery and leads in European
exports).
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1. Characterization of Equity Markets and Firm Finance
The ownership structure of German firms is dramatically different
from their American counterparts. Finance in Germany derives not from
securities markets, but from banks and long-term debt. While German
capital markets remained, up until the past few decades, relatively under-
developed, the legal protection afforded creditors has traditionally been
robust.3 14  Accordingly, controlling shareholders, inter-company cross
holdings, and pyramidal ownership structures characterize German equity
markets. Most exchange-listed firms are controlled by a family, a majority
shareholder, or a combination of large shareholders.' Moreover, a
particular bank (Hausbank), maintaining a long-term relationship with the
company, often dominates corporate affairs by exerting its leverage as a
lender, the company's primary source of finance, a major shareholder, and
proxy voter for deposited shares.
As a result, in contrast to the short-term company financing typical of
U.S. and U.K. capital markets, Germany's equity and finance markets are
relatively long-term and patient. 316  The implications of this structure on
corporate governance are discussed in more detail infra. At this point,
however, it is useful to note that encouraging the participation of long-term
investors may ameliorate the pressures on American corporate boards to
sacrifice sustainability for short-term profits.
2. Organizational Forms
In Germany, unlike in the U.S. and U.K., the largest firms take the
form of not just public corporations that list shares on public exchanges
(Aktiengesellschaften, or "AG")," but also limited liability companies
314. Nowak, supra note 287, at 425.
315. E.g., Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 5.
316. E.g., Enriques & Volpin, supra note 245, at 122 (A "controlling family is likely to commit
more human capital to the firm and to care more about its long-run value." The authors also observe
that can abuse their power to usurp corporate assets and opportunities for themselves, i.e., "self-
dealing" or "tunneling."). At the same time, such financing is criticized as being unfriendly to start-ups,
as it does not provide adequate venture capital. See also, e.g., Mitchell et al., supra note 14, at 419-20
("Rhineland capitalism"' based on "bank-based debt, intertwining debt and equity ownership, inter-
corporate shareholders" encourages direct and long-term monitoring of corporate performance by
capital providers and cooperative relations between employers and employees that have a long-term
payoff.").
317. While their shares are listed on public exchanges, these companies do not resemble the typical
diversified American public company. These firms often have controlling shareholders, and often those
shareholders are not themselves public companies. Ekkehart Boehmer, Corporate Governance in
Germany: Institutional Background and Empirical Results, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (K. Gugler, ed., 2002. ("[S]evcral listed firms are nested into a group
structure that may involve several different types of companies, each subject to different requirements
regarding disclosure and accounting. Without a sound understanding of each part of the group, it is
difficult to appropriately value the listed corporation").
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(Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung, or "GmbH"). AGs can be, but
rarely are, purely public with a diversified share ownership
(Publikhumgesellschaften). More often, a dominate shareholder holds a
controlling majority of shares.3 18  These forms, called
Kapitalgesellschaften, grant their equity holders limited liability. As such,
they are more heavily regulated, at least in comparison to those business
forms that do not confer such benefits on their equity holders.3 19 Although
this paper focuses only upon the governance and characteristics of AGs,
both AGs and GmbHs are similar in that they are commonly dominated by
a controlling owner.320 Therefore, many of the characteristics of the AG
apply to the GmbH.
In the Anglo-American regime, public companies have a unitary board
structure that supervises company management. Often, the chairman of the
board is the company's chief executive, and many other directors serve
operational functions, i.e., the "insider director." 32 ' Outside directors are,
perceived to be more friendly to shareholder concerns. In contrast, German
public corporations have a dual board structure.322 The supervisory board
(Aufsichtsrat), which appoints the members of the operational managing
board (Vorstand),323 cannot seat any "inside" directors. Rather, the law
requires that the membership of a company's supervisory and management
boards cannot overlap.324 While managing boards are responsible for all
the corporation's business affairs, the supervisory board does retain power
to approve certain transactions and to oversee the management board's
performance.3 25 It also enjoys broad powers to gather information and to
intervene with operations to carry out its oversight duties.32 6
The power of supervisory boards, which are often compared to
American "outside directors,"327 is limited.328 Once appointed, the
managing board owes duties not to the supervisory board, but to the
318. Dinh, supra note 3, at 982; Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 5. For example, a study shows
that of all listed public companies, 82% have a large blockholder controlling more than 25% of voting
rights, and half of those have a holder holding more than 50% of equity. Likewise, only four percent of
GmbH entities have dispersed ownership. Goergen, Manjon & Renneboog, Recent Developments in
German Corporate Governance, 28 Int'l REV. L. & ECON. 175, 177 (2008).
319. Boehmer, supra note 117, at 2.
320. See Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 13.
321. This overlap leads to conflict of interest concerns familiar to students of U.S. corporate law,
e.g., when setting executive compensation. Insider directors, it is moreover argued, do not have
adequate motivation or incentive to police the wrongdoing or shirking of management.
322. E.g., Enriques & Volpin, supra note 245, at 128.
323. E.g., Smith, supra note 71, at 179; Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 5.
324. Aktiengesetz [AtkG] [Corporate Law Code] § 105 (2010).
325. Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 11.
326. Id.
327. Id at 5. The supervisory boards serves as a rough equivalent to the U.S. "outside" directors
and the managing board, the "insider" directors. Id For example, the supervisory board will approve
"material" related party transactions attempted by the management board. Id at 6.
328. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 71, at 179.
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corporation in general. Therefore, it is possible for the management board
to avoid the supervisory board's recommendations, so long as they justify
their behavior in terms of the "corporate interest." 329 In corporations that
have a controlling shareholder- which is very common in Germany-the
supervisory board often serves as a mere instrumentality of that shareholder
and, therefore, does not exercise an independent, mediating voice over
corporate affairs.3 30 In addition, the supervisory boards of dispersed public
companies usually maintain a close relationship with the controlling
management board. These cozy relations undermine the supposed
"independence" of the board and, therefore, arguably allow for insider self-
dealing.331 Moreover, while managing boards are theoretically independent
from supervisory boards, it is not uncommon for their members to occupy
supervisory board members of a parent company.332 The supervisory
board, in addition, may only remove managing board members for cause.
Thus, in many circumstances, it cannot influence corporate operations
except under the most egregious of circumstances. 33 3
Given the limited power of the supervisory board, one can observe
that German companies may suffer from the same kinds of agency costs
associated with U.S. firms, despite their different board structures. These
costs also-though to different degrees-highlight the importance of
having "independent" or "outside" directors approve certain transactions.
Given the similarities, coming up with a theory of American corporate
governance that takes more stakeholders into account, as does the German
model, should not prove impracticable.
3. Shareholders
The relative lack of depth of German equity markets reflects the
pattern of shareholder ownership of its companies. Unlike large firms in
the U.S. and U.K., whose capitalization is dispersed, controlling
shareholders dominate firm equity in Germany for both public corporations
and limited liability companies.334 Such shareholders and owners are most
often large institutional investors and financial companies, e.g., banks,
insurance companies,335 investment funds, and foreign investors.336  Of
329. Smith, supra note 71, at 179; Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 2 (board tasked to promote the
interests of the firm, not shareholders (Unternehmensinteresse).
330. Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 5.
331. Dinh, supra note 3, at 982.; Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 5.
332. Boehmer, supra note 317, at 2.
333. Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 14.
334. Although some German corporations are widely diversified, they are few and far between.
Most firms, even if publicly traded, are dominated by a single large blockholder. See discussion, supra
note 316.
335. See, e.g., Hbpner, supra note 12, at 9; Enriques & Volpin, supra note 245, at 117 (in
Continental Europe, "few listed companies are widely held. Instead, the typical firm in stock exchanges
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these, banks are the most powerful: they can exert leverage by virtue of
their status as a firm creditor, shareholder, and proxy for the shares
deposited with them by individual shareholders.33 7
Often, the identity of the company's ultimate owners remains
undisclosed. Inter-firm crossholdings are common in Germany,3 38
rendering difficult the tracing of firms' overlapping equity holders.
Ownership patterns that involve such cross shareholdings, as well as
contractual voting and management arrangements, interlocking
management and supervisory boards between related companies, and
pyramidal ownership structures, 33 9 not only camouflage the ultimate
beneficial owners and controllers of German firms, but also act to enhance
the power of dominant shareholders. 340  The traditional341 role of German
banks, as shareholders, proxy holders, and lenders further obscures the
source of German firms' ownership and control. Such banks, referred to as
Hausbanks, often hold a substantial amount of company equity while also
maintaining a debtor relationship with the firm. They can therefore exact
controlling leverage by virtue of their dual status as lender and stockholder.
Adding to their power, individual shareholders will often deposit their
shares with banks who, through powers of attorney, exercise the owners'
voting rights.342
The patterns of German firm ownership create different corporate
governance problems than those faced by Anglo-American firms. While
majority and controlling shareholders in German corporations enjoy much
power over management, minority shareholders enjoy relatively less
protections than their U.S. and U.K. counterparts. At the same time, large
shareholders generally invest for the long term and naturally assume a
greater monitoring role than their diversified U.S. counterparts.3 43 The
principal-agent problem, therefore, shifts from one arising between
dispersed shareholders and management to one arising between majority
around the world has a dominant shareholder, usually an individual or a family, who controls the
majority of votes."). In Germany, recent studies show that only 50% of public corporations are widely
held; ten percent are under family control, and 20% are controlled by a unitary pyramidal structure. In
contrast, in the U.S., 80% of public corporations are widely held, and 20% are under family control.
Even more of a contrast, 100% of public corporations in the U.K. are widely held. Enriques & Volpin,
supra note 245, at 119.
336. Boehmer, supra note 317, at 11.
3 3 7. Id.
338. Id
339. E.g., Enriques & Volpin, supra note 245, at 117 (pyramidal ownerships, shareholder
agreements, dual classes of shares).
340. Boehmer, supra note 317, at 6.
341. As explained infra, changes in law and market pressures are transforming the role played by
the German hausbank in German firm leadership.
342. Boehmer, supra note 317, at 7.
343. Hdpner, supra note 12, at 7. It is argued that since coordinated market economies involved
long-term investment decisions, financing must be long-term. To convince banks to invest long-term,
they demand relatively higher monitoring powers.
Summer 2011 361
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
and minority shareholders. This and other differences are explained in more
detail in the following paragraphs.
These differences certainly offer reasons that German-style corporate
governance cannot be immediately exported into the United States. But
they also show that U.S. public companies, generally lacking the presence
of long-term majority shareholders, could take advantage of some of the
benefits associated with these shareholders, i.e., their strong monitoring
characteristics and long-term outlook, by encouraging their formation in
U.S. markets.
a. Dominant Shareholders
In a company with a majority shareholder, that shareholder will
dominate both the supervisory and management boards.3 4 4  While this
arrangement meets with its own peculiar agency costs, 345 it also eliminates
some costs that are more familiar to scholars of U.S. corporate governance.
Blockholders with large ownership stakes have every reason to monitor
management.46 Unlike the diversified shareholders of the American public
company, controlling German shareholders have the motivation and the
resources to ensure the firm is operated in their interests and without
wasting or pilfering corporate assets. 347
German corporate laws reflect the power affording controlling
shareholders. For example, shareholders of German AGs convene at an
annual general meeting (Hauptversammlung), and can call a nonregular
meeting if called by shareholders representing at least five percent of the
firm's capitalization.348 They can use such meetings to influence
management behavior and to submit their own proposals.
b. The Market for Corporate Control
Many scholars of U.S. corporate governance cite to the so-called
"market for corporate control" as an important disciplinary mechanism for
corporate boards. It also serves as a source of pressure on management to
344. Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 5.
345. See discussion on costs, infta section c and e.
346. Jacoby, supra note 9, at 23.
347. H6pner, supra note 12, at 56; Enriques & Volpin, supra note 245, at 117 ("dominant
shareholders have both the incentive and the power to discipline management."); Id at 122 (family
controlled firms in continental Europe generally have a better share price-to-asset replacement value
ratio (i.e., Tobin's Q). These authors also note, however, that "concentrated ownership can create
conditions for a new agency problem, because the interests of controlling and minority shareholders are
not aligned." Id at 117. This controlling shareholder agency problem is address briefly, infra.
348. Hbpner, supra note 12, at 6.
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pursue short-term stock prices.349 In Germany, however, this phenomenon
is less pronounced as it is in Anglo-American corporate governance
regimes.350 In fact, "[h]ostile tender offers have been virtually non-existent
in Germany until very recently," 5  and until 1995, Germany had no
takeover laws, either facilitating takeovers or protecting management from
them.352 Simply, hostile takeovers are much more difficult to achieve
unless an offeror obtains the support and consent of the controlling
shareholder.53 As a result, the "market discipline" which much of
American academia relies upon to force corporate management to pursue
shareholder wealth maximization, does not exist in Germany.3 54 This
distinction illustrates the different agency costs associated with the German
corporate governance regime, and, in so far as the market for corporate
control is indeed an effective monitor of corporate management,155 counsels
against its wholesale adoption in the U.S. At the same time, its absence
encourages corporate managers to pursue long-term growth strategies.
c. Long-Term Bank Control
The role played by banks in German corporate governance is
drastically different from that played by banks in U.S. corporations. By
virtue of proxy holdings, banks often dominate the shareholder-half of
supervisory boards. They also exert influence by virtue of their status as
corporate lenders. The house banks commonly possess technical
departments tasked to monitor the financial performance of the firm,356 and
can pressure management to behave in certain ways or to reveal certain
information as they force renegotiations of loan agreements.357 Moreover,
banks possess the proxy votes of smaller shareholders, who give them such
power in conjunction with managing their stock portfolios. Exercising the
voting rights associated with their depository shares as well as the shares
349. See discussion supra pt. I.A.7.
350. Owen et al., supra note 16, at 12 (concentrated ownership "is one of the reasons why hostile
takeovers have been so rare in both Germany and Continental Europe"); Odenius, supra note 276, at
13-14.
351. Nowak, supra note 287, at 441.
352. Id. at 443 (citing the Cbernahmekodex [Takeover Code], a voluntary guideline that was
introduced in 1995).
353. Boehmer, supra note 317, at 9-10.; Hdpner, supra note 12, at 17 ("[c]ompanies with a high
percentage of state, family or company ownership are sheltered from takeovers").
354. Nevertheless, some commentators argue that the product market disciplines management: a
competitor will eat up a company's market share if management is shirking. Hdpner, supra note 12, at
15. As a corollary, such discipline does not exist in sheltered sectors, where firms enjoy quasi-
monopoly status. Id.
355. Some critics, for example, argue that the product market adequately disciplines management
into good behavior. See discussion on product market competition infra.
356. Jacoby, supra note 9, at 19.
357. Anderson & Gupta, supra note 127, at 20.
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they own directly, the voice of the Hausbank on the supervisory board of
German companies is often overwhelming.
Accordingly, agency costs associated with banks occur that are
unheard of in the United States: costs associated with bank interests
diverging from the interests of minority shareholders"' and workers.' At
the same time, the role of the German Hausbank eliminates some agency
costs familiar to scholars of U.S.-style corporate governance. Possessing
an informational advantage, these bank shareholders, unlike their
diversified U.S. counterparts, have the means and motivation to monitor
management.36 But, because of their multiple roles within the firm, i.e., as
stockholder, board member, lender, and financial service provider, 36 1 they
may not do so on behalf of all shareholders.3 62 Nevertheless, their long-
term investment outlook means that they will generally aim to preserve the
company's long-term financial health-a benefit to all stakeholders.
The prominent role of the Hausbank in German financial markets and
in its corporate governance illustrates the implausibility of adopting
German-style corporate governance in the United States. It does show,
however, that alternative methods of finance, other than through short-term
equity investors, is feasible in a modem industrial economy.
358. Smith, supra note 71, at 180-81 (Noting that "[a] bank voting shares which it does not own
may be more included to vote for the maintenance of the status quo especially if, as is often the case,
the bank is represented on the supervisory board of the company in question and if such bank at the
same time is a lender to the company.") (internal quotation omitted).
359. See id at 159-60 (For example, "'i]nstitutional investors who hold large blocks of stock are
less able to sell their shares on the open market and must take a more long-term view that may conflict
with the interests of small shareholders, who can sell their stock at any time If institutional
investors' exercise of influence over corporate governance rises to the level of 'control,' superseding
the control exercised by management, then the principal-agent problem has merely been shifted from
management to the institutional investor.").
360. See, e.g., Anderson & Gupta, supra note 127, at 10 ("banks are capable of acquiring
information about firms and managers in a way that makes the need for open market disclosure of a
firm's 'decision and control rights' less meaningful"). For example, banks, during due diligence
leading up to a loan agreement, can access a firm's projections, ability to meet revenue targets,
reliability of competence of its workforce. Such information is not available to minority investors. Id.
at 20. "This continuing ability of the bank to extract, at will, non-public information from the borrower
insulates the bank to some extent from the risk of expropriation by the owners, which in turn relegates
the need for the firm to institute costly governance mechanisms." Id
361. For example, "[i]t is widely known that decisions maximizing the value of loans often reduce
the market value of equity. The same argument holds for fee-maximizing decisions. Therefore, the
objective of the banks should be to balance decisions increasing the value of debt versus those
increasing the value of equity. Given the substantially larger size of the debt portfolio, it is rational,
legal, and fully ethical for banks to act as debtors in all respects.' Boehmcr, supra note 317, at 12; see
also Hdpner, supra note 12, at 1.
362. Boehmer, supra note 317, at i1-12; see also Smith, supra note 71, at 190 (as creditors, banks'
interests may align more with management than outside shareholders).
364 Vol. 7:2
STAKEHOLDER-SHAREHOLDER THEORY
d. Lack of Transparency
The transparency of German firm financials remains far behind that
expected by investors in U.S. markets. Under the U.S. model, transparency
of a firm's performance allows investors to make sound investment
decisions by correctly assessing their risk. It also permits investors to
police a company's management. The German tradition, however, does not
offer the same amount of protection.3 63 "Without knowing whose interests
are representing using those voting rights, it is very difficult for outside
investors to assess the incentives of large shareholders in the same firm to
act in the interest of all shareholders." 364  Fearing expropriation and
unknown risk, the cost of equity capital in Germany is relatively great. It
deters minority investors, and they will consequently demand a higher
return to compensate for the extra risk.
German transparency rules thus reflect the prevalence of majority
shareholders in corporate ownership structures, as such insider shareholders
can extract all the information they need without exogenous legislation.
Financing, in addition, remains available from banks and retained earnings,
thus rendering less consequential the higher cost of minority equity
investor capital. Its transparency laws, therefore, would not work well in
U.S. markets. Their relative weakness, however, reflects the benefits of
having a long-term controlling shareholder, as such transparency laws may
not prove as necessary for investor protection.
e. Majority Shareholder Rent-Seeking
Despite the benefits that the controlling shareholder may offer in
regards to policing management, they also present a different kind of
agency cost from that implicated by the wealth of diverse shareholders in
the hands of centralized management: "the expropriation of minority
investors through the controlling shareholders."3 65 Indeed, the presence of
a blockholder can result in "a kind of crony capitalism in which insiders
363. For example, the disclosure requirements are less stringent than their U.S. counterpart. Baums
& Scott, supra note 150, at 8. In addition, they are more difficult to enforce through shareholder private
rights of action. Id at 8 (unlike the U.S. regime, German shareholders must prove causation instead of
relying on, for example, the common-law "efficient capital markets hypothesis"); Id. at 10 ("German
law placed even higher hurdles in the way of a shareholder's successful prosecution of an enforcement
action against management board and supervisory board members than those found in the U.S."). See
generally Aktiengesetz [AtkG] [Corporate Law Code] §§ 93, 116 (2010). Moreover, and importantly,
German plaintiffs' lawyers cannot seek fees on a contingency basis, thereby taking the teeth out of the
plaintiffs' bar. Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 11.
364. Boehmer, supra note 317, at 7.
365. Owen et al., supra note 16, at 10.
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loot the firm at the expense of minority shareholders, using inside
information and self-dealing."366
In Germany, minority shareholder protection remains weak16 7 and
significant opportunities remain for a majority shareholder to usurp
corporate assets and opportunities from the firm and from minority
investors. 368  Traditionally, regulations against self-dealing were relatively
toothless.3 69 For example, minority investors do not receive the benefit of
statutory appraisal rights in squeeze-out merger transactions.o Thus, in
Germany, a freeze-out may occur while paying minority shareholders less
than market value. In contrast, minority shareholders of a U.S. public
company, while they cannot stop a merger, they can demand fair value for
their shares through judicial appraisal." Controlling shareholders,
moreover, have access to high-quality information that remains out of reach
to smaller shareholders, and can use the extra information to their
advantage.372  Minority shareholders in Germany, unlike their U.S.
counterparts, play no role in approving conflict of interest transactions, and
disclosure of such transactions is made only to the supervisory board."
The United States, of course, enjoys relatively greater minority shareholder
protections.
The differences are not only reflected in the law. Large blockholders
may find it easier to increase the value of their shares at the expense of
minority shareholders, rather than to raise the firm's wealth as a whole. 374
Through tunneling, or self-dealing, controlling shareholders that have
relatively low cash flow rights, i.e., a bank, can transfer assets to a firm
where they have greater cash flow rights. 7 In this way, assets are stripped
from the company-and its minority investors-and into the pockets of the
controlling shareholder. Such self-dealing can be affected through
manipulating transfer pricing between related entities and through irregular
or excessive executive compensation. Controlling shareholders, in
addition, can use their crossholdings and pyramidal ownership groups to
366. Jacoby, supra note 9, at 23.
367. H6pner, supra note 12, at 10.
368. E.g., insider trading; supra pt. 1I.B.5.
369. E.g., Odenius, supra note 276, at 13; Enriques & Volpin, supra note 245, at 137.
370. Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 17. Until 2002, German law "contained no requirement that
all shareholders be offered the right to sell their shares at an appraised price in case of a change of
control." Id. The changes after 2002 are discussed briefly infra.
371. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2010) (statutory appraisal rights for fair value following
merger). See alsoWeinberger v. U.O.P., Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1981) (board must exhibit fair
dealing and achieve a fair price in minority shareholder freezeouts).
372. Jacoby, supra note 9, at 23.
373. Odenius, supra note 276, at 13.
374. Boehmer, supra note 317, at 10 ("Large blockholders have incentives to maximize the value of
their shares. Whethcr this involves maximizing firm value depends on the degree to which they can
extract transfers from small shareholders.")




transfer corporate assets from a company to a controlled subsidiary without
minority shareholders." German corporate governance laws attempt to
address these agency costs by relying upon the two-tier board structure.
Specifically, the supervisory board must approve all majority-shareholder
self-dealing transactions.378 Many critics argue, however, that this
relatively benign check on majority shareholder power provides cold
comfort.
However, given the strong legal safeguards afforded minority
investors in the United States, the difficulties presented by the agency costs
unique to corporations with majority shareholders may not prove
insurmountable should larger shareholders, i.e., stakeholder shareholders,
be introduced into American corporate governance.
4. Labor
Unlike the United States, worker involvement in German corporate
governance is both endogenous and exogenous. German labor relations
rely upon three phenomena: (1) collective bargaining by industry unions;
(2) statutory works councils at the company level; and (3) employee
codetermination on supervisory boards.379 When combined with a more
generous social safety net, these characteristics gives workers more
favorable treatment than that provided to workers in the U.S. At the same
time, it cannot be seriously argued that Germany is not a successful and
advanced industrial economy.380 Indeed, incorporating worker expertise
and interests into company decision-making often creates efficiencies that
benefit all of a company's stakeholders. A study of German labor
relations, therefore, can be useful to one looking to incorporate worker
interests into American corporate governance.
a. Codetermination and Works Councils
The direct incorporation of stakeholder interests in the decision-
making apparatus of German companies is the most distinctive feature of
the German corporate governance regime. All German firms, whether
public or not,38' must have works councils serving as labor representatives
with rights of information, consultation, codetermination and direct
377. Boehmer, supra note 276, at I1.
378. Odenius, supra note 276, at 12.
379. E.g., Dinh, supra note 3, at 978.
380. But see Bainbridge, supra note 155, at 608 ("Empirical evidence . suggests that
codetermination does not lead to efficiency or productivity gains.").
381. They are mandated for all German firms with five or more employees. Dinh, supra note 3, at
980 (citing the 1952 Labor-Management Relations Act, as amended by the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz
1972 [works Council Act], 1972).
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management of certain business activities.382 The membership of these
councils consists of both white- and blue-collar elected employee
representatives. Works councils negotiate the specific terms of union
collective bargaining agreements and must be consulted with regards to
plant closings, relocations, layoffs, and fundamental changes in business
operations and organization." Although works councils possess only a
right of consultation, they can effectively delay corporate changes that
negatively impact stakeholders.38 4
More notorious than the use of works councils, German co-
determination directly involves workers in the managerial structure of
public German corporations. German law mandates that labor
representatives share membership of supervisory boards with shareholder
representatives. Chosen by direct election or through delegates, worker
representatives hold half the board seats of supervisory boards in
corporations with over 2,000 employees" and a third of the seats of
companies with over 500 workers. 8 Furthermore, German law mandates
that union representatives occupy a certain number of these seats. 8
Unsurprisingly, this recipe for board composition earns criticism from
minority shareholder advocates, who think it ineffective in monitoring
against abuses by both management and majority shareholders.38 8 Indeed,
on its face, this arrangement appears to place significant decision-making
power into the hands of labor at the expense of minority shareholders. The
dual-board structure, however, curbs workers' influence: The power of
supervisory boards in general often proves limited,36 9 especially for
companies with controlling shareholders.390 Moreover, the resolution of
many employee-specific issues, like collective bargaining or dispute
arbitration, occurs within the ambit of works councils and not before
supervisory boards.39' Lastly, the tiebreaker on supervisory boards falls to
shareholders, and not to workers. 392
382. Dinh, supra note 3, at 979.
383. Id. at 979-80.
384. Id. at 980.
385. E.g., Enniques & Volpin, supra note 245, at 128. Banks often dominate this shareholder half,
by virtue of their roles as shareholder and as proxy for other shareholders. Id.; Boehmer, supra note
317, at I1; Dinh, supra note 3, at 981 (citing Mitbestimmungeseu [Co-determination Act], 1976). For
companies in the iron, coal and steel industries, only 1,000 employees are needed before their
representatives will occupy half of the seats of a supervisory board. E.g., Odenius, supra note 276, at 9.
386. E.g., Zumbansen & Saam, supra note 129, at 27; Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 5.
387. Dinh, supra note 3, at 981; Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 12 (can appoint up to three
officers on a supervisory board).
3 8 8. Id.
389. Owen et al., supra note 16, at 9; Hopt, supra note 151, at 454 ("the German supervisory board
continues to be a rather ineffective monitor, where as the U.K. board has not only taken on the
monitoring task formally but is better placed to discharge it effectively in practice").
390. Dinh, supra note 3,at 981 82.
391. Id. at 982.
392. Donnelly, supra note 290, at 92.
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While certain commentators fret that worker involvement in corporate
decision-making produces inefficiencies, 39 3 and even accuse it as the culprit
behind German economic stagnation in the 1990s,3 94 it is also argued that
such involvement, unlike the adversarial collective bargaining process,
fosters an efficient regime of cooperation. 3 95  At the very least, works
councils and co-determination may preclude catastrophic conflicts during
collective bargaining with industry-wide unions.396 They also arguably
create an efficient mechanism to regulate the micro-relationship between
employers and employees.3 97
b. Unions
Labor relations in Germany also maintain an adversarial relationship
akin to that in the U.S., although German unions enjoy significantly more
influence than their American equivalents. In Germany, unions (Verein)
transcend company-level industrial relations. They instead traverse entire
industries, negotiating general agreements that company-specific works
councils tailor to specific circumstances." Industry-wide unions are
organized into federations that wield impressive political power. 9 Their
collective bargaining agreements protect not just union members, but all
workers.40 0 They also maintain influence inside specific firms by using
company works councils as contact points. 401
393. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 155, at 608 (Note, however, that the "empirical evidence" of
such inefficiencies are cited by the author by reference to another article by the same author dated in
1996. An example described by the author posits that employee representatives on the board will
extract higher wages from firm profits and therefore make the firm "less profitable." Id at 609. This
definition of profitability, of course, is from the shareholder's perspective).
394. See, e.g., id at 608. Of course, while Germany may not have received the benefit of stock
market bubbles of the turn of the century, it can be said to have weathered the ensuing financial crises
better than equity-based economies. Some may attribute this relative success to the long-term vision
engendered by, inter alia, worker involvement in corporate decision-making.
395. Dinh, supra note 3, at 987; Odenius, supra note 276, at 9 ("labor representatives tend to stress
the advantages of creating a wider acceptance of managerial decisions and resolving conflicts better,
resulting in fewer labor disputes").
396. Dinh, supra note 3, at 982; Donnelly, supra note 290, at 99.
397. Htpner, supra note 12, at 32 (noting also that "codetermination seems to have committed itself
to being a cooperative process. Both sides see themselves as partners, not as opponents in class
confrontation."). Id
398. Dinh, supra note 3, at 979 (works councils are responsible for implementing the union
agreement, and also bargain over specific terms for specific companies).
399. Id at 978-79 (also noting that, for example, sixteen leading unions are organized into the
Deutschen Gewerkshafisbundes federation).
400. Id at 979.
401. Id. at 980. Dinh explains, "the union is somewhat akin to a national political organization
concerned with matters within a given industry. The works council is somewhat analogous to a
parliament, with the union support its active members for seats on the works council." Id (citing Janice
R. Bellace, The Role of Law in Supporting Cooperative Employee Representation Systerns, 15 COM P.
LAB. L.J. 441, 444 (1994)).
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5. E. U. Harmonization and Globalization
In Germany, capital market law, as such, did not exist until 1990.402
Over the past fifteen years, 403 efforts to harmonize the laws of economies of
European Union countries wrought significant changes to the German
corporate governance regime. 404  Most of these changes caused the
appearance of a convergence towards an Anglo-American model of
governance. 05 At the same time, the international competition for equity
capital encouraged the reformation of German corporate governance
laws.406  As a result of globalization, deregulation, and privatization, 407
significant amounts of equity flooded global capital markets. Countries
eager to encourage investment within their borders promulgated minority
shareholder protections and transparency reforms.4 08 Concomitantly,
German firms wanting to exploit opportunities on foreign exchanges had to
accept U.S.-style reporting requirements and accounting methods. 409 These
402. Nowak, supra note 287, at 428 (going on to explain that "[b]efore then, rules and regulations
concerning the issuance and trading of securities were to be found in various parts of the law,
particularly in stock corporation law, securities exchange law, and banking law").
403. Germany's corporate governance reforms were set in motion in the early 1990s. Odenius,
supra note 276, at 7.
404. See, e.g., Zumbansen & Saam, supra note 129, at 8 ("there is wide agreement that these
[Continental European] national systems are under severe and growing pressure to converge").
405. See, e.g., Owen et al., supra note 16, at 6 ("During the 1990s . . . the focus on shareholder value
as the principal measure of a company's performance was seen to be a powerful force for concentrating
the minds of managers on making their business more efficient and more profitable. The apparent
superiority of the American system encouraged other countries to look for ways of injecting greater
dynamism into their financial markets. This meant, among other things, upgrading the importance of
shareholder value and embracing, at least partially, the market for corporate control as a means of
imposing discipline on publicly quoted companies."). Additional pressure came for the
"Americanization" of corporate governance came from institutional investors, especially following the
U.S. dot-com crash and the Enron and Worldcom corporate scandals. Id.; see also Donnelly, supra note
290, at 86-90.
406. Nowak, supra note 287, at 426 ("What seems clear. . . is that the formal legal developments-
driven by the European Union and designed to meet the international appetite for investor protection-
have led to a shift in the foundations of German equity markets.").
407. For example, efforts by the EU to reduce unemployment via early retirement and to harmonize
retirement laws lead to a growing emphasis on private pension systems. The private pension funds
created need, of course, a place to park their money. See Jacoby, supra note 9, at 15; Zumbansen &
Saam, supra note 129, at 8 ("The privatization of public welfare systems and the increased tendency to
base pension and retirement financing on the capital market have coincided with a worldwide
competition for stock market investments.").
408. Enriques & Volpin, supra note 245, at 128.
409. Branson, supra note 8, at 329 (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects
for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641 (1999));
Nowak, supra note 278, at 40 ("At the same time the German stock exchange began to modernize,
German issuers also went 'global' by raising equity in sock markets abroad. The listing of Daimler-
Benz AG on the New York Stock Exchange on October 5, 1993 was part of a comprehensive financing
strategy designed to end the company's reliance on domestic providers of capital. It made Daimler the
first German company to reconcile its financial statements with U.S. GAAP.") See also John Ammer et
al., Look at Me Now: The Role of Cross-Listing in Attracting U.S. Investors (Board of Governors of the
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reforms show that incremental changes in a country7s corporate governance
regime are possible, and that encouraging a flourishing and liquid capital
market is not antithetical to a corporate governance regime that embraces
stakeholder involvement in corporate decision-making.
As a few examples of harmonization, Germany promulgated minority
shareholder protections,' 0 laws forbidding insider trading, increased
transparency through heighted reporting and accounting standards, 4 1 1 and
encouraged derivative lawsuits by shareholders against management. 4 12  It
passed rules facilitating communication among shareholders, made
derivative suits easier to bring, and streamlined the private enforcement of
its securities laws, thereby encouraging U.S.-style shareholder litigation.4 13
It also created a securities law enforcement bureaucracy roughly analogous
to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.414 In 1998, Germany
even introduced Sarbanes-Oxley-type legislation, aiming to increase the
monitoring effectiveness and risk management of supervisory and
management boards. 4 15
European Union harmonization,m416 moTover, has done much to
change corporate disclosure requirements and to restrict self-dealing and
Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion Paper No. 815, 2004), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2004/815/default.htm (using a 1997 survey to demonstrate
U.S. investors' preference for cross-listed foreign equities and finding differences based on the country
of origin).
410. Such protections are seen to facilitate capital market development because they assure
investors "that in addition to their original investment more of the firm's profits will come back to them
as dividends and interests, and this assurance motivates them to pay more for financial assets.".
Anderson & Gupta, supra note 127, at 9.
411. In 1990, Germany promulgated the Verkaufsprospektgesetz [Prospectus Act], analogous to the
Securities Act of 1933, which governs the prospectus requirements for initially offered securities.
Nowak, supra note 287, at 428. In 1994, Germany passed the Zweites Finanzmarketfidrderungsgesetz
[Second Financial Market Promotion Act] ("FFT 11") that, inter alia, delineated periodic reporting
requirements analogous to those required by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id at 429-30. In
1995, issues of securities have been required to make ad hoc disclosures of certain events that directly
impact share value. Id. at 432 (citing Section 15 of the Securities Trading Act (1995)).
412. The Fourth Financial Market Promotion Act ("FFG IV") created an option for shareholders to
privately sue issuers for making untimely, false, or misleading statements as well as for non-disclosure
of material information. Nowak, supra note 287, at 440. (citing the Wertpapierbandelsgesetz [WpHG]
[Securities Trading Act], § 37b). Moreover, several German law firms have begun to specialize in US-
style securities litigation. Id at 439.
413. Enriques & Volpin, supra note 245, at 132-33.
414. The Federal Securities Supervisory Office was created in 1995. Nowak, supra note 287, at
430. Later, in 2002, it was consolidated with banking, insurance regulators into the Federal Financial
Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt fir Finanzdienstleistungsaufticht) ("BaFin"). Id. (citing the
Gesetz ilber die integrierte Finanzaufsicht [Law on Integrated Financial Services Supervision]
("FinDAG").
415. Id. at 435 (citing the 1998 Corporation Control and Transparency Act ("KonTraG").
416. Such harmonization, it is argued, is desirable because it facilitates trade, the movement of
business and capital, and thus renders it easier for firms to adjust to other markets and is economically
efficient. 1, supra note 260 at 290-92. In the European Community, harmonization arose
primarily from Community legislation, or "Directives," which member states would incorporate into
their own laws. Id at 291.
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insider trading. Since 2006, listed companies in Europe must draw up their
books according to International Financial Reporting Standards ("IFRS"),
including the disclosure of any retained earnings.417 They must also
disclose any insider trading. 18 Moreover, companies must now disclose
compensation information for their boards, including the existence of any
stock options.419 These disclosure requirements are policed by newly
empowered public enforcement regimes.420
The Leviathan-like role the German Hausbank has on supervisory
boards likewise wanes. Hoping to capitalize on the same profits enjoyed
by their American colleagues in times of plenty, these banks began to
exchange their voice on corporate boards for greater liquidity42' and
gradually reoriented themselves towards the investment bank paradigm. 422
Meanwhile, as a part of reforms passed in 1998, new laws required such
banks to abstain from exercising proxy votes in companies where they
already held more than five percent of shares and to consult with the actual
shareholders before exercising their proxies. 423  Now, "individuals may
instruct their banking institution to exercise their proxy rights in a
particular manner."424
Similar law cracked down on large blockholders.4 25 At the turn of the
millennium, new legislation prohibited deviations from the one-share one-
vote principle. By forbidding multiple voting stock, caps on voting rights,
and maximum voting rights, new laws limited the power of controlling
shareholders. 2 6 Meanwhile, changes in tax regulation encouraged the sale
of cross-corporation shareholdings, enticed banks and other financial
institutions to unload some of their controlling blocks.427 As a result,
interlocking directorates are declining. 428 The European Court of Justice,
417. This reform was seen as important because companies could cover up unprofitable times by
dispersing such retained earnings. Enriques & Volpin, supra note 245, at 136 ("As a consequence,
investors should be better able to understand whether companies retain excessive cash in the effort to
maximize the size of the firm and the private benefits that size can bring.").
418. Id at 134.
419. Id. at 135. However, German companies, upon a vote of shareholders, may opt out of this
requirement until 2011. Id at 136.
420. Id at 136 (supervisory agency can review company's financial reports; increased public
oversight of auditors via a PCAOB equivalent).
421. Jacoby, supra note 9, at 15.
422. H6pner, supra note 12, at 26. For example, Deutsche Bank "has nearly halved its supervisory
board chairs in German companies." Id.
423. Nowak, supra note 287, at 436 (citing the KonTraG) (must also disclose when bank
shareholdings exceed five percent of voting rights and must submit proposals as to how to exercise the
proxy voting rights of their customers).
424. Donnelly, supra note 290, at 86.
425. For a detailed summary of the decrease in equity ownership concentration, see Dariusz Wojcik,
Change in the German Model of Corporate Governance: Evidence from Bloekholders, 1997 2001
(Oxford 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=294459.
426. Nowak, supra note 287, at 436 (citing thc KonTraG).
427. Id at 437 (citing Steuererleichterungsgesetz [Tax Reduction Act], 2000).
428. Hdpner, supra note 12, at 26.
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moreover, recently held unlawful certain laws entrenching specific
shareholders.429
Harmonization has also somewhat undermined the unique regime of
co-determination. Companies may now form as European companies
(Societas Europa),430 and can elect to adopt less worker representation on
their boards of directors and a unitary board structure 4 31-even if such
companies do business in Germany.
Changes in takeover legislation also occurred. In 1995, a bureaucratic
commission introduced voluntary guidelines that counseled bidders to
make an offer to all minority shareholders when acquiring a majority of a
company's voting shares.4 32 Later, although Germany blocked the passage
of a E.U.-wide takeover code providing strong protections to minority
shareholders,433 it did promulgate a takeover law in 2002434 that permits
certain anti-takeover devices 4 35 while requiring all bidders to make an
"adequate" offer for all company shares in change of control
436transactions. This provision allows minority shareholders unhappy with
the change of events a viable exit option.4 37 At the same time, worker
representatives on supervisory boards no longer act as the impenetrable
barrier to takeovers that they once did. Moving in a productivity-oriented
direction, unions no longer view takeovers as a kind of predatory
capitalism. Instead, they now accept certain reorganizations as acceptable
instruments of economic behavior. 4 38 As a result of these reforms, the role
of Anglo-American investors increased through the 1990s and 2000s.
British and American funds now invest actively in German firms. 439
429. Zumbansen & Saam, supra note 129, at 1-2 (citing Volkswagen, Case C-112/21005 (Oct. 23,
2007), an opinion holding unlawful provisions that give minority shareholders (here, a local
government) veto power over a takeover that is otherwise approved of by the majority of shareholders).
430. Negotiations over the SE endured for three decades. Id. at 3.
431. Hopt, supra note 151, at 454-55 (citing Council Regulation of 8 October 2001, OJ 294/1,
10.11.2001, Art. 39 et seq. and Art. 43 et seq.); Odenius, supra note 276, at 9-10 ("A conversion to SE
status offers significant flexibility in terms of internal controls, including by offering the possibility of
moving to a one-tier board, smaller board sizes, and reduced labor participation.").
432. Nowak, supra note 287, at 444 (citing the Obernahmekodex)
433. See, e.g., Owen et al., supra note 16, at 15; Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 17. The
proposed E.U. takeover directive resembled in many respects the City Takeover Code of the U.K.,
addressed infra. See Nowak, supra note 287, at 443. (it would have banned all takeover defenses, e.g.,
"poison pills" and staggered boards).
434. This takeover code ("Wpl)G") replaced the earlier voluntary takeover code and combines
elements of both U.S. and U.K. takeover laws. Odenius, supra note 276, at 14.
435. Although U.S. style poison-pills and other pre-offer protective devices are unlawful, German
boards may decide to sell certain essential assets or issue new shares to a third party. Baums & Scott,
supra note 150, at 17.
436. Nowak, supra note 287, at 444 (citing the Wertpapiererwerbsund Ubernahmegesetz [German
Takeover Act], 2002).
437. Odenius, supra note 276, at 14.
438. Hdpner, supra note 12, at 19.
439. Investments in equities in France, Germany and Japan were, in 2000, allocated as follows:
67.2% was made by U.K. institutional investors, followed by U.S. institutions at 40.3%, French
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Pension funds, like CalPERS, even direct their shareholder activism
towards changing firm governance.440
Despite such reforms, however, a true convergence appears unlikely:
the recent financial recession, as well as the significant differences in
ownership and governance structures, 44 1 currently serve to prevent true
harmonization. 4 2  Germans, seeing the havoc wreaked by participants in
the world's biggest stock markets, are loath to adopt more reforms to bring
themselves closer to the Anglo-American model.443 In addition, many
scholars argue that path dependence, a term describing the costly nature of
economic change, prevents rapid change. 444 Thus, Germany's debt-based
financial system seems unlikely to change any time soon, as does its
corporatist stakeholder-friendly structure.
6. Conclusions
Regardless, those interested in reforming the regime of American
corporate governance can learn from the convergent trends. The growth of
Anglo-American capital markets in Germany shows that, at a minimum,
such markets are not completely antithetical to more stakeholder-friendly
models of governance.445 Indeed, the new interest in promoting
shareholding has not resulting in a rejection of institutions and practices
that shielded the corporate economy from the influence of capital markets,
but in a selective modification of the entire system that endows
institutions at 25.8%, Japanese institutions at 20.6%, and German institutions at only 14%. Carolyn
Brancato & Michael Price, The Institutional Investor 's Goals For Corporate Law in the Twenty-First
Century, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 35, 41 (2000).
440. Hdpner, supra note 12, at 14-15 (noting that Calpers published its Corporate Governance
Principles for Germany in 1999, describing its stance on issues arising by virtue of its role as a
shareholder and voter); Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 12.
441. E.g., Enriques & Volpin, supra note 245, at 138. It is argued, also, that Germany's co-
determination law "has upheld progress in European company law harmonization for decades and has
led to an uneasy compromise in the regulation of the European Company." Hopt, supra note 151, at
453.
442. See, e.g., Owen et al., supra note 16, at 7 ("The U.S. model of corporate governance lost much
of its appeal, especially in those Continental countries where the concept of shareholder value
maximization did not fit easily with long-established habits and attitudes.").
443. See Branson, supra note 8, at 348 ("[T]he market individualism of market leaning economies is
simply intolerable in many societies. The economy is embedded in the social order and social cohesion,
not rugged individualism."); Id at 351 52; see also Columbo, supra note 77, at 285-87 (after the
various corporate scandals at the turn of the century, faith in the free market has waned).
444. See Wojcik, supra note 425, at 2-3 (citing Bebchuk & Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in
Corporate Governance and Ownership, 52 STAN. L. REv. 127 (1999)). According to path dependence,
changes in economic infrastructures will occur only if the benefits of change are sufficiently great to
overcome the costs of such change.
445. The German reforms did not, after all, seek to replicate the U.S. model. Rather, thcy strived
for a hybrid system, with corporate governance to rely upon both insiders and outsiders. Odenius,
supra note 276, at 7 (internal citation omitted). The result of German reforms was that the control of
outsiders, e.g, minority shareholders, has increased and insider control has been reigned in. Id at 15.
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shareholders with new rights and strengthens institutions through which to
exercise them.446 It is possible, given the German experience, that the
American corporate governance regime can likewise make "selective
modifications" to incorporate more stakeholder-friendly measures. For
example, encouraging public pension funds, like CalPERS, to become
increasingly active in corporate governance may bring some of the benefits
associated with the majority German shareholders, although to a lesser
extent.44 7 Moreover, as neither U.S. nor German law can be said to give
primacy to shareholder interests,44 the possibility for stakeholder-friendly
reforms is greater than one might expect.
C. THEORIES OF THE FIRM IN GERMANY: VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM
AND CONVERGENCE TOWARDS THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MODEL?
The theories justifying the German regime of corporate governance
reflect an acceptance that the economy serves a social purpose. They also
show that taking account of stakeholders may lead to efficiencies that will
benefit not only shareholders, but also all stakeholders. Many of these
theories overlap those found in American jurisprudence and academia.
They therefore lead to the conclusion that stakeholder-friendly governance
reforms are possible in America.
1. Varieties of Capitalism
Germany, with its codetermination, union prevalence, and
blockholdings, represents an example of a coordinated market economy,
against which the U.S. counterpart is often measured."' However, it is
possible that the German version of capitalism is not a product of some
innate human characteristic of Germans, but instead is the product of a
historical balancing of existing power and economic structures. Under the
varieties of capitalism theory of corporate governance, the difference can
be explained by assuming that institutions in an economy are arranged so
as to be in equilibrium.4 50 For example, as banks grew into the most
important source of capital, their role on corporate boards likewise
increased. In the leadership vacuum following World War II, unions came
to represent popular interests. Their role in corporate governance therefore
446. Donnelly, supra note 290, at 99.
447. See Baums & Scott, supra note 150, at 12. Although increasingly active, however, such
investors have yet to become a powerful determinant of board behavior. Id at 13.
448. Id at 18.
449. Hdpner, supra note 12, at 5-6.
450. Id at 6 ("The varieties approach describes production systems as configurations of institutional
arrangements at the national level. One decisive assumption is that institutional arrangements in
different domains of the productive systems [e.g., labor, capital, intercompany relations, competition,
government regulation] are in balanced positions to each other."); Owen, et al., supra note 16, at 7.
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increased.45' In contrast, in the United States, New Deal legislation
prevented the amassing of political and economic power in banks and other
financial institutions.452 At the same time, the Clayton Act of 1914
prohibited interlocking directorships, 453 thus preventing the intra-firm cross
holdings typical of industry in Germany. Accordingly, American
companies had to find financing elsewhere, i.e., in the hands of individual
investors. 454
A lesson to be derived from this theory of governance is that so long
as the interests of powerful economic and social interests are
accommodated and balanced, many different varieties of capitalism can be
successful and stable. It thus demonstrates that any given system of
governance may not be the penultimate product of economic competition
and market pressures, but instead more of an accident. Such a system, like
the Anglo-American corporate governance regime, is therefore amenable to
reform when social and economic interests change.
2. Stakeholder-Based Governance
In the German variety of capitalism, efficiency and profit are not the
only goal of industrial enterprise. Nor is the monetary welfare of
shareholders. Rather, Germany's economic model aims to govern human
and corporate lives, goals, and aspirations. 45 Indeed, outside the former
British Empire, "the world's economies are perceived as serving the society
as a whole. Citizens and national leaders see the economy as but an
element of the larger society." 456 This concept, recognized in Germany for
decades, has begun to resonate in Anglo-American thinking, especially as
corporations globalize and the power of sovereign states wanes.
3. Specific Investment and Team Theory
The German model of corporate governance also resonates with the
specific investment model. While rejecting as normative consensus the
451. Hbpner, supra note 12, at 6.
452. Jacoby, supra note 9, at 9 (For example, the Glass-Steagall Act, eventually repealed in the
1990s, prevented the combination of both investment and commercial banking); Smith, supra note 71,
at 152 ("Professor Roe notes that these more centralized foreign structures [in Germany and Japan]
would be illegal in the United States. He discusses as examples of legal barriers preventing more
concentrated ownership in the United States various financial regulations including the Bank Holding
Company Act, the Glass-Steagall Act, and the McFadden Act that prevent the development of German
or Japanese-style systems in the United States.") (citing Roe, supra note 71, at 94-96, 98-99, 170-71).
453. Mizruchi & Hirshman, supra note 31, at 1073 (citing Clayton Act of 1914 § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 19
(2010)).
454. Smith, supra note 71, at 15253.
455. See Branson, supra note 8, at 332.
456. Id at 347.
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shareholder-oriented paradigm, 4 5 7 the German corporate governance regime
also recognizes the specific investments made by multiple stakeholders by
affording them voice and protection. It therefore aligns nicely with team
theory.
For example, the existence of codetermination and works councils
reflect the team-specific investment made by labor. Often, it is argued that
stakeholders should not become involved in the management of company
affairs because they have no skin in the game-they are adequately
protected through contract. Any decisions they make, therefore, will
necessarily be inefficient. German corporate law, which mandates their
involvement, can be said to recognize that employees "do make a
nondiversifiable investment in human capital, an investment that increases
the employee's stake in the corporation proportionately to the firm-
specificity of the human capital." 45 8 Their involvement in firm decision-
making, therefore, is not inefficient but instead will help to enhance firm
wealth.
Moreover, the German corporation's long-term relations with its
workers, suppliers, banks, and customers "facilitate commitments to
permanent employees." 459 Long-term commitments by the actors on each
side facilitate these stable relationships, as "personal ties are supported by
lifetime employment."460 Toencourage such long-term commitments,
employees, therefore, are given a greater voice over firm affairs. 4 6 1
Employee involvement, moreover, fosters efficiency-enhancing
cooperation, an alternative that increases firm and shareholder wealth more
than a system based upon class confrontation.462 In contrast, when financial
and worker commitments are more short-term, and employees are not
expected to make significant firm-specific investments, their influence over
management decisions is logically lessened.463
Similarly, German corporate governance reflects the long-term
specific investment of company management. Unlike the United States,
457. Branson, supra note 8, at 331.
458. Dinh, supra note 3, at 993 (internal quotation omitted); Jacoby, supra note 9, at 30
("[E]mployees are an important (though imperfectly measured) source of capital to the enterprise. And,
while shareholders are protected through limited liability and portfolio diversification, employees have
neither of these risk-reducing shields.").
459. Jacoby, supra note 9, at 19. The author goes on to argue that "these commitments promote
extensive firm-specific training systems because employees require assurances that the returns on their
training investments will be fairly divided and ultimately paid. Id.
460. See id at 20 (long-term employees can be well known and trusted by the firm's various long-
term stakeholders, including banks, customers, and suppliers).
461. See Hdpner, supra note 12, at 7 (employees receive the benefits of co-determination, works
councils and job security; investors receive monitoring capabilities, access to information, and
protection from minority shareholder pressures).
462. See Htipner, supra note 12, at 32.
463. See Jacoby, supra note 9, at 19-20 ("In the United States, by contrast, employer training
investments are much lower than in Germany or Japan, employees are more mobile . . . and there are
few examples of employees having a role in corporate governance except in unionized firms.").
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which developed a professional board of director labor market, German
managers are "embedded in a much stronger technical culture, which leads
to a strong production on production design." 464  These managers rise up
from the ranks, developing long-term relationships with customers,
suppliers, banks, shareholders, and workers.45 Unlike the professional
managers of the United States, they enjoy a rich and diverse understanding
of the specific industry and the firm itself They are also insulated from the
negative implications of short-term stock price fluctuations. 466
Simply, Germany does not rely upon the enforcement of arm's length
contracts to protect stakeholders from opportunism. Rather, German
companies use relational contracting based on personal ties, trust, and
reputation.467 This institutional arrangement fits well with a team theory of
the firm and shows that this theory of corporate governance is possible and
profitable to implement.
4. Product Market Discipline
In Anglo-American corporate governance regimes, scholars expect
that the market for corporate control will curb agency costs associated with
the separation of ownership and control. Essentially, directors, concerned
about their job security, will endeavor to keep stock prices high to preclude
predatory tender offers.4 68 Such efforts, in theory, will maximize firm
value and protect shareholder interests. In Germany, however, firm
management does not face this kind of pressure.
Yet, those that direct German firms are not immune to market
pressures. German firms still face powerful international product market
competition. This competition drives them to maximize efficiencies and,
therefore, firm value,469 which in turn, increases share price.470 In other
words, product market competition acts as an adequate proxy for the
market for corporate control.471 With the increasingly globalized product
market, the pressures of this crucible will grow even greater and will
464. HIdpner, supra note 12, at 22.
465. Id.; Jacoby, supra note 9, at 19-20.
466. Hpner, supra note 12, at 22.
467. Jacoby, supra note 9, at 21.
468. E.g., Hdpner, supra note 12, at 17.
469. Hdpner, supra note 12, at 15; see also Bainbridge, supra note 174, at 784; see generally Jens
Koke & Luc Renneboog, Do Corporate Control and Product Market Competition Lead to Stronger
Productivit Growth? Evidence from Market-Oriented and Blockholder-Based Governance Regimes, 48
J. L. & ECON. 475 (2005).
470. Htpner, supra note 12, at 17 ("Multiple regression shows that both the institutionalization of
ownership structure and the competition with foreign goods have significant effects on shareholder
orientation.").
471. Id. at 15 ("the product market plays the role of the (restricted) market for corporate control: in
the case of opportunistic managers, a firm with a stronger management team will capture the product
market from the firm with the weaker management team").
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therefore, theoretically, hone the ability and honesty of German firm
management.4 72
Presumably, the same product market competition may serve as a
disciplining mechanism on the managers of U.S. companies. Accordingly,
given that shareholder wealth can be left in the capable hands of the
product market, sacrificing some investor voice for other stakeholders may
not prove entirely catastrophic to shareholder interests.
5. Shareholder Value, Liberalization, and Institutional Investors
Some commentators argue that the stability created by German's
variety of capitalism prevents its transition to a more liberal market
economy.4 73  Nevertheless, the globalization of financial markets creates
the same kinds of pressures to enhance shareholder value in German firms
as it does in Anglo-American firms.474 At the same time, the growing
involvement in German capital markets by foreign institutional investors-
especially those hailing from the U.S. and U.K.47 5-pressures German firm
management to focus more on short term share price.476
Undoubtedly, shareholder value is becoming more and more
influential in Germany. In some German firms, for example, disclosures to
investors grew more robust 477  and management began to implement
informal mechanisms to incorporate investor input into decision-making.478
Notably, some German firms began incentivizing managerial compensation
by linking it to share price. 479  Foreign institutional investors influence the
management of German companies by throwing sunshine on corporate
activities and by threatening to withdraw capital unless management
increases stock prices.480  As an illustration, CalPERS, a public (defined
472. Hdpner, supra note 12, at 16 (but also noting that only industries subject to such competition
will have their agency costs thus reduced; sheltered industries will avoid the disciplining mechanism).
473. Id. at 7 (citing Soskice/Hank).
474. Id. ("pressures associated with the internationalization of finance, both direct investments and
portfolio investments . . . puts pressure on the institutions of coordinated market economy .. [which]
could lead to companies developing shareholder value strategies.").
475. The involvement of such investors grew dramatically in the 1990s. For example, in 1999, 40%
of Mannesmann equity was held by U.S. and U.K. investors; 31% of DaimlerChrysler, and 27.5% of
Deutsche Telekom. Id. at 14.
476. Hdpner, supra note 12, at 13; see also Strine, Fundamental Question, supra note 141, at 10-11
(describing impact on short-term prices by institutional investor activity).
477. Id at 11 ("Shareholder oriented companies are supposed to publish annual reports of high
quality. In the late 1990s, several companies made progress in transparency by using the International
Accounting Standards or the General Accepted Accounting Principles [GAAP] instead of the insider-
oriented accounting rules of the Handelsgesetzbuch.").
478. Id at 11 (e.g., organization and informational meetings with institutional investors, publishing
reports, and the establishment of investor relations departments, all of which reduce agency costs).
479. Id at 12 (e.g., stock options). It should be noted, moreover, that embracing a shareholder-
value theory of corporate governance legitimizes increasing management remuneration. Id at 24.
480. Hdpner, supra note 12, at 14.
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benefit) pension fund hailing from California, published corporate
governance principles according to which it makes investment decisions.
Such guidelines create incentives for German firm management to alter
their decision-making to accommodate such investors' preferences.48'
Moreover, the growing market for corporate control in Germany, as in the
U.S., boosts the shareholder value movement.482 And German unions, once
opposed to corporate takeovers a priori because of their perceived threat to
worker interests, now view takeovers less as an instrument of class conflict
and more as an acceptable instrument of economic behavior.483 Indeed,
some proponents of the varieties of capitalism theory of corporate
governance 484 fear that the shareholder value phenomenon, foreign to the
German managed economy, will destabilize its productive institutions by
creating an imbalance between the historical relationship between banks,
controlling shareholders, and corporations. 485
D. CONCLUSIONS
The German corporate governance regime, especially as institutional
investors assume an increasing role in corporate decision-making, shows
that stakeholder involvement in corporate decision-making is a feasible in a
modern, industrialized economy. Moreover, the growing role of minority
institutional investors, and the legal changes that accommodate them,
illustrate that such involvement may be feasible in economies more
dependent upon securities market-based financing. These and other
conclusions are explained in more detail below.
1. A Role for Stakeholders in Corporate Decision-Making is Feasible
The German corporate governance regime, which imbeds stakeholder
representation into corporate governance, demonstrates that growth and
effective corporate management is possible, even if non-shareholder
stakeholders, in the form of creditors and workers, help run the firm. In
fact, such representation promotes stable, sustainable, and long-term
growth. Thus, a corporation need not be governed solely by a board
elected by shareholders to be profitable.
In addition, certain convergent trends in Germany reveal that a more
stakeholder-friendly model of corporate governance is possible in the U.S.
The growing participation of institutional investors in the German
corporate governance regime illustrates that governments can integrate
481. Id at 15.
482. See discussion of the changing takcover cnvironment supra.
483. HaIpner, supra note 12, at 19.
484. This theory is presented briefly supra.
485. Htipner, supra note 12, at 7.
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Anglo-American corporate governance concepts with more stakeholder-
friendly rules. Similarly, the increasing prevalence of active institutional
investors in the United States since the 1990s, and accompanying recession
of dispersed stock ownership,4 86 proves that Anglo-American regimes can
indeed accommodate stakeholder interests.
2. Corporate Constituents Can Wear Multiple Hats
The German model also shows that stakeholder interests can also be
represented through their roles as investors. German banks assume a role
as investor, proxy voter, and board member. It is possible, therefore, that
labor and other stakeholders can achieve influence by exploiting its
multiple roles in the corporate governance regime.
3. Common Ground Between Labor and Investors
The German model-especially the recent changes to that model-
also brings into relief the common ground that can exist between labor and
long-term shareholders. Each seeks a high degree of transparency4 87 and
the long-term profitability of the firm.488 For example, both unions and
minority investors reject traditional German accounting standards, which
allow companies to hide cash flows in good times and disguise reserves as
profits in bad times.489 Both minority investors and workers do not benefit
from the stripping of corporate assets through exorbitant executive
remuneration policies.490 The common ground between these two groups is
powerful enough that "[t]here is absolutely no indication that shareholder
value companies attempt to put an end to codetermination." 49 1  This
alignment of interests between labor and such investors renders more
486. See Smith, supra note 71, at 156-57 ("[A]s Professor Roe admits, there is evidence that the
corporate governance structures in Germany, Japan and the United States are converging. For example,
banks in the United States are increasingly sponsoring mutual funds. Furthermore, institutional
investors have threatened to become more active in corporate governance, increasing the size of their
equity holdings in U.S. corporations. These trends may be evidence that the structure of U.S.
corporations is moving.").
487. Ht6pner, supra note 12, at 27 ("Unions recognize that international accounting standards,
wither IAS or US-GAAP, seem to be, at first sight, investor oriented. In effect, they are viewed as
being employee oriented, too. Trade unionists argue that they have called for company transparency all
along, because they need accurate information to achieve the goal of codetermination: to monitor
economic power.").
488. See, e.g., Hopt, supra note 151, at 461 ([W]eakening the voice of employees on supervisory
boards would be "even worse for the shareholders because . . . employees ... know the company best
and have a keen interest in its prosperity, for the sake of their own jobs and salaries.").
489. Hdpner, supra note 12, at 28.
490. Id. ("Just like shareholder activists, unions criticize the trend towards escalating salaries.");
Strine, supra note 96, at 16.
491. Hdpner, supra note 12, at 32.
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feasible a model of governance that incorporates a stakeholder agenda
through the shareholder mechanism.
III. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE U.K.
An examination of the German model reveals that a corporate
governance regime that incorporates stakeholder involvement can serve to
promote stakeholder interests while also leading to stable industrial growth.
In turn, an examination of the U.K. corporate governance regime reveals
that such involvement can be facilitated by empowering stakeholders in
their role of shareholders in economies less dependent upon debt financing.
For a large part, corporate governance in the U.K. resembles its
American counterpart.492 Both countries' public corporations share patterns
of widely dispersed share ownership, boast well-developed securities
markets, promulgate significant disclosure requirements, and offer minority
shareholder protections. They both, also, value shareholder wealth
maximization.493
But in the U.K., one major difference in corporate governance exists:
U.K. law affords shareholders much more power over their boards of
directors. In the U.K., unlike in the U.S., shareholders can call an
extraordinary general meeting with the approval of only shareholders
representing ten percent of firm equity, and can remove board members
with only a plurality of votes.494 They may also amend corporate charters
free of any board gatekeeping function. 495  These abilities render corporate
492. The U.K. regime is not based on state law that provides "default" rules that apply absent a
contractual arrangement otherwise (e.g., in a corporate charter of bylaws). Instead, it derives from a
"comply or explain" regime based upon a code of behavior. See Financial Reporting Council, The
Combined Code on Corporate Governance 1 (2003), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/
documents/pdf/combinedcodefinal.pdf.
493. For instance:
British corporate law values and corporate governance structures continue to be aligned with
their American counterparts. . . . [They] share a pattern of widely dispersed share ownership,
in contrast to Europe and Japan, where more companies are family-owned, otherwise have a
dominant shareholder, or exhibit patterns of concentrated bank share-ownership or cross-
shareholding between bank and industry .... Both countries have well-developed securities
markets, and both depend upon similar mechanisms to promote managerial accountability,
including financial transparency, stock market valuations, and the market for corporate
control. Moreover, the United States and the UK both exhibit a form of shareholder
capitalism, under which the purpose of the corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth, in
contrast to the European stakeholder view, according to which managers need to balance the
interests of multiple constituencies when making decisions.
Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American
Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 493, 498 (2005). Britain, for example,
strenuously opposed a proposed mandated labor participation in governance during EU governance
reform negotiations. Branson, supra note 8, at 337.
494. Owen et al., supra note16, at 7, 19.
495. Bruner, supra note 184, at 605.
382 Vol. 7:2
STAKEHOLDER-SHAREHOLDER THEORY
boards, wary of these powers, more welcoming to shareholder proposals.4 96
It likewise stands in stark contrast to U.S. shareholders, who must wage a
costly proxy fight to implement their suggestions.497 in addition, takeover
regulation in the U.K. grants greater protections to minority shareholders
than in the U.S. While in the U.S., management may utilize protective
devices like poison pills, staggered boards, and shareholder rights plans to
block hostile tender offers, such conduct is prohibited under U.K. corporate
governance rules.4 98
The focus on shareholder rights in U.K. corporate governance does
not derive from a greater cultural appreciation for private equity markets,
however. Britain's commitment to stakeholder protections is arguably as
vibrant as that in Germany.499 As in Germany, inter-war economic
difficulties created a welfare state that "[accepted] the idea that the state
had to provide jobs and comforts when business could not."500
In fact, at least one scholar explains that it is this commitment to
social welfare, illustrated by the relatively strong exogenous protection
afforded stakeholders, that account for the difference between the role and
protection afforded minority shareholders between the U.S. and the U.K.s'o
The divergence in the protective devices afforded to minority investors
arises from "the different ways in which they [relate] to external regulatory
structures that affect relationships among stakeholders in the corporate
enterprise." Simply, employees in the U.K. enjoy social safety nets and
employment protections strong enough to diminish the need to include their
voices in corporate governance.5 03 These protections deflected stakeholder-
oriented political pressures away from the corporate governance regime
and into exogenous legislation.504 Moreover, the labor movement in the
U.K., fearful that the use of German-style codetermination and works
councils would undermine the power of trade unions, focused their efforts
496. Owen et al., supra note 16, at 19.
497. Id
498. Odenius, supra note 276, at 14; Bruner, supra note 184, at 605-06.
499. See Bruner, supra note 184, at 632-33.
500. Id at 624.
501. Idat 586.
502. Idat 583-84.
503. Id at 585-86. While the U.K. Takeover Code is decidedly shareholder-centric, it does toss a
few crumbs at stakeholders. For example, employee representatives may consult with target boards
during hostile tender offer bidding and present their views during the tender offer proposal process.
Recent proposed changes to the Code would likewise require bidders to disclose more information on
their financial wherewithal so that employees, concerned shareholders and other stakeholders can better
understand the impact of the deal on their interests. See Eduardo Gallardo, Protectionism and
Paternalism at the UK Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, HARVARD LAw SCHOOL FORUM ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Dec. 1 1, 2010), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/20 10/12/11 /protectionism-and-paternalism-at-the-uk-panel-on-takeovers-and-mergers/#more-
14391.
504. Bruner, supra note 184, at 617.
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on collective bargaining instead. 05 Thus, unlike the American version,
where corporate law takes an ambivalent stance towards stakeholders and
shareholders,506 and unlike the German model, incorporating stakeholders
directly, corporate governance in the U.K. focuses heavily on shareholder
rights.
United Kingdom institutional shareholders take advantage of laws that
protect their interests. They are, as a rule, more interventionist and more
numerous than their American counterparts.' And many choose to flex
this muscle in a stakeholder-friendly way: its corporations and its
institutional investors more often adhere to CSR and SRI policies than
those in the U.S."08 In addition, although shareholder wealth is the admitted
goal of U.K. corporate law, it is often described in terms of "enlightened
shareholder value," which advocates the respect for stakeholder interests
because such respect facilitates long-term sustainability.509 This divergence
results from different institutional pressures faced by U.K. companies.
They arise from Continental Europe's more stakeholder-friendly corporate
governance laws, as well as from the increasing prevalence of socially
conscious union pension funds 10 and nongovernmental organizations
("NGOs").51' At the same time, many European countries require that
certain institutional investors publicly report the degree to which they adopt
SRI principles.5 12  To attract the money of these investors, many U.K.
companies embrace "enlightened shareholder value" by, for example,
505. See generally Ben Clift, Andrew Gamble & Michael Harris, The Labour Party and The
Company, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE COMPANY 30 (Andrew Gamble, Gavin Kelly & John
Parkinson, eds. Oxford 2000). Labor leadership felt, inter alia, that "excessive collusion" would "lead
to unions becoming implicated in management decision-making processes which could compromise
their rights to free collective bargaining." Id at 67.
506. Bruner, supra note 184, at 594-98.
507. Owen, et al., supra note 16, at 7.
5 0 8. Id
509. Bruner, supra note 184, at 633; Allen et al., supra note 140, at 1076-77. See also generally
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E. 2d 776 (ll. 1969) (a famous American corporate law opinion that held
that a board of directors could choose not to install nighttime lighting in a baseball stadium, against the
wishes of shareholders, because protecting community concerns could benefit the business in the long-
term).
510. For example, socially responsible pension funds, like those of union members, and insurance
companies are more popular in the U.K. than in the U.S. In tandem, socially responsible investment
advisory services like Hermes EOS are more popular in the U.K. See, e.g., generally, UK
SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT AND FINANCE, RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS: SUSTAINABLE PENSION (2009),
available at http://www.uksif.org/cmsfiles/28141I/SustainablePensionsReport_2009.pdf; see also
generally, SOCIAL INVESTMENT FORUM, 2010 REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS
IN THE UNITED STATES (2010), available at http://www.socialinvest.org/resources/pubs/trends/
documents/ 2010OTrendsES.pdf.
511. Williams & Conley, supra note 113, at 499.
512. Id. at 503-04 ("For example, France, Belgium, Germany, and the UK have passed laws that
require pension funds to disclose the extent to which they take ethical, social, and environmental
information into account in constructing their investment portfolios."); Bantekas, supra note I, at 326.
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voluntarily implementing "triple bottom line reporting."' The level of
activism of these institutional investors, indeed, is so high that some
observers link their political influence to the U.K.'s relatively shareholder-
friendly takeover codes.514
The U.K. provides an example of how one might accommodate
stakeholder interests in a shareholder-centric corporate governance regime.
Specifically, it encourages the active involvement of long-term stakeholder
shareholders in corporate decision-making. Through "enlightened
shareholder investing" and "triple bottom line" reporting, shareholder
activism can mesh nicely with both stakeholder protections and shareholder
value.
Shareholder activism, however, can also harm stakeholders.
Investors, wishing to increase their value to their beneficiaries, will
pressure management to increase share value. Such short term planning
can lead to layoffs, outsourcing, or worse.' The results can prove
perverse: an underfunded union pension plan, which manages the
retirement savings of workers, may fill the role of the activist investor
clamoring for short-term profits.5 16 While in the U.K., social safety net
programs will protect these workers, they may not in the U.S.
Thus, lessons are to be learned from the fact that Britain's
shareholder-friendly corporate regime arose in conjunction with a relatively
robust welfare state. While the U.K. corporate governance regime
illustrates the feasibility of empowering stakeholders through their role as
shareholders, it also counsels the empowerment of only the right sort of
shareholder, and only for the right sort of long-term planning."
513. See Williams & Conley, supra note 113, at 504 ("The thinking behind [laws requiring
investors to divulge their SRI practices] is that as pension fund managers start to ask companies for
information on these issues, the companies will respond by making the information more generally
available.").
514. See generally Marco Ventoruzzo, Takeover Regulation as a Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Taking
U.K. Rules to Continental Europe, 11 U. PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 135 (2008).
515. See discussion, supra note 98
516. See Gilson, supra note 98, at 47-48; Deakin, supra note 98, at 977.
517. See Strine, supra note 96, at 13 ("Management and labor have legitimate reasons to distrust
activist short-term investors who seek to influence corporate policy. . . . [T]hat investor is accountable
to no one if the corporation later falters . . The company's long-term investors, management and
labor are left eating the activists' cooking."). See also Bainbridge, supra note 155, at 623 (shareholders
themselves have very diverse interests: short-term v. long-term, diversified or not, inside versus outside,
social versus economic, hedged v. unhedged.). The motivations and desires of these different kinds of
investors may not align with stakeholder interests. To illustrate: a hedged investor may actually profit
poor firm performance, and short-term shareholders may advocate firm liquidation or the shedding of
jobs to cut costs to increase stock prices in the short-term.
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IV. A STAKEHOLDER-SHAREHOLDER THEORY
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
This comparative study of Anglo-American and German corporation
law reveals that stakeholder interests may be successfully incorporated into
the endogenous U.S. corporate governance regime without undermining the
country's economic welfare or disrupting its legal system. More
specifically, it counsels the incorporation of stakeholder interests through
their role as shareholders. Not only does American corporate law and
academic thought already anticipate the participation of shareholders in the
management and monitoring of corporations, they also already
accommodate stakeholder interests-although to an extent considered
inadequate by many critics. In the U.S., this shareholder-stakeholder
relationship offers the only realistic means for stakeholders to include their
interests during corporate decision-making.
Institutional investors that represent the investments of corporate
stakeholders are well positioned to advocate for such interests. As agents,
institutional investors are retained to dispose of assets according to the
desires of their stakeholder beneficiaries. It can be argued, for example,
that because pension benefits represent the deferred wages of workers,
pension financing should be steered by the owners of those benefits, i.e.,
the workers.' If, in turn, the pension fund can exercise its power as a
shareholder, it provides an outlet for workers to influence corporate
decision-making.5 19 The same could be said for any individual beneficiary
of an institutional investor.
This stakeholder-as-stockholder theory of corporate governance can
also be good for the corporate bottom line by focusing management on
long-term and sustainable growth520 and by encouraging better investments
from corporate constituents. For example, when employees own stock in
the company for which they work, their loyalty and motivation increases in
comparison to those who do not.521
Moreover, citizen stockholders can use their investments to wield
results for themselves. Ordinary citizens desirous of changing corporate
behavior can also get involved through their investment funds. Should
"stockholders [take] a moral interest in observing the common good and
assisting the needy, boards would be compelled to take these interests into
account in their decision-making." 522 And because most Americans are
518. Pierre Habbard, The Stewardship of European Workers' Capital in Times of Crisis, 17
TRANSFER: EuR. REV. OF LAB. AND RES. 59, *7 (2011).
519. See, e.g., Mitchell et al., supra note 140, at 458,
520. See discussion regarding "enhanced shareholder value," supra pt. lA.
521. Kropp, supra note 207, at 2.
522. Colurnbo, supra note 77, at 270.
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"forced capitalists," 523 investing their retirement savings on stock markets,
they have the ability to influence corporate decision-making for that good.
Facing insecurities and instability in the face of globalization, they may
also have the necessary motivation to do so. 524
Not only is the empowerment of shareholder activists the only realistic
approach to incorporate stakeholder interests into corporate governance, it
is currently the focus of the advocates of pro-stakeholder reforms in
corporate governance.5 25 Regrettably, this movement is in its infancy. But
certain steps can be, and are being taken to move the process forward.
These events and suggestions are set forth in the remaining paragraphs of
this paper.
A. THE STAKEHOLDER-SHAREHOLDER MOVEMENT IS GAINING
MOMENTUM
Stakeholder representation in corporate decision-making is already
growing. For example, in many countries, trade unions currently pursue a
dual-tracked approach to representing workers' interests: (1) advocacy
through union activity; and (2) advocacy through workers' role as
shareholders, i.e., via their pension funds and other long-terms savings
plans.5 26  Trade union engagement through workers' role as shareholders,
sometimes referred to as the "stewardship of workers' capital," seeks to
promote workers' interests by not only using their status as significant
shareholders to pressure management to adopt internationally recognized
labor standards,5 27  but also to embrace more transparent corporate
governance practices and more sustainable environmental policies.528 An
increasing number of shareholders, especially public sector funds
dominated by union organizations, 5 29 table proposals that aim not at
maximizing share value in the short term, but instead advocate for other
523. Strine, supra note 96, at 4.
524. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Breaking the Corporate Governance Log/am in Washington: Some
Constructive Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward, 63 Bus. L. J. 1079, 1082 (2008) ("As these
forced capitalists face the insecurities and instability arising out of our nation's struggle to remain
competitive in the face of globalized product and capital markets-think downsizings, more frequent
job changes, and benefit cuts-it is unsurprising that they would give voice to concerns about CEO
compensation, stock options fraud, and other hot button issues.").
525. In the international trade union movement, for example, efforts are made to advance worker
rights by increasing the power of unions as well as the power of union pension funds. See discussion,
infra.
526. Habbard, supra note 518, at 7.
527. See, e.g., Int'l Labour Organization [ILO], Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (4th ed. 2006); see also Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development [OECD], Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2008).
528. Habbard, supra note 518, at 7.
529. See Bainbridge, supra note 155, at 630 (most shareholder activism in the U.S. is done by
public and union pension funds).
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socially beneficial changes.' Moreover, empowered perhaps ironically"'
by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"),
activist institutional investors have gained ability to manage securities
fraud litigation against corporations.I532 Institutional investors can,
therefore, pursue their agendas by suing corporations who make misleading
disclosures about their impact on social welfare. 3
Despite these positive changes, shareholder advocacy of stakeholder
interests is far from common and influential in most corporate boardrooms.
For example, their activism most often coincides with reforms that support
advocates of shareholder primacy. Specifically, shareholder proposals
usually call for reforms involving the election and appointment of
"independent" directors, majority voting rules, and the de-staggering of
corporate boards. Such reforms sometimes tend to promote shareholder
value and not stakeholder interests. 34 Moreover, public pension funds
generally possess a fiduciary duty not to advocate for their beneficiaries'
political and social interests, but to maximize the value of their
investments.535 When it comes to stakeholder-friendly reform, therefore,
they may find their hands tied unless they can couch it in terms of share
prices. Meanwhile, most institutional investors will face an uphill battle
anyway, as none by themselves possesses a large enough block of shares to
force change in corporate policy."' And many of these investors prefer to
sell their shares rather than fight unwelcome corporate decision-making.5 37
530. Owen et al., supra-note16, at 20.
531. The PSLRA was intended to eliminate shareholder "strike" suits by, inter alia, imposing
heightened pleadings standards. Instead, it empowered institutional investors by allowing them to more
easily become "lead plaintiffs." See, e.g., In re St. Jude Medical, Inc. Sec. Litig., 629 F.Supp.2d 915,
920 (D.Minn. 2009); Steven Serajeddini, Loss Causation and Class Certification, 108 MICH. L.R. 255,
267 (2009); Matthew O'Brien, Choice of Forum in Securities Class Actions: Con/ronting 'Reform' of
the Securities Act of 1933, 28 REV. LITIG. 845, 857-58 (2009); Joshua D. Fulop, Agency Costs and the
Strike Suit: Reducing Frivolous Litigation Through Empowerment of Shareholders, 7 J. Bus. & SEC. L.
213 (2007).
532. Elliott J. Weiss, The Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the PSLRA After a Decade, or Look What's
Happened to My Baby, 61 VAND. L. REV. 543, 547 (2008) (purpose of encouraging institutional
investors to serve as plead plaintiffs was to give a powerful party "economic incentive to retain and to
monitor class counsel so as to reduce substantially the agency costs associated with securities class
action litigation"); Amy M. Koopmann, A Necessary Gatekeeper: The Fiduciary Duties of the Lead
Plaintifjin Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 34 J. CORP. L. 895, 911 (2009).
533. For example, the SEC suggested that corporations have a duty to disclose the environmental
impact of their operations. See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate
Change, Securities Act Release No. 9106, Exchange Act Release No. 61469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8,
2010). Stakeholder-shareholders can use securities lawsuits to pressure management to make sure such
disclosures are made in required filings. See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to
Climate Change, Securities Act Release No. 9106, Exchange Act Release No. 61469, 75 Fed. Reg.
6290, 6293 (Feb. 8, 2010).
534. Mitchellet-al.,4supra-note 140, at458-59.
535. Id at 457.
536. Bainbridge, supra note 155, at 631.
537. See id at 619 ("Many investors, especially institutions, rationally prefer liquidity to
activism."); id at 631 (many institutional investors will prefer liquidity to activism).
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Still some will seek to "free ride" on others' activism, thereby raising the
costs of such activism." And many will continue to pursue a short-term
stock price agenda.539
B. CURRENT TRENDS TOWARD CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT ARE INADEQUATE
The need for direct stakeholder advocacy through their role as
shareholders is highlighted by the relative lack of success of the CSR and
SRI movements to date. The combination of SRI by large investors and
CSR by corporations gave many scholars hope that the world's
corporations would self-regulate themselves into socially responsible
behavior and, therefore, effectively protect stakeholders. But CSR and SRI
offer, at best, an incomplete solution. The voluntary nature of CSR causes
it to miss some issues and to fail to eradicate some of the worst abuses.540
Any codes of conduct adopted are not legally enforceable except in very
limited circumstances.54 1 Moreover, only the very biggest companies,
those that rely upon consumer demand and investor pressure (and
especially those in high-impact industries), participate in CSR.5 42 Thus,
most enterprises, who employ the gross majority of the world's workers,
remain uninvolved. 543
Furthermore, SRIs fail, for several reasons, to apply consistent and
effective pressure on corporations to abide by the CSR agenda. Given the
lack of harmonization of reporting standards and full, honest, and complete
reporting, SRIs cannot, in a practical manner, perform their oversight
function.544  More importantly, even if corporations' CSR performances
538. Bainbridge, supra note 155, at 631.
539. Strine, Fundamental Question, supra note 96, at 10-13.
540. Ward, supra note 202, at 821-22; Picciotto, supra note 112, at 142 (describing selective
enforcement and haphazard content, and identifies studies performed by the ILO and OECD that show
that corporate codes of conduct often fail to include provisions for basic labor rights); Harrison, supra
note 271, at 7 (selective and weak implementation of CSR, combined with reporting consisting of only
"anecdotal descriptions of isolated projects and philanthropic activity, while only divulging positive
(and never negative) events undermines the usefulness of CSR and SRI). Many company codes, for
example, do not contain any allowances for collective bargaining or rights of association for workers
both found in the ILO Declaration. Blackett, supra note 116, at 411-12.
541. Bantekas, supra note 1, at 323 (not subject to government or private enforcement unless they
are built into contractual terms or used successfully in a false advertising suit); see also Ward, supra
note 202, at 822; see also Piciotto, supra note 112, at 146.
542. Androniki Apostolakou & Gregory Jackson, Corporate Social Responsibility in Western
Europe: An Institutional Mirror or a Substitute? 20 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1341591.
543. See CSR EUROPE, supra note 112, at 2 (the CSR movement is confined to large companies,
"[y]et 99% of European companies are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and about two-
thirds of jobs in the private sector are in SMEs."); Ward, supra note 202, at 822 ("market-based drivers
of responsible business behavior that take the form of consumer demand, or investor pressure, or
campaign activity by non-governmental organizations, cannot reach all businesses in the same way").
544. See Harrison, supra note 271, at 7 (noting that (1) consumers may have a difficult time
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were transparent and honest, SRIs arguably violate their domestic
"fiduciary duties" by favoring CSR over the maximization of value for
their beneficiaries.5 45 Many self-proclaimed SRIs, despite the best of
intentions, still find themselves focusing on short-term profits regardless of
any legal duties.5 46  Indeed, there is no question that despite the strides
made in CSR and SRI, "shareholder value," i.e., stockholder wealth
maximization, remains the rule in the U.K. and the U.S. 547
C. SUGGESTIONS
To empower and encourage the effectiveness of stakeholder-
shareholders in influencing corporate decision-making, several legal
reforms are possible. Mandatory "triple bottom line" reporting standards
for public companies would persuade companies to increase stakeholder
protections so that they attract stakeholder and SRI capital. It will also
allow stakeholder-shareholders to monitor and police bad corporate
behavior. 548
Affording certain types of long-term investors powers to influence
corporate decision-making will also encourage the right kind of shareholder
activism. For example, distributing voting rights only to large shareholders
with vested, long-tenrm interests will encourage management to take a long-
term, sustainable, and ultimately more stakeholder-friendly view towards
governance. 549  Imposing a capital gains tax on short-term investors will
have the same effect."' Allowing shareholders who control a large enough
equity stake to call special meetings, as they can in German and U.K. firms,
assessing the universe of corporate conduct codes; and (2) the auditors that review company reports are
generally not human rights experts and may have conflicts of interest).
545. Ward, supra note 202, at 823 (observing that businesses may be constrained, because of their
legal fiduciary duties, to adopt CSR at the expense of shareholder value).
546. OECD STEERING GROUP, supra note 122, at 24, 27 ("[i]n some instances shareholders have
been equally concerned with short-termism as have managers and traders, neglecting the effect of
excessive risk taking policies"); Zumbansen, supra note 103, at 33; see also Strine, Fundamental
Question, supra note 96, at 7-8 ("But in corporate polities, unlike nation-states, the citizenry can easily
depart and not 'eat their own cooking.' As a result, there is a danger that activist stockholders will
make proposals motivated by interests other than maximizing the long-term, sustainable profitability of
the corporation.").
547. See Williams & Conley, supra note 113, at 501-02 ("Notwithstanding the developments
[regarding CSR and SRI], there are clearly shareholder value pressures at work in the UK, and we do
not mean to suggest otherwise. The mergers and acquisitions culture, the financial press, financial
globalization, and managerial self-interest are powerful incentives for companies to focus on short-term
stock valuations.").
548. See, e.g., Columbo, supra note 77, at 277.
549. See Allen et al., supra note 140, at 1073, 1099 (voting rights that afford "stockholders who are
genuinely long-term, active investors an opportunity to ensure that corporate boards will consist of
persons stockholders believe will be diligent creators and maintainers of shareholder value."); Strine,
Fundamental Question, supra note 96, at 23 (the author suggests raising the filing fee for Rule I14a-8
proposals and allowing stockholder proposal powers only to long-term investors).
550. Strine, Fundamental Question, supra note 96, at 17.
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will also increase their influence. In addition, permitting private sector
union members to control their own pension funds, without employer
interference, will help enable stakeholder-shareholders to achieve the kind
of influence in America that they enjoy in the U.K."' Likewise, promoting
unionization across industries will give these funds greater economic
power, and therefore a greater share in the corporations in which they
invest.552 These newly empowered stakeholder-shareholders could even
nominate and elect their own candidates to corporate boards.
Eliminating quarterly reporting requirements, in addition, will take
management attention away from the short-term, and perhaps imprudent,
business planning and focus them on long-term, sustainable, and
stakeholder-friendly growth.553 Likewise, taming the market for corporate
control can ameliorate some of these same pressures. States may also, of
course, redefine fiduciary duties to explicitly include stakeholders.554
V. CONCLUSION
This paper sets forth an argument for including and encouraging
stakeholder-shareholder activism based upon a comparative analysis of
U.S., German, and U.K. corporate governance regimes. It identifies,
through this comparative analysis, the ability of a corporate governance
regime to accept certain modifications that incorporate different constituent
interests. By comparing the Anglo-American style changes to the German
stakeholder model, in conjunction with American corporate law and theory,
it is possible to identify certain areas of potential reform that would
encourage stakeholder-friendly corporate governance changes. As an
example, this paper looks at the U.K. model of heighted shareholder
protection and investor activism on behalf of stakeholders. Lastly, it offers
551. Shareholder securities lawsuits in the U.S. are generally led by public employee pension
funds. See Bainbridge, supra note 155, at 630; Prevost, Rao & Williams, supra note 256, at 1-2.
Currently, the Taft-Hartley Act requires employees to share control over worker pension funds with
employers. 28 U.S.C. § 186(c) (2010). These funds, representing over 6% of all pension fund assets
and comprising over 420 billion dollars worth of investment capital, if Taft-Hartley is repealed, can
become a significant stakeholder voice in corporate governance. See James Heinsman, What are Taft-
Harley Pension Funds?, ENTRUST CAPITAL (June 8, 2009), available at http://www.
hedgecrunch.com/what-are-taft-hartley-pension-funds.
552. See Stone, supra note 88, at 14, 16 (describing how the new flexible and short-term
employment relationship is antithetical to the American union structure and that, at any rate, collective
bargaining laws do not apply to "independent contractors" and temp workers.). Allowing industry-wide
unionization, like that found in Germany, would perhaps provide more fertile ground.
553. Strine, supra note 96, at 16.
554. See Greenfield, supra note 88, at 23-24 (suggesting that corporate fiduciaries owe their duties
to the corporation as a whole). This will, of course, involve overcoming issues of vagueness and
ambiguity. These obstacles should not, however, prove insurmountable. After all, the U.S. has
effectively regulated "pornography" with no definition better than "I know it when I see it." See
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Summer 2011 391
392 HAST[NGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 7:2
some suggested reforms that might make this stakeholder-shareholder
theory of corporate governance a reality.
